United States v. Medhi Ilkhani , 516 F. App'x 661 ( 2013 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-50513
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:07-CR-678-MMM-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MEDHI ILKHANI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 12, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and ZOUHARY, District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
Defendant-Appellant Medhi Ilkhani appeals the district court’s order revoking
and reimposing a term of supervised release, which expired May 13, 2012. Because
the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we repeat
only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal. This appeal is now
moot. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss.
A case becomes moot when it no longer satisfies the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which demands that “the
plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,
477 (1990)). In criminal appeals, “[a]n incarcerated convict’s (or parolee’s) challenge
to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement
because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of parole)
constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation
of the conviction.” Id. “But when a defendant challenges only an expired sentence,”
his appeal loses the presumption of validity. See United States v. Juvenile Male, __
U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (2011). To demonstrate his appeal is not moot, Ilkhani
bears “the burden of identifying some ongoing collateral consequence that is traceable
to the challenged portion of the sentence and likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
2
Ilkhani fails, however, to identify any ongoing collateral consequences
sufficient to meet the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, and instead
admits his appeal now is moot. He argues only that we should remand the case to the
district court with instruction to vacate the order from which he appeals. See United
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39–41 (1950) (noting vacatur “clears the
path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties” and prevents “a
judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal
consequences”). But Munsingwear is a civil doctrine, and we need not apply it here.
See id. at 39; United States v. Tapia-Marquez, 361 F.3d 535, 537–38 (9th Cir. 2004)
(declining to apply Munsingwear in an appeal from an expired sentence).
Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
DISMISSED AS MOOT.
3