Washie Ouma v. Clackamas County , 663 F. App'x 544 ( 2016 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        OCT 5 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WASHIE OUMA,                                    No. 14-35495
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:12-cv-01465-HZ
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CLACKAMAS COUNTY; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 27, 2016**
    Before:      TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Washie Ouma appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging constitutional violations arising from an arrest
    and a subsequent visual body cavity strip search during his pre-arraignment
    detention at Washington County jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Blanas, 
    393 F.3d 918
    , 926 (9th Cir. 2004).
    We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins.
    Co. v. Polaris Pictures Corp., 
    159 F.3d 412
    , 418 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ouma’s claims
    against defendant Clackamas County arising from his arrest because Ouma failed
    to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any constitutional
    deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom of Clackamas
    County. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690-94 (1978) (setting
    forth requirements for a § 1983 claim of municipal liability).
    Summary judgment on Ouma’s Fourth Amendment claim against defendant
    Washington County was proper because Ouma failed to raise a genuine dispute of
    material fact as to whether the search was not reasonably related to a legitimate
    penological interest of Washington County. See Bull v. City & County of San
    Francisco, 
    595 F.3d 964
    , 971-74 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (setting forth factors
    relevant to reasonableness of pretrial detention search or search policy, including
    whether a search is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also
    Monell, 
    436 U.S. at 690-94
    .
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action against
    defendant Does 1, 2, and 3 because Ouma did not timely identify or serve those
    defendants. See In re Sheehan, 
    253 F.3d 507
    , 511 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth
    2                                    14-35495
    standard of review); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 
    629 F.2d 637
    , 642-43 (9th Cir. 1980)
    (use of John Doe allowed through the end of discovery).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in
    the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal.
    See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). Nor do we consider
    documents not filed with the district court. See United States v. Elias, 
    921 F.2d 870
    , 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
    We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s order granting Washington
    County’s bill of costs and the order denying Ouma’s motions for reconsideration,
    including Ouma’s arguments regarding the voluntary dismissal of defendant Does
    4-9, because Ouma failed to file a separate or amended notice of appeal. See
    Whitaker v. Garcetti, 
    486 F.3d 572
    , 585 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. App. P.
    4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
    Clackamas County’s request for damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, set forth in
    its answering brief, is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    14-35495