Abdul Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc. , 836 F.3d 1102 ( 2016 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ABDUL KADIR MOHAMED,                   No. 15-16178
    individually and on behalf of all
    others similarly situated,                 D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellee,   3:14-cv-05200-EMC
    v.
    OPINION
    UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;
    RASIER, LLC,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    and
    HIREASE, LLC,
    Defendant.
    RONALD GILLETTE,                       No. 15-16181
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                   3:14-cv-05241-EMC
    UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    2           MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    ABDUL KADIR MOHAMED,                    No. 15-16250
    individually and on behalf of all
    others similarly situated,                 D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellee,   3:14-cv-05200-EMC
    v.
    UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;
    RASIER, LLC,
    Defendants,
    and
    HIREASE, LLC,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 16, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    Filed September 7, 2016
    Before: Richard C. Tallman, Richard R. Clifton, and
    Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Clifton
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                            3
    SUMMARY*
    Arbitration / California Private Attorney General Act
    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district
    court’s orders denying Uber Technologies, Inc.’s motion to
    compel arbitration in actions brought by two former Uber
    drivers, Abdul Mohamed and Ronald Gillette, on behalf of
    themselves and a proposed class of drivers, and remanded for
    further proceedings.
    The district court denied Uber’s motion to compel
    arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims.
    The panel held that the district court erred in assuming the
    authority to decide whether the parties’ arbitration
    agreements were enforceable. The panel further held that the
    question of arbitrability as to all but Gillette’s California
    Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) claim was delegated
    to the arbitrator. The panel also held that under the terms of
    the agreement Gillette signed, the PAGA waiver should be
    severed from the arbitration agreement and Gillette’s PAGA
    claim may proceed in court on a representative basis. The
    panel also held that all of plaintiffs’ remaining arguments,
    including both Mohamad’s challenge to the PAGA waiver in
    the agreement he signed and the challenge by both plaintiffs
    to the validity of the arbitration agreement itself, were subject
    to resolution via arbitration.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    4           MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying the
    motion to compel arbitration filed by Hirease, LLC, an
    independent background-check company that Mohamed
    named in his complaint alongside Uber. The panel held that
    Hirease was not entitled to compel arbitration as Uber’s
    agent.
    COUNSEL
    Theodore Boutrous, Jr. (argued) and Theane D. Evangelis,
    Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, California;
    Joshua S. Lipshutz and Kevin J. Ring-Dowell, Gibson, Dunn
    & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco, California; Rod M. Fliegel,
    Littler Mendelson P.C., San Francisco, California; Andrew
    M. Spurchise, Littler Mendelson P.C., New York, New York;
    for Defendants-Appellants Uber Technologies, Inc. and
    Rasier, LLC.
    Pamela Devata (argued) and Nicholas R. Clements, Seyfarth
    Shaw LLP, San Francisco, California; Timothy L. Hix,
    Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-
    Appellant Hirease, LLC.
    Laura Ho (argued), Andrew P. Lee, and William Jhaveri-
    Weeks, Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho, Oakland,
    California; Robert Ahdoot, Tina Wolfson, and Theodore
    Maya, Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC, West Hollywood, California;
    Meredith Desautels and Dana Isaac Quinn, Lawyers’
    Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area,
    San Francisco, California; Monique Olivier, Duckworth
    Peters Lebowitz Olivier LLP, San Francisco, California; for
    Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                  5
    Kevin Ranlett, Archis A. Parasharami, Evan M. Tager, and
    Andrew J. Pincus, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.;
    Warren Postman and Kate Comerford Todd, U.S. Chamber
    Litigation Center, Inc., Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae
    Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
    Matthew C. Koski, National Employment Lawyers
    Association, Oakland, California; David H. Seligman,
    Towards Justice, Denver, Colorado; Jahan C. Sagafi, Outten
    & Golden LLP, San Francisco, California; for Amici Curiae
    National Employment Law Project, National Employment
    Lawyers Association, National Association of Consumer
    Advocates, and Towards Justice.
    6           MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    OPINION
    CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiff-Appellees Abdul Mohamed and Ronald Gillette,
    former Uber drivers, filed an action in district court alleging
    on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of other drivers
    that Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, and
    Hirease, LLC, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
    and various state statutes. Gillette has also brought a
    representative claim against Uber under California’s Private
    Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) alleging that he was
    misclassified as an independent contractor rather than an
    employee. The district court denied Uber’s motion to compel
    arbitration of the claims. Mohamed v. Uber Technologies,
    
    109 F. Supp. 3d 1185
     (N.D. Cal. 2015). Uber argues on
    appeal (1) that the district court erroneously considered
    whether the arbitration provisions were enforceable when that
    question was clearly delegated to an arbitrator, and (2) that
    even if the district court properly considered arbitrability, it
    erred in concluding that the arbitration provisions were
    invalid and in declining to compel arbitration.
    We conclude that the district court erred at the first step
    and improperly assumed the authority to decide whether the
    arbitration agreements were enforceable. The question of
    arbitrability as to all but Gillette’s PAGA claims was
    delegated to the arbitrator. Under the terms of the agreement
    Gillette signed, the PAGA waiver should be severed from the
    arbitration agreement and Gillette’s PAGA claims may
    proceed in court on a representative basis. All of Plaintiffs’
    remaining arguments, including both Mohamed’s challenge
    to the PAGA waiver in the agreement he signed and the
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                           7
    challenge by both Plaintiffs to the validity of the arbitration
    agreement itself, are subject to resolution via arbitration.
    I. Background
    Plaintiff Abdul Mohamed began driving for Uber’s black
    car service in Boston in 2012, and for UberX1 around October
    2014. Like all Uber drivers, Mohamed used a smartphone to
    access the Uber application while driving, which enabled him
    to pick up customers.
    In late July 2013, Mohamed was required to agree to two
    new contracts with Uber (the “Software License and Online
    Services Agreement” and the “Driver Addendum”; jointly,
    the “2013 Agreement”) before he was allowed to sign in to
    the application. The 2013 Agreement provided that it was
    governed by California law. It included an arbitration
    provision requiring Uber drivers to submit to arbitration to
    resolve most disputes with the company. It also included a
    provision requiring drivers to waive their right to bring
    disputes as a class action, a collective action, or a private
    attorney general representative action. Drivers could opt out
    of arbitration by delivering notice of their intent to opt out to
    Uber within 30 days either in person or by overnight delivery
    service. Mohamed accepted the agreements and did not opt
    out.
    Nearly a year later, in June 2014, Uber released an
    updated version of the Software License and Online Services
    1
    An Uber black car is a commercially registered livery car that
    passengers can access using the Uber smartphone application. UberX is
    a lower-cost alternative in which drivers use their own cars to pick up
    passengers via the app.
    8             MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    Agreement and the Driver Addendum (jointly, the “2014
    Agreement”). The 2014 Agreement also provided that it was
    governed by California law. It included an updated
    arbitration provision with an easier opt-out procedure that
    enabled drivers to opt out via e-mail as well as in person or
    by delivery service. It also included a provision requiring all
    disputes with the company “to be resolved only by an
    arbitrator through final and binding arbitration on an
    individual basis only, and not by way of court or jury trial, or
    by way of class, collective, or representative action.”
    Mohamed accepted these agreements and did not opt out. In
    early October 2014, Mohamed accepted a similar agreement
    with Rasier, a wholly owned subsidiary of Uber (“Rasier
    Software Sublicense & Online Services Agreement” (Rasier
    Agreement)).2
    In late October 2014, shortly after he began driving for
    UberX, Mohamed’s access to the app was cut off due to
    negative information on his consumer credit report,
    effectively terminating his ability to drive for Uber.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Gillette began driving for Uber
    in the San Francisco Bay Area in March 2013. Like
    Mohamed, he was required to agree to the 2013 Agreement
    before signing into the Uber application in late July 2013.
    Also like Mohamed, he did not opt out. In April 2014,
    Gillette’s access to the app was cut off because of negative
    2
    Except where necessary, this opinion refers to Uber and Rasier
    collectively as “Uber.” The Rasier Agreement contained terms similar to
    those in the Software License and Online Services Agreement, and neither
    party has alleged any arguments specific to the Rasier Agreement. Thus,
    we treat it as part of the 2014 Agreement.
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                   9
    information on his consumer credit report. This effectively
    terminated his relationship with Uber.
    On November 24, 2014, Mohamed filed a class action in
    the Northern District of California against Uber, Rasier, and
    Hirease, an independent company that conducted background
    checks. Mohamed alleged that the use of his consumer credit
    report violated the FCRA, the Massachusetts Consumer
    Credit Reporting Act (MCCRA), and the California
    Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA). Two
    days later, on November 26, 2014, Gillette filed a separate
    lawsuit against Uber, also in the Northern District of
    California. Gillette alleged that the company’s use of his
    consumer credit report violated the FCRA and the California
    Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA).
    He also alleged that Uber had misclassified him and other
    employees as independent contractors in violation of
    California’s PAGA statute.
    Uber moved to compel arbitration in both lawsuits,
    arguing that Gillette was bound by the arbitration provision
    in the 2013 Agreement and Mohamed by the arbitration
    provision in the 2014 Agreement. The district court denied
    both motions, Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1190, and Uber
    now appeals.
    II. Discussion
    We review de novo an order denying a motion to compel
    arbitration. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 
    724 F.3d 1069
    , 1072 (9th Cir. 2013).
    Both the 2013 and the 2014 Agreements contained
    provisions that provided, using very similar language, that
    10             MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    disputes would be resolved by arbitration and, further, that
    any dispute as to arbitrability (with one exception discussed
    below) would be resolved by the arbitrator. These provisions
    stated:
    Except as it otherwise provides, this
    Arbitration Provision is intended to apply to
    the resolution of disputes that otherwise
    would be resolved in a court of law or before
    a forum other than arbitration.          This
    Arbitration Provision requires all such
    disputes to be resolved only by an arbitrator
    through final and binding arbitration and not
    by way of court or jury trial.3
    Such disputes include without limitation
    disputes arising out of or relating to
    interpretation or application of this Arbitration
    Provision, including the enforceability,
    revocability or validity of the Arbitration
    Provision or any portion of the Arbitration
    Provision.
    The 2014 Agreement continued: “All such matters shall be
    decided by an Arbitrator and not by a court or judge.”
    Both the 2013 and 2014 Agreements also contained
    provisions that required drivers to waive the right to bring
    class, collective, and representative actions (including claims
    3
    In the 2014 Agreement, this sentence read: “This Arbitration Provision
    requires all such disputes to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final
    and binding arbitration on an individual basis only and not by way of court
    or jury trial, or by way of class, collective, or representative action.
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                      11
    under the PAGA statute), either in court or in arbitration. The
    2013 Agreement, but not the 2014 Agreement, carved out
    challenges to these waivers from the general delegation
    provision: “Notwithstanding any other clause contained in
    this Agreement, any claim that all or part of the Class Action
    Waiver, Collective Action Waiver or Private Attorney
    General Waiver is invalid, unenforceable, unconscionable,
    void or voidable may be determined only by a court of
    competent jurisdiction and not by an arbitrator.”
    The district court concluded that the delegation clauses in
    both the 2013 and the 2014 Agreements were ineffective
    because they were not clear and unmistakable. Mohamed,
    109 F. Supp. 3d at 1198–1204. The court also concluded that
    even if the delegation clauses were clear and unmistakable,
    they were unenforceable because they were unconscionable.
    Id. at 1204–16. We disagree. The 2013 Agreement clearly
    and unmistakably delegated the question of arbitrability to the
    arbitrator except as pertained to the arbitrability of class
    action, collective action, and representative claims. The 2014
    Agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated the question
    of arbitrability to the arbitrator under all circumstances.
    Neither delegation provision was unconscionable. Thus, all
    of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration
    agreement, save Gillette’s challenge to the enforceability of
    the PAGA waiver in the 2013 Agreement, should have been
    adjudicated in the first instance by an arbitrator and not in
    court.
    A. Delegation of the issue of arbitrability
    “[U]nlike the arbitrability of claims in general, whether
    the court or the arbitrator decides arbitrability is ‘an issue for
    judicial determination unless the parties clearly and
    12            MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    unmistakably provide otherwise.’” Oracle Am., 724 F.3d at
    1072 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
    
    537 U.S. 79
    , 83 (2002)). “In other words, there is a
    presumption that courts will decide which issues are
    arbitrable; the federal policy in favor of arbitration does not
    extend to deciding questions of arbitrability.” 
    Id.
     Clear and
    unmistakable evidence of an agreement to arbitrate
    arbitrability “might include . . . a course of conduct
    demonstrating assent . . . or . . . an express agreement to do
    so.” Momot v. Mastro, 
    652 F.3d 982
    , 988 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 
    561 U.S. 63
    , 79–80
    (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
    In Momot, we held that language “delegating to the
    arbitrators the authority to determine the validity or
    application of any of the provisions of the arbitration clause[]
    constitutes an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues
    concerning the arbitration agreement.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Rent-A-
    Ctr., 
    561 U.S. at 68
    ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Here, both the 2013 and the 2014 Agreements delegated to
    the arbitrators the authority to decide issues relating to the
    “enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration
    Provision or any portion of the Arbitration Provision.” This
    language is similar to but more expansive than the language
    at issue in Momot, and thus also “clearly and unmistakably
    indicates [the parties’] intent for the arbitrators to decide the
    threshold question of arbitrability.” Id.4
    4
    The arbitration agreements may not have clearly and unmistakably
    delegated to the arbitrator the authority to decide the question of waiver
    by litigation conduct. See Martin v. Yasuda, No. 15-55696, 
    2016 WL 3924381
    , at *5 (9th Cir. July 21, 2016). But that question is not at issue
    in this litigation.
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                    13
    The district court determined that the delegation
    provisions themselves were “unambiguous,” but it
    nonetheless held that they conflicted with venue provisions
    elsewhere in the 2013 and 2014 Agreements. Mohamed,
    109 F. Supp. 3d at 1199. Both venue provisions stated that
    “any disputes, actions, claims, or causes of action arising out
    of or in connection with this Agreement or the Uber Service
    or Software shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
    the state and federal courts located in the City and County of
    San Francisco.” The district court concluded that the
    language in the venue provisions granting state or federal
    courts in San Francisco “exclusive jurisdiction” over “any
    disputes, actions, claims or causes of action arising out of or
    in connection with this Agreement” was “inconsistent and in
    considerable tension with the language of the delegation
    clauses, which provide[d] that ‘without limitation’
    arbitrability will be decided by an arbitrator.” Id. at 1201.
    The court also identified an inconsistency between the
    “without limitation” language and the carve-out provision in
    the 2013 Agreement granting courts jurisdiction over
    challenges to the PAGA waiver. Id. at 1201–02.
    These conflicts are artificial. The clause describing the
    scope of the arbitration provision was prefaced with “[e]xcept
    as it otherwise provides,” which eliminated the inconsistency
    between the general delegation provision and the specific
    carve-out in the 2013 Agreement. As for the venue provision,
    the California Court of Appeal has observed that “[n]o matter
    how broad the arbitration clause, it may be necessary to file
    an action in court to enforce an arbitration agreement, or to
    obtain a judgment enforcing an arbitration award, and the
    parties may need to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
    obtain other remedies.” Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream
    Theater, 
    21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 322
    , 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), as
    14           MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 28, 2004). It is apparent
    that the venue provision here was intended for these purposes,
    and to identify the venue for any other claims that were not
    covered by the arbitration agreement. That does not conflict
    with or undermine the agreement’s unambiguous statement
    identifying arbitrable claims and arguments.
    The delegation provisions clearly and unmistakably
    delegated the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator for all
    claims except challenges to the class, collective, and
    representative action waivers in the 2013 Agreement. In
    accordance with Supreme Court precedent, we are required to
    enforce these agreements “according to their terms” and, in
    the absence of some other generally applicable contract
    defense, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, let an
    arbitrator determine arbitrability as to all but the claims
    specifically exempted by the 2013 Agreement. Rent-A-Ctr.,
    
    561 U.S. at 67
    .
    B. The delegation provisions were not unconscionable
    The district court also held that, even if the delegation
    provisions were clear and unmistakable, they were both
    unenforceable due to unconscionability. Mohamed, 109 F.
    Supp. 3d at 1204–16.              Under California law,
    “‘unconscionability has both a ‘procedural’ and a
    ‘substantive’ element,’ the former focusing on ‘oppression’
    or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on
    ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.” Armendariz v. Found.
    Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 
    6 P.3d 669
    , 690 (Cal. 2000)
    (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 
    186 Cal. Rptr. 114
    , 121–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)). Both substantive and
    procedural unconscionability must be present in order for a
    court to find a contract unconscionable, but “they need not be
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                    15
    present in the same degree.” 
    Id.
     Recently, the California
    Supreme Court has emphasized that “unconscionability
    requires a substantial degree of unfairness beyond ‘a simple
    old-fashioned bad bargain.’” Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc.,
    
    367 P.3d 6
    , 12 (Cal. 2016) (quoting Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc.
    v. Moreno, 
    311 P.3d 184
    , 291 (Cal. 2013)). Rather,
    unconscionable contracts are those that are “so one-sided as
    to ‘shock the conscience.’” Id. at 11 (quoting Pinnacle
    Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC,
    
    282 P.3d 1217
    , 1232 (Cal. 2012)). When considering an
    unconscionability challenge to a delegation provision, the
    court must consider only arguments “specific to the
    delegation provision.” Rent-A-Ctr., 
    561 U.S. at
    73
    The district court concluded that the delegation provisions
    in both the 2013 and 2014 Agreements were procedurally and
    substantively unconscionable. For the 2013 Agreement, the
    court concluded that the provision was procedurally
    unconscionable because it was “hidden in a prolix printed
    form,” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 
    469 F.3d 1257
    , 1280
    (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Flores v. Transamerica
    HomeFirst, Inc., 
    113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376
    , 381 (Cal. Ct. App.
    2001)), and because there was no meaningful opportunity for
    the drivers to reject the contract. Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d
    at 1205–06. For the 2014 Agreement, the court concluded
    that the delegation provision was procedurally
    unconscionable because “the 2014 agreement[] utterly failed
    to notify drivers of a specific drawback of the delegation
    clause—namely, that drivers may be required to pay
    considerable forum fees to arbitrate arbitrability,” and
    because employees likely felt at least some pressure not to
    opt out of arbitration despite the presence of a clear opt-out
    provision. Id. at 1215–16. The court also concluded that
    both the 2013 and 2014 Agreements were substantively
    16             MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    unconscionable because they required arbitration costs and
    fees to be shared equally between Uber and the driver. Id. at
    1206–10, 1216. As a result, it concluded that both delegation
    provisions should be invalidated. Id. at 1210, 1216.
    Uber argues that the delegation provisions could not have
    been procedurally unconscionable because both agreements
    gave drivers an opportunity to opt out of arbitration
    altogether. The district court agreed with Uber that, under
    Ninth Circuit precedent, “the existence of a meaningful right
    to opt-out of [arbitration] necessarily renders [the arbitration
    clause] (and the delegation clause specifically) procedurally
    conscionable as a matter of law.” Id. at 1212. As to the 2013
    Agreement, the court concluded that the right to opt out was
    not “meaningful” because drivers were required to opt out
    either in person at Uber’s San Francisco offices or by
    overnight delivery service, both of which were so
    burdensome as to make the opt-out right “illusory.” Id. at
    1206. As to the 2014 Agreement, which contained a much
    less burdensome opt-out procedure, the court held that our
    precedent “failed to apply California law as announced by the
    California Supreme Court,” and as such, declined to apply it.5
    Id. at 1212.
    5
    The district court order cited several of our decisions, culminating with
    Kilgore v. Key Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 
    718 F.3d 1052
     (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc),
    acknowledging that they supported Uber’s position. Mohamed, 109 F.
    Supp. 3d at 1212. Nonetheless, the order stated that the district court
    “cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly
    contradicting California Supreme Court authority.” Id. The California
    authority cited in the order preceded our decision in Kilgore, so the court’s
    decision to ignore our precedent cannot be explained by any intervening
    California authority.
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                     17
    The district court does not have the authority to ignore
    circuit court precedent, and neither do we. “Binding
    authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a
    body competent to do so.” Hart v. Massanari, 
    266 F.3d 1155
    , 1170 (9th Cir. 2001); see Miller v. Gammie, 
    335 F.3d 889
    , 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (identifying the
    limited circumstances when a three-judge panel of this court
    is not bound by our precedent). In Nagrampa, we determined
    that “[t]he threshold inquiry in California’s unconscionability
    analysis is ‘whether the arbitration agreement is adhesive.’”
    
    469 F.3d at 1281
     (quoting Armendariz, 
    6 P.3d at 690
    ). In
    Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, we held that an arbitration
    agreement is not adhesive if there is an opportunity to opt out
    of it. 
    283 F.3d 1198
    , 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Kilgore
    v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass’n, 
    718 F.3d 1052
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2013)
    (en banc). Taken together, these two principles compel us to
    find that the 2014 Agreement, at least, is not adhesive, which
    supports our holding that the delegation provision is not
    unconscionable.
    The district court’s conclusion that the right to opt out of
    the 2013 Agreement was illusory fares no better. “An
    illusory promise is one containing words ‘in promissory form
    that promise nothing’ and which ‘do not purport to put any
    limitation on the freedom of the alleged promisor.’” Flores
    v. Am. Seafoods Co., 
    335 F.3d 904
    , 912 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (quoting 2 Corbin on Contracts 142 (rev. ed. 1995)). While
    we do not doubt that it was more burdensome to opt out of
    the arbitration provision by overnight delivery service than it
    would have been by e-mail, the contract bound Uber to accept
    opt-outs from those drivers who followed the procedure it set
    forth. There were some drivers who did opt out and whose
    opt-outs Uber recognized. Thus, the promise was not
    illusory. The fact that the opt-out provision was “buried in
    18             MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    the agreement” does not change this analysis. Mohamed,
    109 F.Supp. 3d at 1205. As we noted in Ahmed, “one who
    signs a contract is bound by its provisions and cannot
    complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the
    instrument.” 
    283 F.3d at 1200
     (quoting Madden v. Kaiser
    Found. Hosps., 
    552 P.2d 1178
    , 1185 (Cal. 1976)).
    The delegation provisions were not procedurally
    unconscionable in either the 2013 or the 2014 Agreements.
    Because the agreements were not procedurally
    unconscionable, and because both procedural and substantive
    unconscionability must be present in order for an agreement
    to be unenforceable, see Armendariz, 
    6 P.3d at 690
    , we need
    not reach the question whether the agreements here were
    substantively unconscionable. The district court should have
    ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute over arbitrability
    (with a narrow exception for the argument over the PAGA
    waiver in the 2013 Agreement, as discussed below), and we
    remand with instructions that it do so.6
    6
    We note that Plaintiffs also raised the argument that the class and
    collective action waivers in the arbitration agreements may violate the
    National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for the first time in a sur-reply.
    That untimely submission waived the argument. See, e.g., United States
    v. Dreyer, 
    804 F.3d 1266
    , 1277 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Generally, an appellee
    waives any argument it fails to raise in its answering brief.”). Even if the
    argument had been properly raised, however, the option to opt out meant
    that Uber drivers were not required “to accept a class-action waiver as a
    condition of employment,” and thus there was “no basis for concluding
    that [Uber] coerced [Plaintiffs] into waiving [their] right to file a class
    action” in violation of the NLRA. Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s,
    Inc., 
    755 F.3d 1072
    , 1075 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Morris v. Ernst &
    Young, No. 13-16599, 
    2016 WL 4433080
     at n.4 (Aug. 22, 2016).
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                     19
    C. The effective vindication doctrine
    Plaintiffs also argue that even if the delegation provisions
    are otherwise enforceable, they are invalid because both the
    2013 and 2014 Agreements contain a fee term requiring
    drivers to split the costs of arbitration equally with Uber and
    thus preclude drivers from effectively vindicating their
    federal statutory rights. Effective vindication provides courts
    with a means to “invalidate, on ‘public policy’ grounds,
    arbitration agreements that ‘operat[e] . . . as a prospective
    waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.’” Am.
    Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
    133 S. Ct. 2304
    , 2310 (2013)
    (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
    Plymouth, Inc., 
    473 U.S. 614
    , 637 n. 19 (1985)). In Italian
    Colors, the Supreme Court stated that effective vindication
    may “cover filing and administrative fees attached to
    arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum
    impracticable.” 
    Id.
     at 2310–11; see also Chavarria v. Ralphs
    Grocery Co., 
    733 F.3d 916
    , 927 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that
    the effective vindication doctrine was implicated when
    “administrative and filing costs, even disregarding the cost to
    prove the merits, effectively foreclose pursuit of the claim”).
    Evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs suggests that the costs of
    arbitration in this case may exceed $7,000 per day.
    However, Uber has committed to paying the full costs of
    arbitration. So long as Uber abides by this commitment, the
    fee term in the arbitration agreement presents Plaintiffs with
    no obstacle to pursuing vindication of their federal statutory
    rights in arbitration. As a result, we decline to reach the
    question of whether the fee term would run afoul of the
    effective vindication doctrine if it were enforced as written.
    20           MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    D. The PAGA waiver
    Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration provisions in the 2013
    and 2014 Agreements were invalid under California law
    because they both contained unenforceable, unseverable
    waivers of Plaintiffs’ claims under the California PAGA
    statute. Because we conclude that the district court should
    not have reached the question of whether the arbitration
    agreements were enforceable in the first place, it is not
    necessary to address this argument pertaining to the 2014
    Agreement. Plaintiffs’ challenges to the enforceability and
    severability of the PAGA waiver in the 2014 Agreement fall
    to the arbitrator to decide.
    As noted above, however, the 2013 Agreement
    specifically required the district court, and not the arbitrator,
    to consider certain challenges to the arbitration provision,
    including challenges to the enforceability of the PAGA
    waiver. Because of that carve-out, it remains for us to
    consider on the merits whether the PAGA waiver in that
    agreement is enforceable, and what effect the waiver has on
    the arbitration provision as a whole.
    The district court concluded that the arbitration provision
    in the 2013 Agreement was procedurally unconscionable
    because it was adhesive, oppressive, and a surprise to drivers
    who accepted the agreement, and that it was substantively
    unconscionable because it contained a PAGA waiver that was
    unenforceable under California law. Mohamed, 109 F. Supp.
    3d at 1217–18. The district court also concluded that the
    PAGA waiver was unseverable from the remainder of the
    agreement and that “the entirety of the arbitration agreement
    fails because the PAGA waiver fails.” Id. at 1218. For the
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                     21
    reasons stated above, the district court’s holding on
    unconscionability was erroneous.
    Perhaps recognizing that the district court’s
    unconscionability analysis ran counter to existing Ninth
    Circuit precedent, Plaintiffs argue on appeal that even if the
    district court erred in finding that the arbitration provision in
    the 2013 Agreement was unconscionable, the PAGA waiver
    was still invalid under California law and unseverable from
    the remainder of the arbitration provision under the terms of
    the contract. Plaintiffs argue that the invalid PAGA waiver
    thus dooms the entire arbitration provision, such that claims
    governed by that agreement (i.e., all of Gillette’s claims)
    must be litigated in court. Although we agree that the PAGA
    waiver in the 2013 Agreement was invalid under California
    law, we conclude that it is severable from the remainder of
    the 2013 agreement.
    In Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 
    327 P.3d 129
     (Cal.
    2014), the California Supreme Court held that where “an
    employment agreement compels the waiver of representative
    claims under the PAGA, it is contrary to public policy and
    unenforceable as a matter of state law.” Id. at 149. We have
    held that the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt this
    rule. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 
    803 F.3d 425
    ,
    427 (9th Cir. 2015). Uber attempts to distinguish this case
    from Iskanian because drivers were able to opt out of the
    2013 Agreement, but its effort is unavailing. Drivers
    presented with the 2013 Agreement were required to make
    the decision whether or not to opt out within 30 days of
    receipt, and Iskanian made clear that, while employees “are
    free to choose whether or not to bring PAGA actions when
    they are aware of Labor Code violations,” it is “contrary to
    public policy for an employment agreement to eliminate this
    22          MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    choice altogether by requiring employees to waive the right
    to bring a PAGA action before any dispute arises.” 327 P.3d
    at 313. Because the PAGA waiver in the 2013 Agreement
    required employees to make a decision as to whether or not
    they would preserve their right to bring PAGA claims before
    they knew any such claims existed, it is unenforceable under
    Iskanian and Sakkab.
    The PAGA waiver is severable from the remainder of the
    arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement, however. In
    Section 14.1, the agreement provided that “[i]f any provision
    of the Agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable, such
    provision shall be struck and the remaining provisions shall
    be enforced to the fullest extent under law.” In Section
    14.3(v), the agreement further provided:
    There will be no right or authority for any
    dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated as a
    private attorney general representative action
    (“Private Attorney General Waiver”). The
    Private Attorney General Waiver shall not be
    severable from this Arbitration Provision in
    any case in which a civil court of competent
    jurisdiction finds the Private Attorney General
    Waiver is unenforceable. In such instances
    and where the claim is brought as a private
    attorney general, such private attorney general
    claim must be litigated in a civil court of
    competent jurisdiction.
    While this provision is hardly a model of clarity, the third
    sentence stated explicitly that PAGA claims are subject to
    litigation in court, contrary to the district court’s conclusion
    that the PAGA waiver was unseverable from the remainder of
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                     23
    the agreement. Finally, in Section 14.3(ix), the agreement
    provided that “[e]xcept as stated in subsection v, above, in the
    event any portion of this Arbitration Provision is deemed
    unenforceable, the remainder of this Arbitration Provision
    will be enforceable.” Reading these ambiguous provisions
    together, we conclude that in stating that the PAGA waiver
    and the arbitration provision are not severable, the contract
    provides that, if the PAGA waiver turned out to be invalid,
    the arbitration provision would also be invalid as to any
    PAGA representative claim. Thus, while Plaintiffs’ PAGA
    claim must be litigated in court, the PAGA waiver does not
    invalidate the remainder of the arbitration provision in the
    2013 Agreement, and it should be enforced according to its
    terms.
    E. Hirease cannot compel arbitration
    Plaintiff Mohamed (but not Gillette) named independent
    background-check company Hirease in his complaint
    alongside Uber. Hirease moved to join Uber’s motion to
    compel Mohamed into arbitration, though Hirease was not
    identified as a party or a signatory to the agreement between
    Uber and the drivers. The district court denied Hirease’s
    joinder in Uber’s motion to compel on the same grounds that
    it denied Uber’s motion, without separately discussing the
    question of whether Hirease was covered by the arbitration
    provisions. Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1237.
    On appeal, Hirease argues that it should be covered by the
    arbitration agreement because: (1) Mohamed has alleged an
    agency relationship between Hirease and Uber, see, e.g.,
    Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 
    724 F.3d 1218
    , 1232–33 (9th Cir.
    2013); (2) Hirease and Uber share an “identity of interest,”
    see, e.g., Jones v. Jacobson, 
    125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522
    , 537 n.9
    24          MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); and (3) the cause of action alleged
    against Hirease is “intimately founded in and intertwined
    with” underlying contract obligations, Murphy, 724 F.3d at
    1229 (quoting Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 
    705 F.3d 1122
    ,
    1128 (9th Cir. 2013)).
    Hirease’s first argument rests on the wording of
    Mohamed’s complaint, which alleged generally that
    Defendants—defined to include Hirease, Uber, Rasier, and
    unknown Does—knowingly violated the FCRA, MCRA, and
    CCRAA by failing to provide job applicants and employees
    with adequate notice regarding the use of their consumer
    credit reports for employment purposes. The complaint also
    included allegations that “each named Defendant and DOES
    1–50 were the employees, agents, or representatives of each
    other” and that “[e]ach Defendant has ratified and approved
    the acts of its agents.” Hirease argues that under California
    law, “a plaintiff’s allegations of an agency relationship
    among defendants is sufficient to allow the alleged agents to
    invoke the benefit of an arbitration agreement executed by
    their principal even though the agents are not parties to the
    agreement.” Thomas v. Westlake, 
    139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 114
    , 121
    (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
    As the California Court of Appeal has noted elsewhere,
    however, “[c]omplaints in actions against multiple defendants
    commonly include conclusory allegations that all of the
    defendants were each other’s agents or employees and were
    acting within the scope of their agency or employment.”
    Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler, 
    155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567
    , 571
    (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). If Hirease were correct that such
    allegations were sufficient to establish an agency relationship
    for the purpose of compelling arbitration, “in every multi-
    defendant case in which the complaint contained such
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                          25
    boilerplate allegations of mutual agency, as long as one
    defendant had entered into an arbitration agreement with the
    plaintiff, every defendant would be able to compel arbitration,
    regardless of how tenuous or nonexistent the connections
    among the defendants might actually be.” 
    Id.
     As such,
    generalized allegations of an agency relationship made in a
    complaint are not, by themselves, a sufficient ground on
    which to compel arbitration when “the mutual agency of all
    defendants is not a judicially admitted fact.” Id. at 573.
    There has been no such judicial admission here.
    There is no specific indication of an actual agency
    relationship between Uber and Hirease, either in the
    complaint or elsewhere in the record. An agency relationship
    “requires that the principal maintain control over the agent’s
    actions.” Murphy, 724 F.3d at 1232. Mohamed did not
    allege any facts suggesting that Uber maintained control over
    Hirease’s actions, or vice versa. Indeed, while the complaint
    stated four causes of action, Hirease was named in only one
    of them, for a violation of the MCRA. This claim alleged
    (1) that Hirease failed to deliver a copy of the consumer
    report to Plaintiff and other members of the MCRA class as
    required by Massachusetts General Laws (MGL) ch. 93 § 60,7
    7
    MGL ch. 93 § 60 requires consumer reporting agencies under certain
    circumstances to:
    notify the consumer of the fact that public record
    information is being reported by the consumer reporting
    agency, together with the name and address of the
    person to whom such information is being reported; or
    maintain strict procedures designed to insure that
    whenever public record information which is likely to
    have an adverse effect on a consumer’s ability to obtain
    employment is reported it is complete and up to date.
    26             MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    and (2) that Defendants failed to advise members of the
    putative MCRA class of their rights under MGL ch. 93 § 62.8
    Hirease’s alleged violation of MGL ch. 93 § 60 was
    predicated on its own failure to act, and there is nothing in the
    complaint to suggest that failure was influenced or controlled
    by Uber. Nor is there any indication that Hirease had any
    role in or control over the alleged failure to advise members
    of the putative MCRA class of their rights under MGL ch. 93
    § 62, which applies to “user[s] of . . . consumer credit
    reports” such as Uber. Because Hirease “has presented no
    evidence, on appeal or before the district court, that [Uber]
    controlled its behavior in ways relevant to [Mohamed’s]
    allegations,” Hirease is not entitled to compel arbitration as
    Uber’s agent. Murphy, 724 F.3d at 1233.
    In the same vein, there is no indication in the complaint
    that Uber and Hirease share an identity of interest, which
    Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “[a] relationship between
    two parties who are so close that suing one serves as notice to
    the other.” (10th ed. 2014). Because Hirease’s liability stems
    from its own alleged violation of Massachusetts law,
    independent of any actions Uber may or may not have taken,
    there is no such relationship here.
    It also requires consumer reporting agencies to “enter into an agreement
    with the user of such consumer report which provides that no consumer
    report may be requested by the user until and unless the user has provided
    written notice to the employee or prospective employee that a consumer
    report regarding the employee will be requested.” Id.
    8
    MGL ch. 93 § 62 provides in relevant part that “[w]henever . . .
    employment involving a consumer is denied or terminated . . . because of
    information contained in a consumer report from a consumer reporting
    agency, the user of the consumer report shall . . . notify such consumer in
    writing against whom such adverse action has been taken.”
    MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES                    27
    Finally, the allegations Mohamed leveled against Hirease
    were not “intimately founded in and intertwined with” the
    underlying contract obligations established in the 2014
    Agreement. Murphy, 724 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Kramer,
    705 F.3d at 1128). The rule requiring enforcement of an
    arbitration agreement under such circumstances “reflects the
    policy that a plaintiff may not, ‘on the one hand, seek to hold
    the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the
    agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on
    the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the
    defendant is a non-signatory.’” Id. (quoting Goldman v.
    KPMG LLP, 
    92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534
    , 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)).
    Non-signatories can enforce arbitration agreements when they
    are being sued “for ‘claims that are based on the same facts
    and are inherently inseparable from arbitrable claims,’” 
    id. at 1231
     (quoting Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Envtl. Org.
    P’Ship, 
    1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328
    , 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)), but
    [m]ere allegations of collusive behavior
    between signatories and non[-]signatories to
    a contract are not enough to compel
    arbitration between parties who have not
    agreed to arbitrate: those allegations of
    collusive behavior must also establish that the
    plaintiff’s claims against the nonsignatory are
    intimately founded in and intertwined with the
    obligations imposed by the contract
    containing the arbitration clause.Id. (quoting
    Goldman, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545). Here, the
    claims against Hirease arise under the MCRA
    and not out of obligations imposed by the
    2014 Agreement. Therefore, the rule that an
    arbitration agreement can be enforced by a
    non-signatory when the allegations against the
    28             MOHAMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES
    non-signatory are intimately founded in and
    intertwined with underlying contract
    obligations does not apply.
    III.      Conclusion
    We affirm in part and reverse the district court’s order
    denying Uber’s motions to compel arbitration and remand for
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    We affirm the district court’s order denying Hirease’s
    joinder in the motion to compel.
    All parties shall bear their own costs.
    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and
    REMANDED.