Genbao Gao v. State of Hawaii, Department Of , 424 F. App'x 641 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            MAR 25 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GENBAO GAO,                                      No. 10-15311
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00478-DAE-
    BMK
    v.
    STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT                      MEMORANDUM *
    OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    David Alan Ezra, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 8, 2011 **
    Before:        FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Genbao Gao appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
    action alleging employment discrimination and retaliation. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,
    
    382 F.3d 969
    , 973 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Gao’s claims raised in his first Equal
    Employment and Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) proceeding because he filed
    this action more than ninety days after receipt of the right to sue letter. See 42
    U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 
    892 F.2d 1442
    , 1445
    (9th Cir. 1990) (“An action brought under Title VII must be filed within ninety
    days of receipt of a right to sue letter from the EEOC or appropriate state
    agency.”).
    The district court properly dismissed the discrimination claim because Gao
    failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. See also Abagninin v.
    AMVAC Chem. Corp., 
    545 F.3d 733
    , 742 (9th Cir. 2008) (conclusory allegations of
    law are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); see
    also Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 
    349 F.3d 634
    , 646 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (discussing the three prongs for a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination).
    The district court properly dismissed Gao’s retaliation claim because Gao
    failed to allege facts showing that he was terminated because he engaged in a
    protected activity. See Learned v. City of Bellevue, 
    860 F.2d 928
    , 932-33 (9th Cir.
    2                                     10-15311
    1988) (Title VII protects only those employees who claim retaliation resulting
    from their opposition to discrimination under Title VII).
    The district court also properly dismissed the Title VI claim because Gao did
    not establish that the Hawaii Attorney General’s Office’s primary objective was to
    provide employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
    The district court properly dismissed Gao’s Americans with Disabilities Act
    (“ADA”) claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
    Ala. v. Garrett, 
    531 U.S. 356
    , 360 (2001) (holding that states are immune from
    private suits brought in federal court under Title I of the ADA).
    Gao’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                  10-15311