United States v. Gurmit Kaila , 366 F. App'x 782 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 22 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-30208
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:08-CR-02021-LRS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
GURMIT SINGH KAILA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Lonny R. Suko, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 1, 2010 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: ALARCÓN, W. FLETCHER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Gurmit Singh Kaila (Kaila) challenges his eleven-month prison
sentence for illegally structuring bank deposits in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
Kaila contends that the government breached the plea agreement by arguing for a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
higher sentence based on deposits not stipulated to in the agreement; his sentence
was procedurally and substantively unreasonable; and the district court abused its
discretion in imposing special conditions of supervised release requiring Kaila to
disclose financial information and cooperate with the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).
1. The district court properly sentenced Kaila pursuant to the unambiguous
terms of the plea agreement, which did not preclude the government from arguing
that a higher sentence was warranted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United
States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2009) (“It is irrelevant that the
government advocated for a higher sentence based on uncharged conduct. It never
promised to do the contrary, and we therefore conclude that it did not breach the
plea agreement.”); see also United States v. Cannel, 517 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.
2008).
2. Kaila’s sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, as the
district court considered Kaila’s non-frivolous arguments, applied the requisite 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sentenced Kaila at the lower end of the plea
agreement’s stipulated Sentencing Guidelines range. See United States v. Overton,
2
573 F.3d 679, 700 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (“[T]he record before us more than
sufficiently demonstrates that the district court heard and considered [Kaila’s]
arguments, contemplated the § 3553(a) factors, and reached an informed
conclusion regarding sentencing.”); see also United States v. Garcia, 522 F.3d 855,
860 (9th Cir. 2008), as amended (holding that a sentence within the plea
agreement’s stipulated range was substantively reasonable).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing supervised release
conditions requiring Kaila to disclose financial information to the probation
officer. The financial disclosure conditions are reasonably related to the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors and do not constitute an unreasonable deprivation of liberty. See
United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The applicable statute
requires the judge, at sentencing, to consider the need to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant. That language does not limit the court to looking
only at the offense already committed, but rather requires the court to look forward
in time to crimes that may be committed in the future.”) (citation, footnote
reference, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Garcia, 522 F.3d at 862.
3
The financial disclosure conditions are not vague or overbroad, as Kaila
does not have to “guess at [their] meaning.” United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d
858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007), as amended (citation omitted).
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a supervised
release condition requiring Kaila to cooperate with the IRS and disclose relevant
information to his probation officer. The condition is reasonably related to the
applicable § 3553(a) factors and the plea agreement’s requirement that Kaila
cooperate with the IRS. See United States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[C]onditions are permissible if they are reasonably related to the goals
of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender, taking into
account the offender’s history and personal characteristics, and involve no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised
release.”) (citation omitted).
The condition is not “so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Soltero, 510 F.3d
at 866 (citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.
4