Gill v. Holder , 361 F. App'x 719 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              DEC 28 2009
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VARINDER KAUR GILL,                               No. 07-71737
    Petitioner,                         Agency No. A097-613-670
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted December 15, 2009 **
    Before:        GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    Varinder Kaur Gill, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an
    immigration judge’s decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    KAD/Research                                1
    removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our
    jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence,
    Rostomian v. INS, 
    210 F.3d 1088
    , 1089 (9th Cir. 2000), and we deny in part and
    dismiss in part the petition for review.
    Gill was detained briefly three times over an eleven-year period, and
    although she was slapped and verbally threatened, she did not require medical
    treatment. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that any harm Gill
    may have suffered, even in the aggregate, did not rise to the level of persecution.
    See Gu v. Gonzales, 
    454 F.3d 1014
    , 1019-21 (9th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence
    also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Gill failed to establish past persecution or
    an objective, well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground.
    See Sangha v. INS, 
    103 F.3d 1482
    , 1486 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly Gill’s
    asylum claim fails.
    Because Gill failed to demonstrate eligibility for asylum, it follows that she
    did not satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Farah
    v. Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 1153
    , 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of Gill’s CAT claim
    because Gill failed to establish it was more likely than not she would be tortured if
    KAD/Research                               2                                    07-71737
    returned to India. See Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, 
    518 F.3d 1081
    , 1084 (9th Cir.
    2008).
    We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of voluntary departure,
    see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(f), 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and therefore we dismiss the petition as
    to Gill’s voluntary departure request.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
    KAD/Research                                3                                   07-71737