United States v. Valentin Quintero Aispuro , 660 F. App'x 526 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 15 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 15-10318
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
1:13-cr-00182-AWI-BAM-1
v.
VALENTIN QUINTERO AISPURO, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 13, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, CHRISTEN, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Valentin Quintero-Aispuro (“Aispuro”) appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found at one of his
residences—a home on Martinho Avenue (the “Martinho” address). Aispuro
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
argues that the search warrant for the residence was unsupported by probable
cause. We affirm.
“A search warrant is supported by probable cause if the issuing judge finds
that, ‘given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.’” United States v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). The relevant inquiry is
whether the issuing judge had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable
cause existed. Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39).
As reflected in the police officer affidavit that was used to seek a search
warrant for the Martinho residence, a reliable confidential informant had told
police that Aispuro was dealing drugs out of an address on Vetter Street, but that
he had a second home on Martinho Avenue, where he kept the profits. That
officer also observed activity consistent with drug dealing at the Vetter address and
observed Aispuro at the Vetter address and his vehicle at the Martinho address. In
addition, when Aispuro was pulled over for a vehicle code violation, Aispuro
stated that he lived at the Martinho address.
This court has “recognized that in narcotics cases ‘evidence is likely to be
found where the dealers live.’” United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973,
978 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Angulo–Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399
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(9th Cir. 1986)). Here, there was “a ‘reasonable nexus’ between the contraband
sought and the residence . . . . [because] it would be reasonable to seek the
evidence there.” Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 869 F.2d 479, 484 (9th
Cir. 1989)). That Aispuro lived at the Martinho address, along with the
information contained in the affidavit, was enough for the issuing judge to
reasonably infer that evidence was likely to be found at the Martinho address. See
Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399.
Even if the warrant was unsupported by probable cause, the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule would apply here because the “evidence [was]
obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900
(1984). Aispuro argues that the “the affidavit upon which the warrant is based is
so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon it
in good faith.” United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007).
But, for the same reasons explained above, the totality of the circumstances in this
case provided sufficient indicia of probable cause that a reasonable officer could
rely on the warrant in good faith.
AFFIRMED.
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