Matthew Cramer v. Target Corporation , 531 F. App'x 809 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW B. CRAMER, No. 11-17913
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:08-cv-01693-SKO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TARGET CORPORATION,
Defendant,
and
ERIC HELLER; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Sheila K. Oberto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted June 18, 2013***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Matthew B. Cramer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We
may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare
Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Barrios and Heller because Cramer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether these defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his
health, and whether the delay in treatment for his fractured clavicle caused him
further injury. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (defendant is deliberately indifferent
only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s
health); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (to establish
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that a delay in treatment resulted in
further injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); Johnson v.
Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1998) (the Eighth Amendment sets the
minimum standard for a pre-trial detainee’s right to medical care).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
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Wheatly because the undisputed facts show that Wheatly had no involvement in
the alleged constitutional violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th
Cir. 2011) (discussing the causation element of § 1983 claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by quashing or denying
Cramer’s subpoenas because the subpoenas were either defective, overbroad or
unnecessary. See Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 768 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008)
(standard of review); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir.
2003) (explaining that district courts have broad discretion to permit or deny
discovery).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cramer’s motions
for further discovery because Cramer failed diligently to pursue discovery and to
explain how the information he sought would have shown that the delay caused
him further injury and, thereby, preclude summary judgment. See Chance v.
Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998) (setting forth the
standard of review; explaining that the movant in a motion for further discovery
must identify what information is sought and how it would preclude summary
judgment, and that the district court does not abuse its discretion by denying
further discovery where the movant has failed diligently to pursue discovery).
AFFIRMED.
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