Susan Klat v. Mitchell Repair Information Co , 528 F. App'x 733 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JUN 17 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SUSAN V. KLAT,                                   No. 11-55717
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00100-JM-CAB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MITCHELL REPAIR INFORMATION
    COMPANY, LLC; SNAP-ON
    INCORPORATED,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 10, 2013 **
    Before:        HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
    Susan V. Klat appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
    her employment action alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo, Vasquez v. County
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    of Los Angeles, 
    349 F.3d 634
    , 639 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment because Klat failed to
    raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to the first element of her prima facie
    case of retaliation, that is, whether she was engaged in a protected activity under
    Title VII at the time of her termination. See 
    id. at 646
     (setting forth elements of a
    prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII); Learned v. Bellevue, 
    860 F.2d 928
    ,
    932-33 (9th Cir. 1988) (to survive summary judgment, employee must raise a
    triable dispute that, at the time of termination, her “opposition” to or
    “participation” in certain conduct was reasonably perceived to fall within the
    protection of Title VII).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Klat’s motion for
    disqualification because Klat failed to establish that the judge’s impartiality might
    reasonably be questioned. See Pesnell v. Arsenault, 
    543 F.3d 1038
    , 1043 (9th Cir.
    2008) (setting forth standard of review over disqualification motions and grounds
    for recusal under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 144
     and 455(a)).
    Klat’s contentions regarding the district court’s alleged failure to review the
    entire record are unpersuasive.
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                     11-55717
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-55717

Citation Numbers: 528 F. App'x 733

Judges: Berzon, Hawkins, McKEOWN

Filed Date: 6/17/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023