United States v. Gene Guardipee, Sr. , 370 F. App'x 858 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              MAR 12 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-30231
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               D.C. No. 4:08-CR-00128-SEH-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    GENE K. GUARDIPEE, Sr.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 3, 2010
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: PAEZ, TALLMAN and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-Appellant Gene Guardipee, Sr., raises procedural and substantive
    challenges to his sentence after pleading guilty to Assault Resulting in Serious
    Bodily Injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). We presume the parties’
    familiarity with the facts and do not recount them here except as necessary to
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
    explain our decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
    affirm.
    “We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines
    de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of
    discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United States v.
    Loew, 
    593 F.3d 1136
    , 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The district court did not err in applying a four-level enhancement pursuant
    to § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) of the Guidelines. U.S. S ENTENCING G UIDELINES M ANUAL §
    2A2.2(b)(2)(B) (2009). The district court properly determined that there was intent
    to cause bodily injury. See United States v. Dayea, 
    32 F.3d 1377
    , 1380 (9th Cir.
    1994) (holding that § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) requires intent to injure). The district court’s
    conclusion that Guardipee possessed the requisite intent was not clearly erroneous
    based on the fact that Guardipee left the location after arguing with the victim,
    returned with a metal pipe, and struck the victim on the head while he was
    2
    sleeping.1 There was also insufficient evidence to show that Guardipee was not
    sufficiently in control of his faculties, or otherwise “too [intoxicated] to form the
    requisite intent.” United States v. Allen, 
    341 F.3d 870
    , 891 (9th Cir. 2003); accord
    United States v. Blalock, 
    571 F.3d 1282
    , 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding requisite
    specific intent for application of sentencing factor despite there being no dispute
    that the defendant was high on PCP and had stripped naked in the street in front of
    a police station and fired his gun).
    In addition, the district court neither committed procedural error at
    sentencing nor imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. The district court
    properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors as well as “listened to [Guardipee’s]
    arguments and then simply found these circumstances insufficient to warrant a
    sentence lower than the Guidelines range.” United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez,
    
    567 F.3d 1050
    , 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations
    1
    The district court was not required to find intent beyond a reasonable
    doubt. See United States v. Dare, 
    425 F.3d 634
    , 642 (9th Cir. 2005) (“As a general
    rule, the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard for
    factual findings used for sentencing.”); United States v. Ameline, 
    409 F.3d 1073
    ,
    1077–78 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Standing alone, judicial consideration of facts
    and circumstances beyond those found by a jury or admitted by the defendant does
    not violate the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. A constitutional infirmity
    arises only when extra-verdict findings are made in a mandatory guidelines
    system.”).
    3
    omitted). The 48-month within-Guidelines sentence was not substantively
    unreasonable. See Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).
    AFFIRMED.
    4