United States v. Brandon Conley , 585 F. App'x 502 ( 2014 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                          OCT 20 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 13-10312
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00077-JAM-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    BRANDON ALTON CONLEY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 7, 2014**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: IKUTA, N.R. SMITH, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    A jury convicted Appellant Brandon Conley of manufacturing at least one
    hundred marijuana plants under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and possessing a firearm in
    connection with a drug trafficking crime under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1). The district
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    court sentenced Conley to two consecutive five-year terms. Conley timely
    appealed.
    The district court did not err in finding that Conley was not in custody for
    Miranda1 purposes when law enforcement agents questioned him in his front yard
    because the brief, casual encounter did not create a “police-dominated
    atmosphere.” See United States v. Craighead, 
    539 F.3d 1073
    , 1084 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (listing factors relevant to whether a suspect is in custody in his home). Though
    the agents held the ammunition from Conley’s handgun and told Conley to stay in
    his front yard while they spoke with another suspect, these restrictions on his
    freedom of movement did not rise to a de facto arrest requiring Miranda warnings.
    See United States v. Woods, 
    720 F.2d 1022
    , 1029–30 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
    brief questioning during an investigatory detention was not custodial).
    Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in declining to remove juror
    number two. When defense counsel pointed out the juror’s habit of closing his
    eyes, the court examined the juror on the record. Having satisfied itself that the
    juror’s lapses lasted only a few seconds, the court’s conclusion that the juror had
    not been sleeping was within its discretion. See United States v. Springfield, 
    829 F.2d 860
    , 864 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the district court did not abuse its
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    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
    2
    discretion in determining that a sleeping juror did not miss substantial testimony).
    The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, was
    sufficient to support Conley’s conviction of possessing a firearm in furtherance of
    a drug trafficking crime. Because Conley did not challenge the sufficiency of the
    evidence as to the possession element before the district court, we review only for
    plain error or a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Atkinson, 
    990 F.2d 501
    ,
    502–03 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). No miscarriage of justice resulted from the
    jury’s conclusion that Conley possessed the rifle or the shotgun, or both. The jury
    could infer that Conley exercised control over the weapons from his codefendant’s
    testimony that Conley gave him permission to use them to protect the grow
    operation. See United States v. Espinosa, 
    827 F.2d 604
    , 614 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1987)
    (defining constructive possession).
    The district court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to support the
    “in furtherance” element. The testimony produced at trial showed that Armenta
    used the weapons in his role of protecting the marijuana from intruders, permitting
    the jury to conclude that Conley possessed the weapons in furtherance of a drug
    trafficking crime. See United States v. Hector, 
    474 F.3d 1150
    , 1156 (9th Cir.
    2007) (stating the elements of the offense defined in 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)).
    Lastly, the district court did not plainly err in failing to instruct the jury that
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    it must agree unanimously as to which specific firearm or firearms Conley
    possessed. See United States v. Chi Mak, 
    683 F.3d 1126
    , 1133 (9th Cir. 2012)
    (reviewing instructions for plain error where the defendant did not object at trial).
    Jury unanimity as to which of the two firearms Conley possessed was not required,
    and the district court did not plainly err in failing to give a specific unanimity
    instruction. See Richardson v. United States, 
    526 U.S. 813
    , 817 (1999) (noting that
    the jury need not agree as to the means by which an element of the offense was
    satisfied).
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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