Rodney Barno v. Stuart Ryan , 399 F. App'x 272 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           OCT 12 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RODNEY BERNARD BARNO,                            No. 09-55646
    Plaintiff - Appellant,           D.C. No. 3:07-CV-01373-WMC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    STUART RYAN, Warden of Calipatria; et
    al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    William McCurine, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **
    Submitted September 13, 2010 ***
    Before:         SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Rodney Bernard Barno, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
    district court’s judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging claims for
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    ***The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    deliberate indifference to his safety and due process violations arising out of his
    alleged classification as a sex offender. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo, Nelson v. Heiss, 
    271 F.3d 891
    , 893 (9th Cir. 2001), and
    we affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Barno’s deliberate indifference claim
    because Barno failed to allege that he suffered any injury or threat of harm other
    than the allegedly erroneous classification itself, possible loss of a prison job, and
    temporary restrictions on visitations with minors. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 
    539 U.S. 126
    , 136-37 (2003) (visitor restrictions on inmates charged with substance
    abuse did not violate Eighth Amendment); Walker v. Gomez, 
    370 F.3d 969
    , 973
    (9th Cir. 2004) (there is no Fourteenth Amendment liberty or property interest in
    prison employment); Hoptowit v. Ray, 
    682 F.2d 1237
    , 1256 (9th Cir. 1982)
    (“[M]isclassification does not itself inflict pain within the meaning of the Eighth
    Amendment.”).
    The district court also properly dismissed Barno’s due process claim because
    the alleged classification error did not result in any deprivations or changes in the
    conditions of confinement that constituted an “atypical and significant hardship . . .
    in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” so as to give rise to a protected
    liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 484 (1995); Neal v. Shimoda, 131
    2                                     09-
    55646 F.3d 818
    , 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (inmate’s sex offender classification implicated a
    liberty interest only because applicable regulations required that sex offenders
    participate in a mandatory treatment program before being eligible for parole).
    Barno’s request to vacate his expedited motion for an order requiring prison
    officials to return legal documents is granted. In response to his voluminous letters
    requesting a copy of the docket report confirming receipt of his reply brief, we note
    that Barno’s reply brief was filed and considered.
    Barno’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    09-55646