Charles Brown v. Carnevale , 361 F. App'x 883 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 11 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES N. BROWN, No. 09-35040
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:06-cv-01238-BR
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CARNEVALE, DR.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 15, 2009 **
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Charles N. Brown, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his safety and serious medical needs while he was a pretrial
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
PDM/Research
detainee at Washington County Jail. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s dismissal of a
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 273
(9th Cir. 1990), and de novo its grant of summary judgment, Oliver v. Keller, 289
F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Brown’s claims
against defendants Carnevale, Nowack and Doe for lack of personal jurisdiction.
See Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A federal court is without
personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
Prison Health Services and Washington County because Brown failed to present
any evidence that a specific official policy or custom deprived him of his
constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94
(1978) (holding that municipalities cannot be held liable under a theory of
respondeat superior but can be held liable when the constitutional deprivation
arises from an impermissible governmental policy or custom); see also Sanchez v.
Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the party opposing
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summary judgment must present “significant probative evidence tending to support
its claim that material, triable issues of fact remain”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Theissen, Diamond, and Gordon, because Brown failed to present any evidence
supporting his claim that they violated his constitutional rights. See Leer v.
Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing that an official can be liable
under § 1983 only “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s
affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that
causes the deprivation” at hand) (emphasis in original); see also Sanchez, 891 F.2d
at 242.
Brown failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendant Kravitz
purposefully ignored or failed to respond to Brown’s medical needs by denying his
inmate appeals. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that prison officials manifest a deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s
medical needs if they intentionally deny, delay or interfere with medical
treatment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Lyons
and Pope because Brown failed to demonstrate a triable issue as to whether they
were aware of and disregarded a serious threat to his safety. See Farmer v.
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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable
under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety[.]”).
Brown’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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