Amezcua Garcia v. Holder , 360 F. App'x 907 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           DEC 30 2009
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ABELARDO AMEZCUA GARCIA,                         No. 07-72516
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A095-558-303
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted December 15, 2009 **
    Before:        GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    Abelardo Amezcua Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
    from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) removal order and denying his application for
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    IH/Research
    voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We
    review de novo questions of law, Husyev v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 1172
    , 1177 (9th
    Cir. 2008), and claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings,
    Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 
    255 F.3d 775
    , 779 (9th Cir. 2001). We deny in part and
    grant in part the petition for review.
    The agency properly concluded that Amezcua Garcia is removable under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(1)(A) because the record of conviction establishes that his 1995
    conviction for violating California Health & Safety Code section 11366.5 (“section
    11366.5”) related to a federally defined controlled substance and he was therefore
    inadmissable at the time of his 1999 entry. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(2)(A)(i)(II);
    Parrilla v. Gonzales, 
    414 F.3d 1038
    , 1043 (9th Cir. 2005).
    Amezcua Garcia’s contention that California Health & Safety Code section
    11366.5 lacks the requisite mens rea to qualify as a crime relating to a controlled
    substance is unavailing. See People v. Sanchez, 
    33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155
    , 158 (Cal.
    App. 1994). To the extent Amezcua Garcia contends that he lacked the requisite
    mens rea for conviction, we cannot collaterally reexamine his conviction here. See
    Ortega de Robles v. INS, 
    58 F.3d 1355
    , 1358 (9th Cir. 1995).
    Amezcua Garcia’s contention that BIA’s sua sponte vacatur of the IJ’s grant
    of voluntary departure violated due process is unpersuasive. Amezcua Garcia’s
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    statutory eligibility for voluntary departure was a question of law which the BIA is
    permitted by regulation to review de novo. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    (d)(3)(i); Lata v.
    INS, 
    204 F.3d 1241
    , 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error for a due process
    violation).
    Finally, the BIA erred in holding that Amezcua Garcia’s conviction was
    categorically an aggravated felony as defined in 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(B), as not
    all the behavior prohibited by section 11366.5 would constitute a violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 856
    (a)-(b).
    First, 
    21 U.S.C. § 856
    (a)(1) requires that the owner personally intend to
    engage in prohibited drug manufacturing, distribution, or usage, while section
    11366.5 requires only that the owner knowingly permit others who have such
    intent to engage in drug-related activity on the property. See United States v. Ford,
    
    371 F.3d 550
    , 554 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158.
    Second, although 
    21 U.S.C. § 856
    (a)(2) and section 11366.5 are similar,
    they differ in that the mens rea requirement for the former is “knowingly and
    intentionally” while the mens rea requirement for the latter is only “knowingly.”
    We cannot read the explicit mens rea requirement of “intentionally” out of the
    statute. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States EPA, 
    942 F.2d 1427
    , 1432 (9th
    Cir. 1991) (“Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret
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    statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to
    interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute
    inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.”).
    Because the BIA did not reach any other basis for characterizing Amezcua
    Garcia’s conviction as an aggravated felony, we remand for the BIA to reconsider
    Amezcua Garcia’s request for voluntary departure.
    Each party shall bear its own costs for this petition for review.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;
    REMANDED.
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