Winona Weathers v. M. Hagemeister-May , 663 F. App'x 547 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 05 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WINONA WEATHERS, No. 15-17492
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:13-cv-01932-AWI-
MJS
v.
M. HAGEMEISTER-MAY; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 27, 2016**
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Winona Weathers, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal for failure to state a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th
Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Weathers’ Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) claim because Weathers failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
her foot problems qualify as a disability under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)
(defining “disability” under the ADA); Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d
1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014) (a disability is a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities).
The district court properly dismissed Weathers’ equal protection claim
because, even assuming she had a disability, Weathers failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that her exclusion from the fabric facility was not rationally
related to a legitimate state objective. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d
668, 686-87 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he disabled do not constitute a suspect class for
equal protection purposes.”); Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 1221-22 (9th Cir.
1989) (“When a state policy does not adversely affect a suspect class or impinge
upon a fundamental right, all that is constitutionally required of the state’s program
is that it be rationally related to a legitimate state objective.”).
The district court properly dismissed Weathers’ retaliation claim because
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Weathers failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant participated in
the alleged act of retaliation or that the allegedly adverse action was taken because
she engaged in protected conduct. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68
(9th Cir. 2005) (elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); Jones v.
Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under
color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of
personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation....”)
The district court properly dismissed Weathers’ Title VII claim because
Weathers failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants discriminated
against her on the basis of her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see also Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093 n. 8 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“Title VII does not encompass discrimination on the basis of
disability.”).
The district court properly dismissed Weathers’ Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) claim because Weathers is not an employee for purposes of the FLSA.
See Burleson v. California, 83 F.3d 311, 313-14 (9th Cir. 1996) (California
inmates employed by the Prison Industry Authority are not employees for purposes
of Fair Labor Standards Act).
The district court properly dismissed claims against defendant Beard
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because Weathers failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Beard participated in
or directed any constitutional violation or knew of any violation and failed to act to
prevent it. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040 (1045) (9th Cir. 1989). (requirements
for establishing supervisory liability).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Weathers’ state law claims because Weathers
failed to state a federal claim. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821, 826 (9th Cir.
2001) (setting forth standard of review; “[a] court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Weathers’ request to submit new evidence, filed on June 27, 2016, is denied
because materials “not filed with the district court or admitted into evidence by that
court are not part of the clerk’s record and cannot be part of the record on appeal.”
Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988).
AFFIRMED.
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