Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Andrew Clark ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 27 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,                         No.    18-35887
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 6:11-cv-06248-AA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ANDREW G. CLARK,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted on August 19, 2019**
    Before:      SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Andrew G. Clark appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
    motion to vacate the district court’s judgment in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s action
    alleging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1030
    , and
    state law. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review for an abuse
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    of discretion. United States v. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 
    862 F.3d 1157
    , 1166 (9th
    Cir. 2017). We affirm.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Clark’s motion to
    vacate judgment, which Clark brought nearly six years after the judgment was
    entered, because Clark failed to present any facts that were unknown to him at the
    time of the entry of judgment. See Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc., 862 F.3d at 1167-1168
    (explaining that although a motion for relief for fraud on the court is not subject to
    a one-year time limit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3), “relief for fraud on the court is
    available only where the fraud was not known at the time of settlement or entry of
    judgment”). To the extent Clark’s motion sought disqualification of the district
    judge, there was no error in denying the motion because it is untimely. See United
    States v. Rogers, 
    119 F.3d 1377
    , 1382 (9th Cir. 1997) (failure to file a
    disqualification motion until more than one and one-half years after party became
    aware of the grounds for disqualification rendered his motion untimely).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                       18-35887
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-35887

Filed Date: 8/27/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/27/2019