Michael Cuero v. Matthew Cate , 827 F.3d 879 ( 2016 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MICHAEL DANIEL CUERO,              No. 12-55911
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.               3:08-cv-02008-BTM-WMC
    MATTHEW CATE,
    Respondent-Appellee.                 OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 5, 2015
    Pasadena, California
    Filed June 30, 2016
    Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Barry G. Silverman,
    and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Wardlaw;
    Dissent by Judge O’Scannlain
    2                         CUERO V. CATE
    SUMMARY*
    Habeas Corpus
    The panel reversed the district court’s judgment denying
    California state prisoner Michael Daniel Cuero’s 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas corpus petition and remanded.
    The panel held that after Cuero entered a binding,
    judicially-approved plea agreement guaranteeing a maximum
    sentence of 14 years and 4 months in prison, and stood
    convicted, the prosecution breached the plea agreement by
    moving to amend the complaint to charge Cuero’s prior
    assault conviction as a second strike, and the Superior Court
    acted contrary to federal law, clearly established by the
    Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    (1971), when it permitted the amendment and refused to order
    specific performance of the original plea agreement. The
    panel wrote that by failing to interpret Cuero’s plea
    agreement consistently with California contract law, the
    Superior Court unreasonably applied federal law clearly
    established by the Supreme Court in Ricketts v. Adamson, 
    483 U.S. 1
     (1987). The panel explained that allowing Cuero to
    withdraw his guilty plea, exposing Cuero to the risk of trial
    and receiving an indeterminate sentence of 64 years to life,
    was no remedy. The panel remanded with instructions to
    issue a conditional writ requiring the state to resentence
    Cuero in accordance with the original plea agreement within
    60 days of the issuance of the mandate.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    CUERO V. CATE                         3
    Dissenting, Judge O’Scannlain wrote that the majority
    erroneously orders federal habeas relief to a state prisoner on
    the basis of a non-existent plea agreement and irrelevant state
    contract law.
    COUNSEL
    Devin Burstein (argued), Warren & Burstein, San Diego,
    California, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Anthony Da Silva (argued) and Matthew Mulford, Deputy
    Attorneys General; Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General; Kamala Harris, Attorney General of California;
    Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, California; for
    Respondent-Appellee.
    4                           CUERO V. CATE
    OPINION
    WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
    On December 8, 2005, Michael Daniel Cuero stood in
    open court before the Honorable Charles W. Ervin, Judge of
    the Superior Court in and for the County of San Diego, and
    pursuant to a written plea agreement, he freely and
    voluntarily pleaded guilty to one felony count of causing
    bodily injury while driving under the influence and one
    felony count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Cuero also
    admitted a single prior strike conviction1 and four prison
    priors.2 In exchange for Cuero’s waiver of his constitutional
    and numerous other rights, the prosecution dismissed a
    misdemeanor count, thereby guaranteeing Cuero a maximum
    sentence of 14 years, 4 months in prison and 4 years of
    parole, as explained both in the written plea agreement,
    1
    “California’s current three strikes law consists of two virtually identical
    statutory schemes ‘designed to increase the prison terms of repeat
    felons.’” Ewing v. California, 
    538 U.S. 11
    , 15 (2003) (quoting People v.
    Superior Court of San Diego Cty. ex rel. Romero, 
    917 P.2d 628
    , 630 (Cal.
    1996)). When Cuero was charged in 2005, the three strikes law required
    that a defendant with a single qualifying conviction, i.e., a single strike,
    “be sentenced to ‘twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the
    current felony conviction.’” 
    Id. at 16
     (quoting 
    Cal. Penal Code §§ 667
    (e)(1), 1170.12(c)(1)). If the defendant had two or more qualifying
    convictions, the law mandated “an indeterminate term of life
    imprisonment.” 
    Id.
     (quoting 
    Cal. Penal Code §§ 667
    (e)(2)(A),
    1170.12(c)(2)(A)). See generally 3 B.E. Witkin et al., California Criminal
    Law §§ 428–429 (4th ed. 2012).
    2
    California Penal Code § 667.5(b) requires a court to “impose a one-
    year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term” served
    by a defendant. California courts refer to these prior terms of
    incarceration as “prison priors.” Cuero admitted serving four prison
    priors, resulting in the addition of four consecutive years to his sentence.
    CUERO V. CATE                          5
    Appendix A, ¶ 7a, and by Judge Ervin during the plea
    colloquy. Judge Ervin then accepted Cuero’s plea and
    admissions, and set sentencing for January 11, 2006. That
    same day, Judge Ervin signed the Finding and Order,
    Appendix A at 3, stating that “the defendant is convicted
    thereby.”
    Cuero stood convicted; “nothing remain[ed] but to give
    judgment and determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama,
    
    395 U.S. 238
    , 242 (1969). Under clearly established
    Supreme Court law, the plea agreement bound the
    government. See Mabry v. Johnson, 
    467 U.S. 504
    , 507–08
    (1984) (a defendant’s guilty plea “implicates the
    Constitution,” not the “plea bargain standing alone”);
    Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 262 (1971) (“[W]hen
    a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
    agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part
    of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
    fulfilled.”); Boykin, 
    395 U.S. at 242, 244
     (“[A] plea of guilty
    is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction.”). In
    Cuero’s case, the government was bound by its agreement in
    open court that punishment could be no greater than 14 years,
    4 months in prison. See Ricketts v. Adamson, 
    483 U.S. 1
    , 5
    n.3 (1987) (“[T]he construction of [a] plea agreement and the
    concomitant obligations flowing therefrom are, within broad
    bounds of reasonableness, matters of state law.”); see also
    Buckley v. Terhune, 
    441 F.3d 688
    , 694 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
    banc) (“Under Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 261–62
    (1971), a criminal defendant has a due process right to
    enforce the terms of his plea agreement.”).
    Improbably, the day before the scheduled sentencing, the
    state prosecutor moved to amend the criminal complaint to
    allege an additional prior strike conviction, which, if allowed,
    6                          CUERO V. CATE
    would result in an indeterminate 64 years to life sentence
    under California’s three strikes law.3 Even more improbably,
    a different Superior Court judge than Judge Ervin permitted
    the amendment. Not only did the prosecution breach the plea
    agreement by seeking to amend the complaint after the deal
    was sealed, the Superior Court judge unreasonably applied
    clearly established Supreme Court authority by failing to
    recognize that the “breach [was] undoubtedly a violation of
    the defendant’s rights.” Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 136 (2009) (citing Santobello, 
    404 U.S. at 262
    ). That
    the Superior Court allowed Cuero to withdraw his guilty plea
    and enter a new plea agreement calling for an indeterminate
    25 years to life sentence was no remedy here; Cuero lost the
    benefit of his original bargain.
    Because the state court neither recognized nor applied
    clearly established Supreme Court authority, and acted in
    contravention of that authority, we reverse the judgment of
    the district court denying Cuero’s habeas petition, and we
    remand with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus.
    I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review4
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
     and
    2253. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas
    petition. Hurles v. Ryan, 
    752 F.3d 768
    , 777 (9th Cir. 2014).
    3
    Although the state also alleged two additional “serious felony” priors,
    it was the addition of the second strike that exposed Cuero to an
    indeterminate life sentence.
    4
    Cuero properly exhausted on direct and collateral review his claims
    that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement in violation of his due
    process rights and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We
    do not reach the latter claim.
    CUERO V. CATE                           7
    Because Cuero filed his federal habeas petition after April 24,
    1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
    (“AEDPA”) governs our review. 
    Id.
    AEDPA bars relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the
    merits in state court, unless the state court’s decision satisfies
    the exceptions contained in 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 2254
    (d)(1) or (2).
    Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 98 (2011). Those
    exceptions authorize a grant of habeas relief where the
    relevant state-court decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved
    an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
    law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or (2) “based on
    an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
    evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 2254
    (d)(1), (2).
    “[A] state-court decision is contrary to Federal law ‘if the
    state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by
    th[e Supreme] Court on a question of law,’ or ‘the state court
    confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
    relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result
    opposite to [the Supreme Court].’” Murray v. Schriro,
    
    745 F.3d 984
    , 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original)
    (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 405 (2000)). “A
    state-court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of
    Supreme Court precedent if ‘the state court identifies the
    correct governing legal rule from th[e Supreme] Court’s cases
    but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state
    prisoner’s case,’ or ‘the state court either unreasonably
    extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to
    a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably
    refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it
    should apply.’” 
    Id.
     (alterations in original) (quoting
    Williams, 
    529 U.S. at 407
    ).
    8                         CUERO V. CATE
    We review the last reasoned decision of the state courts.
    “When a state court does not explain the reason for its
    decision, we ‘look through’ to the last state-court decision
    that provides a reasoned explanation capable of review.” Id.
    at 996 (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 
    234 F.3d 1072
    , 1079
    n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)). Where a reasoned state-court decision
    exists, we do not “evaluate all the hypothetical reasons that
    could have supported the high court’s decision.” Cannedy v.
    Adams, 
    706 F.3d 1148
    , 1157 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of
    reh’g by 
    733 F.3d 794
     (9th Cir. 2013); see also 
    id. at 1159
    (“Richter does not change our practice of ‘looking through’
    summary denials to the last reasoned decision—whether
    those denials are on the merits or denials of discretionary
    review.” (footnote omitted)); Medley v. Runnels, 
    506 F.3d 857
    , 862–63 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Judge Callahan
    writing for the majority). Here, we evaluate the San Diego
    Superior Court’s decision to grant the prosecution’s motion
    to amend the complaint following Cuero’s entry of his
    original guilty plea and his conviction based on that plea.5
    II. Discussion
    A. Cuero entered a binding, judicially approved plea
    agreement and stood convicted.
    Under clearly established Supreme Court law, Cuero
    stood convicted and his plea agreement became binding the
    moment the first Superior Court judge accepted his guilty
    5
    On direct appeal, Cuero’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to
    People v. Wende, 
    600 P.2d 1071
     (Cal. 1979) (en banc), and Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). The California Court of Appeal affirmed
    Cuero’s conviction and sentence in an unpublished, unreasoned opinion,
    finding “no reasonably arguable appellate issue.”
    CUERO V. CATE                                9
    plea. “A plea of guilty is more than a confession which
    admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a
    conviction.” Boykin, 
    395 U.S. at 242
    . And “[w]hen a plea
    rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of
    the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
    inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”
    Santobello, 
    404 U.S. at 262
     (emphasis added); see also Peter
    Westen & David Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies
    for Broken Plea Bargains, 
    60 Calif. L. Rev. 471
    , 474 (1978)
    (citing the language quoted above as the “undisputed
    holding” of Santobello). A defendant’s guilty plea thus
    “implicates the Constitution,” transforming the plea bargain
    from a “mere executory agreement” into a binding contract.
    Mabry, 
    467 U.S. at
    507–08.6 In other words, a guilty plea
    seals the deal between the state and the defendant, and vests
    the defendant with “a due process right to enforce the terms
    of his plea agreement.” Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at
    694 (citing
    Santobello, 
    404 U.S. at
    261–62); see also Doe v. Harris,
    
    640 F.3d 972
    , 975 (9th Cir. 2011); Brown v. Poole, 
    337 F.3d 1155
    , 1159 (9th Cir. 2003).
    6
    Although Mabry clarified the constitutional significance of a
    consummated plea agreement, insofar as Cuero’s case is concerned, it did
    nothing more. As the dissent points out, Mabry involved a “prosecutor’s
    withdrawn offer.” 
    467 U.S. at 510
     (emphasis added). In Mabry, the
    prosecution had offered the defendant more lenient sentencing terms in
    exchange for his guilty plea and, when the defendant attempted to accept
    the offer, the government withdrew it. 
    Id.
     at 505–06. The defendant then
    opted to stand trial and, following a mistrial, pleaded guilty on entirely
    different terms. 
    Id. at 506
    . Unsurprisingly, the Mabry court refused to
    enforce the prosecutor’s original, withdrawn offer—the defendant’s guilty
    plea “was in no sense induced by the prosecutor’s withdrawn offer,” 
    id. at 510
    , and that “executory agreement” was not made binding through an
    “ensuing guilty plea,” 
    id. at 507
    .
    10                     CUERO V. CATE
    In Buckley v. Terhune, our court, sitting en banc, affirmed
    a grant of habeas relief pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1)
    that ordered specific enforcement of the terms of a plea
    agreement. 
    441 F.3d at 691
    . There, the state prosecutor
    offered a plea bargain: Buckley would provide cooperating
    testimony against his codefendants in return for which the
    prosecutor would dismiss his robbery and burglary charges
    and reduce the first degree murder charge against him to
    second degree. 
    Id.
     Attached to the offer was a felony
    disposition statement that stated, under “Consequences of the
    Plea,” that Buckley could be sentenced to a “maximum
    possible term of 15 years.” 
    Id.
     Buckley signed the plea
    agreement, initialing the maximum sentence line on
    December 17, 1987. 
    Id.
     At some point before the change of
    plea hearing on January 4, 1988, the state prosecutor, on his
    own and without Buckley’s knowledge, added a handwritten
    paragraph to the disposition statement stating that the
    sentence would be a “maximum term of 15 years to life.” 
    Id.
    at 691–92. Just as in Cuero’s case, during the guilty plea
    colloquy pursuant to the plea bargain, the state court told
    Buckley that he could be sentenced to state prison for a
    “maximum possible term of fifteen years.” 
    Id. at 692
    .
    Following the trial of his codefendants in which Buckley
    “complied with the terms of the negotiated disposition,”
    according to the state prosecutor, the court sentenced Buckley
    to a prison term of 15 years to life. 
    Id. at 693
    . And, again,
    just as in Cuero’s case, the last reasoned state court decision
    failed to “interpret Buckley’s plea agreement according to
    California contract law.” 
    Id. at 691
    . We affirmed the district
    court’s grant of habeas relief because the state court’s failure
    was “contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law as set
    forth in Santobello v. New York . . . and Ricketts v. Adamson,”
    satisfying § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” exception. Id.
    CUERO V. CATE                        11
    While the state prosecutor here did not act so
    underhandedly as Buckley’s, the same result obtained—
    Cuero performed his part of the bargain only to have the state
    renege on its. The state originally charged Cuero with two
    felonies and a misdemeanor. It later amended the complaint
    to add a single prior strike conviction and four prison priors.
    Next, the parties entered into a written plea agreement
    through which the state induced Cuero to cede his
    constitutional and other rights and plead guilty in exchange
    for the state’s promise to drop the misdemeanor charge,
    thereby guaranteeing Cuero a “maximum [sentencing]
    exposure of 14 years, 4 months in state prison, 4 years on
    parole and a $10,000 fine.” On December 8, 2005, the parties
    signed the plea agreement, which is on page three of the
    dissent’s Appendix A, and which, as in Buckley, under
    “Consequences of the Plea” set forth Cuero’s state-
    guaranteed maximum sentencing exposure. That same day,
    Judge Ervin held a change of plea hearing. The state
    prosecutor, Kristian Trocha, Cuero, and Cuero’s counsel,
    Alberto Tamayo, stood before Judge Ervin and expressed
    their mutual intent to “settle this case today.” The court
    received the charge sheet—i.e., the amended complaint,
    Appendix A.1, attached to the majority opinion—and asked
    counsel to what Cuero would be pleading. Cuero’s counsel,
    referring to the charge sheet, stated that Cuero would be
    pleading to “the sheet without the Count 3 misdemeanor.”
    Judge Ervin reiterated, “He’s going to plead guilty to
    everything on the charging document with the exception of
    Count 3.” The judge next indicated that “It is a sentence for
    the Court, no deals with the people,” meaning that the plea
    agreement was as to the charge and not to the specific
    12                          CUERO V. CATE
    sentence.7 Both the prosecutor and defense counsel assented.8
    7
    Two types of plea bargains exist: charge bargains and sentence
    bargains. Charge bargains “consist[] of an arrangement whereby the
    defendant and prosecutor agree that the defendant should be permitted to
    plead guilty to a charge less serious than is supported by the evidence.”
    5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.1(a) (4th ed. 2015).
    Sentence bargains “involve[] an agreement whereby the defendant pleads
    ‘on the nose,’ that is, to the original charge, in exchange for some kind of
    promise from the prosecutor concerning the sentence to be imposed.” Id.;
    see also United States v. Miller, 
    722 F.2d 562
    , 563 (9th Cir. 1983)
    (explaining that charge bargains are “predicated upon the dropping of
    counts,” whereas sentence bargains are “predicated either upon the
    [prosecutor’s] recommendation of or agreement not to oppose a particular
    sentence . . . , or upon a guarantee of a particular sentence”). “Sentence
    bargaining carries with it a somewhat greater risk than charge bargaining.
    When a defendant bargains for a plea to a lesser offense, he receives his
    bargain the instant he enters his guilty plea, but when he pleads guilty in
    exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to seek a certain sentence there
    remains some possibility that . . . the trial judge will not follow the
    prosecutor’s recommendations.” LaFave, supra, at § 21.1(a). This case
    involves only charge bargaining.
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) also reflects the
    distinction between a charge bargain and a sentence bargain, and
    prescribes procedures for each:
    [T]he plea agreement may specify that an attorney for
    the government will:
    (A) not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges;
    (B) recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s
    request, that a particular sentence or sentencing range
    is appropriate or that a particular provision of the
    Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or
    sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a
    recommendation or request does not bind the court); or
    CUERO V. CATE                              13
    Cuero was then placed under oath and asked by Judge Ervin
    “Did you hear the plea agreement that I described?”
    Following Cuero’s affirmative response, the court asked, “Is
    it your full and complete understanding to settle this case
    today?” The court went on to review the forms, the dissent’s
    Appendix A, with Cuero, asking Cuero again to inform him
    that he “wish[ed] to accept the agreement to this case, written
    on the blue form,” and to confirm Cuero “sign[ed] his name,”
    “place[d] his initials in these boxes,” and “put his thumb print
    on it.” Again, following Cuero’s affirmative responses, the
    court stated, “In addition to the plea agreement, the document
    [Appendix A to the dissent] sets forth and describes
    constitutional rights that you enjoy.” See Appendix A at 1.
    The court next informed Cuero that 14 years, 4 months in
    prison was the “maximum punishment [he] could receive,”
    and Cuero pleaded guilty to the two felonies and admitted his
    single strike and four prison priors. The court accepted the
    (C) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is
    the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a
    particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or
    policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not
    apply (such a recommendation or request binds the
    court once the court accepts the plea agreement).
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A)–(C).
    Thus, there were no agreements about Cuero’s sentence, as indicated
    by Appendix A to the dissent; rather, because the state agreed to drop the
    misdemeanor charge, Cuero’s sentence was limited to 14 years and 4
    months.
    8
    The dissent misleadingly mistakes the “no deals with the people”
    language to mean that there was no plea agreement, and, ironically, holds
    up the document setting forth the plea agreement, Appendix A, to support
    its view.
    14                         CUERO V. CATE
    plea. The court then turned to the prosecutor, Mr. Trocha,
    and asked, “People’s motion as to the misdemeanor count,
    which is Count 3?” Mr. Trocha stated, “Dismiss in light of
    the plea.” The court then granted the state’s motion “in light
    of the plea,” accepted “the defendant’s plea and admissions,”
    and concluded that “the defendant is convicted thereby.”
    Nothing more was required to consummate Cuero’s plea
    agreement; it “was accepted and final . . . at the moment that
    the judge made the requisite factual findings and accepted the
    plea.” Brown, 
    337 F.3d at 1159
    . And the prosecution was
    bound by the agreement’s terms, which it acknowledged by
    immediately moving to dismiss the misdemeanor charge.9
    9
    Absurdly, the dissent attaches the very document that the court and
    both state and defense counsel identified as the written plea agreement as
    purported proof that there was no agreement. The dissent’s analysis reads
    like the caption “This is not a pipe” below Magritte’s famous painting of
    a pipe. Even more mystifying, the dissent disregards the entire plea
    colloquy, transcript of proceedings, and the written plea agreement itself
    to reach this convenient conclusion. The dissent stands alone in its
    erroneous conclusion—not even the state disputed the existence of the
    plea agreement, until oral argument, and it waived that argument by
    failing to raise it in the answering brief. Clem v. Lomeli, 
    566 F.3d 1177
    ,
    1182 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an argument not addressed in an
    answering brief is waived (citing United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas,
    
    508 F.3d 491
    , 502 (9th Cir. 2007)). Throughout its briefing, the state
    insists that California law allowed it to amend the complaint, even after
    the plea agreement was entered and Cuero was convicted. By contrast,
    Cuero argued throughout his opening brief that the state breached his
    original plea agreement—and the state did not dispute the original plea
    agreement’s existence anywhere in its answering brief. To the contrary,
    the state acknowledged the agreement’s existence and framed the issue to
    be resolved as “[w]hether amendment of the complaint after Cuero
    pleaded guilty violated the plea agreement and Cuero’s right to due
    process.” Indeed, the state’s brief contrasted Cuero’s “initial plea
    agreement” with his “second” or “new plea agreement.” It was therefore
    no wonder that members of our panel greeted the state’s argument that
    CUERO V. CATE                               15
    B. The prosecution breached the court-approved plea
    agreement by attempting to amend the complaint.
    Although the prosecution initially honored its promise to
    dismiss the misdemeanor charge, it then breached the plea
    agreement by moving to amend the complaint to charge
    Cuero’s prior assault conviction as a second strike. The
    Superior Court acted contrary to clearly established Supreme
    Court law by permitting the amendment and refusing to
    enforce the original plea agreement.
    “[T]he construction of [a] plea agreement and the
    concomitant obligations flowing therefrom are, within broad
    bounds of reasonableness, matters of state law.” Adamson,
    
    483 U.S. at
    5 n.3; see also Buckley, 397 F.3d at 1161–62
    (Bea, J., dissenting) (“At the time of the state habeas
    proceeding, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
    the Supreme Court, made the interpretation and construction
    of a plea agreement a matter of state law.” (citing Adamson,
    
    483 U.S. at
    5 n.3)), majority rev’d en banc, 
    441 F.3d 688
     (9th
    Cir. 2006); see also Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 137
     (“[P]lea bargains
    are essentially contracts.”). “Under AEDPA, we . . . must
    consider whether the [state court] decision is consistent with
    a proper application of state contract law in interpreting the
    plea agreement; if not, the decision was an ‘unreasonable
    application of’ clearly established federal law.” Davis v.
    Woodford, 
    446 F.3d 957
    , 962 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing, inter
    alia, Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at
    5 n.3). In Buckley, we noted that
    as of 1999, when the state court summarily denied Buckley’s
    habeas petition, the obligation to construe plea agreements
    according to state contract law “had been clearly established
    there was no plea agreement, made for the first time at oral argument, with
    incredulity.
    16                         CUERO V. CATE
    federal law for more than a decade.” 
    441 F.3d at
    694–95
    (quoting Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at
    6 n.3).10
    Under California law, “[a] plea agreement is, in essence,
    a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which
    the court consents to be bound.” People v. Segura, 
    188 P.3d 649
    , 656 (Cal. 2008) (quoting People v. Ames, 
    261 Cal. Rptr. 911
    , 913 (Ct. App. 1989)). Thus, “[a] negotiated plea
    agreement . . . is interpreted according to general contract
    principles.” People v. Shelton, 
    125 P.3d 290
    , 294 (Cal.
    2006). Under California law, “[a] contract must be so
    interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the
    parties as it existed at the time of contracting.” 
    Cal. Civ. Code § 1636
    . A contract’s “clear and explicit” language
    governs its interpretation. 
    Id.
     § 1638. Moreover, “[a]lthough
    a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent
    sentencing discretion, ‘a judge who has accepted a plea
    bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that
    bargain.’” Segura, 188 P.3d at 656 (quoting Ames, 261 Cal.
    Rptr. at 913).
    10
    The dissent argues that Buckley’s reasoning was undermined to the
    point of irreconcilability by the Supreme Court’s intervening opinions in
    Wilson v. Concorran, 
    562 U.S. 1
     (2010) (per curiam), and Swarthout v.
    Cooke, 
    562 U.S. 216
     (2011) (per curiam), freeing our three-judge panel to
    entirely disregard the en banc Buckley decision. The dissent is incorrect.
    Wilson and Swarthout each reversed an intermediate appellate decision
    based on perceived errors of state, rather than federal, law in the areas of
    statutory aggravation and parole, respectively. They do not speak to the
    situation where, as here, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the
    federal constitutional due process right is itself defined by reference to
    principles of state law. Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at
    695 (citing Adamson,
    
    483 U.S. at
    6 n.3).
    CUERO V. CATE                               17
    The terms of Cuero’s plea agreement were “clear and
    explicit”: Cuero promised to plead guilty to two felonies, a
    prior strike, and four prison priors; in exchange, the state
    promised to drop the misdemeanor charge. By seeking to
    amend the charges in the complaint, the prosecution denied
    Cuero the benefit of his bargain: a maximum sentence of 14
    years and 4 months. And, as a result of the amendment, the
    Superior Court ultimately imposed an indeterminate life
    sentence well beyond the limits of the plea agreement.11
    Moreover, the agreement said nothing about altering the
    foundational assumption on which the bargain was
    struck—namely, the set of charges alleged in the criminal
    complaint. See People v. Walker, 
    819 P.2d 861
    , 867 (Cal.
    1991) overruled on other grounds by People v. Villalobos,
    
    277 P.3d 179
     (Cal. 2012) (“When a guilty plea is entered in
    exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other
    counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties,
    including the state, must abide by the terms of the
    agreement.”). Such an implied term would render the
    agreement illusory by providing the state unfettered license
    to terminate it. See Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
    
    697 F.3d 777
    , 791 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n enforceable
    termination clause that gives a promisor an unrestricted
    power to terminate a contract at any time, without notice,
    11
    The state argues that its conduct was appropriate because California
    Penal Code § 1192.5 allows a state court to, among other things,
    “withdraw its approval [of a plea] in the light of further consideration of
    the matter.” But that is not what happened here. Rather, the prosecution
    sought to renege on its court-approved promise to Cuero. The result:
    Cuero received a sentence far greater than that specified in the court-
    approved plea agreement. Section 1192.5 actually prohibits what took
    place here. That section disallows the imposition of “a punishment more
    severe than that specified in the plea.”
    18                         CUERO V. CATE
    renders the promise illusory and unenforceable, at least so
    long as the purported contract remains wholly executory.”).
    This outcome is inconsistent with California contract law,
    which prefers an “interpretation which gives effect” to a
    contract over one that would render it void. 
    Cal. Civ. Code § 3541.12
    As in Buckley, where we noted that the state court’s
    decision denying habeas neither mentioned state contract law
    nor referred to the terms of the plea agreement, nothing in the
    second Superior Court judge’s decision permitting the state
    prosecutor’s amendment here suggests that it understood it
    was dealing with a binding plea agreement, let alone that it
    was constitutionally obligated to construe the agreement in
    accordance with state contract law. See Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at 696
    . Tellingly, the Superior Court permitted the amendment
    12
    The state argues that our construction of the plea agreement is
    foreclosed by California Penal Code § 969.5, which permits amendment
    of a complaint after a defendant pleads guilty if the complaint “does not
    charge all prior felonies of which the defendant has been convicted.” But
    § 969.5 is irrelevant to the interpretation of a court-approved plea
    agreement under state contract principles. Under California law, “a
    prosecutor may withdraw from a plea bargain at any time before the
    defendant pleads guilty or otherwise detrimentally relies on that bargain.”
    Witkin, supra at § 382 (emphasis added); see also People v. Rhoden,
    
    89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819
    , 824–25 (Ct. App. 1999), as modified on denial of
    reh’g (Nov. 23, 1999). Once a defendant enters a guilty plea pursuant to
    a plea agreement, the state is bound by the agreement and any attempt by
    the state to withdraw—through a motion to amend the complaint pursuant
    to § 969.5 or otherwise—constitutes a breach. Simply put, that § 969.5
    provides a discretionary vehicle for post-plea amendment of a complaint
    does not mean that the prosecutor can amend the complaint after the court
    has approved a plea agreement and signed an order of conviction. In any
    event, the state did charge “all prior felonies of which [Cuero] ha[d] been
    convicted” in the original complaint—it simply did not charge Cuero’s
    felony assault conviction as a strike.
    CUERO V. CATE                               19
    in reliance on two state cases: People v. Superior Court
    (Alvarado), 
    255 Cal. Rptr. 46
     (Ct. App. 1989), and People v.
    Jackson, 
    48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838
     (Ct. App.), review granted and
    opinion superseded, 
    914 P.2d 831
     (Cal. 1996). Although
    both cases address the propriety of permitting amendment of
    a complaint after a defendant enters a guilty plea, neither
    addresses the propriety of such amendment after a defendant
    enters a guilty plea induced by a prosecutorial promise—i.e.,
    pursuant to a plea bargain—and it has been approved by the
    court.13 See Jackson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840 (“[T]he court
    took Jackson’s plea to the face of the complaint.”); Alvarado,
    207 Cal. App. 3d at 471 (noting that the transcript of the plea
    colloquy “does not indicate any plea bargain”). In other
    words, neither Alvarado nor Jackson discusses the scenario
    present here, where the court-approved guilty plea was
    entered pursuant to a written plea agreement. Indeed, neither
    case contains so much as a hint that the court was applying
    California contract law. Thus, by failing to interpret Cuero’s
    plea agreement consistently with California contract law, the
    Superior Court unreasonably applied federal law clearly
    established by the Supreme Court in Adamson nearly thirty
    years ago.
    13
    In granting the state’s motion to amend, the Superior Court reasoned
    that Cuero’s “substantial rights [would not be] prejudiced by the mere fact
    that [his] potential punishment may have been increased due to the
    amendment,” and that Cuero would “be in the same situation as he would
    have been prior to entry of the plea.” The court borrowed this (inapposite)
    language almost verbatim from Jackson and Alvarado. See Jackson,
    48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844 (relying on Alvarado).
    20                         CUERO V. CATE
    C. Allowing Cuero to withdraw his guilty plea was no
    remedy at all.
    The Superior Court also unreasonably applied clearly
    established federal law by failing to order specific
    performance of Cuero’s plea agreement. A state court must
    supply a remedy for a breached plea agreement that comports
    with state contract law. See Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 137
    ;
    Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at
    5 n.3; Davis, 
    446 F.3d at 962
    . Under
    California law, the remedy for breach must “repair the harm
    caused by the breach.” People v. Toscano, 
    20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 923
    , 927 (Ct. App. 2004). “‘When the breach [alleged] is a
    refusal by the prosecutor to comply with the agreement,
    specific enforcement would consist of an order directing the
    prosecutor to fulfill the bargain’ and will be granted where
    there is a substantial possibility that specific performance will
    completely repair the harm caused by the prosecutor’s
    breach.” In re Timothy N., 
    157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 78
    , 88 (Ct. App.
    2013) (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Kaanehe,
    
    19 Cal. 3d 1
    , 13 (1977)). Under Buckley, which we are bound
    to follow, in a situation like that here, where the state has
    already received the benefit it bargained for—a plea of guilty
    and a conviction—specific performance is the best remedy,
    unless the defendant, whose choice it becomes, “elect[s]
    instead to rescind the agreement and take his chances from
    there.”14 Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at
    699 n.11.
    14
    In this context, specific performance is necessary to maintain the
    integrity and fairness of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., LaFave,
    supra, at § 21.2(e) (“When the breach was a failure by the prosecutor to
    carry out a promise which was fulfillable, then certainly the defendant’s
    request for specific performance should be honored. . . . [T]here is no
    reason why a prosecutor who has failed to keep his fulfillable plea bargain
    promise should be allowed to force the defendant into a withdrawal of the
    plea and thus, presumably, a permanent breach of the bargain.”) (footnotes
    CUERO V. CATE                                 21
    Moreover, that the state court permitted Cuero to
    withdraw his plea did not “repair the harm” caused by the
    prosecutor’s breach. To the contrary: It exposed Cuero to the
    risk of going to trial and receiving an indeterminate 64 years
    to life sentence. This is hardly the “remedy” Cuero would
    have elected had he properly been given a choice. That
    Cuero was ultimately able to “bargain” for an indeterminate
    25 years to life sentence does not alter the analysis; the state
    could not have lawfully pursued an indeterminate life
    sentence in the first place if it had not been allowed to breach
    the plea agreement. Again, Cuero had performed his part of
    the agreement by pleading guilty to the two felony charges,
    admitting a single prior strike, and conceding his four prison
    priors, giving the government the bargain it sought. Because
    Cuero had already performed, “fundamental fairness demands
    that the state be compelled to adhere to the agreement as
    well.” Brown, 
    337 F.3d at 1162
     (citation omitted). Cuero is
    omitted); State v. Tourtellotte, 
    564 P.2d 799
    , 802 (1977) (Wash. 1977) (en
    banc) (“If a defendant cannot rely upon an agreement made and accepted
    in open court, the fairness of the entire criminal justice system would be
    thrown into question. No attorney in the state could in good conscience
    advise his client to plead guilty and strike a bargain if that attorney cannot
    be assured that the prosecution must keep the bargain[.]”). Although not
    dispositive, when Santobello was decided, “a majority of the court’s
    members . . . [were] on record as favoring looking to defendant’s wishes
    [as to choice of remedy].”                 Dennis A. Fischer, Beyond
    Santobello—Remedies for Reneged Plea Bargains, 2 U. San Fernando
    Valley L. Rev. 121, 125 (1973); see also Santobello, 
    404 U.S. at 267
    (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[A] court ought to accord a defendant’s
    preference considerable, if not controlling, weight inasmuch as the
    fundamental rights flouted by a prosecutor’s breach of a plea bargain are
    those of the defendant, not of the State.”); 
    id. at 268
     (Marshall, J.,
    dissenting) (explaining that Justice Douglas’s concurrence, coupled with
    the dissenting votes, appeared to create a majority in favor of honoring the
    defendant’s preferred remedy).
    22                     CUERO V. CATE
    therefore entitled to the benefit of his original bargain: a
    maximum sentence of 14 years, 4 months in prison.
    III. Conclusion
    The San Diego Superior Court failed to recognize that
    Cuero’s entry and Judge Ervin’s acceptance of Cuero’s guilty
    plea pursuant to the written plea agreement was binding on
    both sides. By allowing the prosecution to breach the
    agreement, reneging on the promise that induced Cuero’s
    plea, the state court violated federal law clearly established
    by the Supreme Court in Santobello. It further violated
    clearly established federal law requiring construction of the
    plea agreement under state contract law. See Adamson,
    
    483 U.S. at
    5 n.3; Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at 697
    . Even worse, the
    last reasoned decision of the state courts relied on two
    inapposite state law cases and failed to even acknowledge,
    much less apply, the well-established Supreme Court
    authority that dictated the contrary result. This error had a
    “substantial and injurious effect” on Cuero, who is serving an
    indeterminate life sentence, the minimum term of which, 25
    years, is well in excess of the 14 year, 4 month maximum
    promised by the government. See Brecht v. Abrahamson,
    
    507 U.S. 619
    , 637 (1993) (citation omitted). Cuero is entitled
    to habeas relief.
    Accordingly, the district court’s judgment denying
    Cuero’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reversed with
    instructions to issue a conditional writ requiring the state to
    resentence Petitioner in accordance with the original plea
    agreement within sixty days of the issuance of the mandate.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    $33(1',;$
    CUERO V. CATE                        23
    O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    Today, the Court erroneously orders federal habeas relief
    to a state prisoner on the basis of a non-existent plea
    agreement and irrelevant state contract law. Because the
    decision of the California Court of Appeal affirming Cuero’s
    conviction was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
    application of, Supreme Court precedent, the district court’s
    denial of the writ of habeas corpus should have been
    affirmed.
    I respectfully dissent.
    I
    A
    It is appropriate to recapitulate the relevant facts. While
    driving under the influence of methamphetamine, Michael
    Daniel Cuero veered off the road and crashed his car into
    Jeffrey Feldman, another driver who was standing outside his
    pickup truck on the side of the road. Feldman sustained
    severe injuries including a ruptured spleen, brain damage, and
    facial disfigurement. Cuero, a convicted felon prohibited
    from possessing a firearm, had a loaded firearm with him.
    Over the next two weeks, the State filed a complaint and
    then an amended complaint against Cuero. The amended
    complaint charged two felonies (driving under the influence
    and possession of a firearm by a felon) and one misdemeanor
    (being under the influence of a controlled substance). The
    State alleged that Cuero had served four prior prison terms
    and that one of Cuero’s prior convictions constituted a
    “strike” under California’s “three strikes law.” See Cal. Penal
    24                          CUERO V. CATE
    Code § 667(b)–(i).1 Cuero initially pleaded “not guilty” to
    the charges in the amended complaint.
    On December 8, 2005, Cuero appeared before the
    superior court to change his plea to guilty. He signed a
    change of plea form, which stated that he had not been
    induced to enter the plea by any promises of any kind and that
    he had no deals with the State.2 After the court had accepted
    Cuero’s plea on both felonies and his admissions to the
    “prison priors” and prior strike, the State moved to dismiss
    the misdemeanor count, and the court granted the motion. A
    sentencing hearing was then scheduled.
    B
    According to the State, during the preparation of the
    sentencing memorandum for the superior court, the probation
    officer discovered that one of Cuero’s prior convictions
    constituted a strike in addition to the single strike alleged in
    the first amended complaint.3 Prior to the scheduled
    1
    Cuero actually had two prior strikes, but the State initially did not
    realize that fact.
    2
    This form, which is the same form that the mistakenly majority calls
    a written plea agreement, is reproduced in Appendix A to this dissent.
    3
    Cuero had been convicted of violating California Penal Code
    § 245(a)(1), which prohibits assault with a deadly weapon other than a
    firearm. “Not all section 245(a)(1) violations constitute strikes under
    California law.” Gill v. Ayers, 
    342 F.3d 911
    , 914 (9th Cir. 2003). “[T]o
    qualify a section 245(a)(1) conviction as a strike, the prosecution must
    establish that the defendant ‘personally inflicted great bodily injury on any
    person, other than an accomplice, or personally used a firearm’ under
    section 1192.7(c)(8) or that he ‘personally used a dangerous or deadly
    weapon’ under section 1192.7(c)(23)” of the California Penal Code. 
    Id.
    CUERO V. CATE                               25
    sentencing hearing, the State moved under California Penal
    Code § 969.5(a) further to amend its complaint again to add
    the allegation of the second strike. Cuero opposed the
    motion. On February 2, 2006, the superior court granted the
    motion with the condition that Cuero would be permitted to
    withdraw his guilty plea, thus restoring all of his
    constitutional rights. The court then accepted for filing the
    second amended complaint alleging the additional strike.
    On March 27, 2006, Cuero moved to withdraw his guilty
    plea entered on December 8, 2005. The court granted the
    motion and set aside that plea. As part of a “negotiated guilty
    plea,” the State filed a third amended complaint omitting the
    felon-in-possession charge, and Cuero pleaded guilty to the
    charge of driving under the influence and admitted the two
    prior strikes. On April 20, 2006, the court sentenced Cuero
    to a term of 25 years to life pursuant to the plea agreement
    and pronounced judgment.
    C
    Cuero appealed to the California Court of Appeal.
    Pursuant to People v. Wende, 
    600 P.2d 1071
     (Cal. 1979), and
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), Cuero’s appointed
    appellate counsel filed a brief setting forth the evidence in the
    superior court, presented no argument for reversal, but asked
    the court of appeal to review the record for error. The brief
    directed the court’s attention to two potential, but not
    arguable, issues: (1) “whether the trial court abused its
    (internal alterations omitted). According to the State, Cuero’s admission
    of a “personal use of a deadly weapon” allegation did not appear in the
    files it originally compiled in preparation for charging Cuero after the car
    crash.
    26                    CUERO V. CATE
    discretion by permitting the prosecutor to amend the
    complaint to allege additional priors after [Cuero’s] initial
    guilty plea” (citing People v. Sipe, 
    42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266
     (Ct.
    App. 1995); People v. Superior Court (Alvarado), 
    255 Cal. Rptr. 46
     (Ct. App. 1989)); and (2) “whether the amendment
    constituted a breach of a plea agreement in violation of due
    process, entitling [Cuero] to specific performance of the
    original agreement” (citing People v. Walker, 
    819 P.2d 861
    (Cal. 1991), overruled in part by People v. Villalobos,
    
    277 P.3d 179
     (Cal. 2012); People v. Mancheno, 
    654 P.2d 211
    (Cal. 1982)). The California Court of Appeal granted Cuero
    permission to file a brief on his own behalf, but he did not
    respond. The court reviewed the entire record and the
    possible issues raised by counsel’s Wende/Anders brief. It
    concluded that they “disclosed no reasonably arguable
    appellate issue” and affirmed, noting that “[c]ompetent
    counsel has represented Cuero on this appeal.”
    In due course, Cuero brought this petition for habeas
    corpus in federal district court, where it was properly denied
    and he timely appealed.
    II
    A
    As a reminder, it must be observed that a state prisoner’s
    federal habeas petition “shall not be granted with respect to
    any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
    proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
    (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
    or involved an unreasonable application
    of, clearly established Federal law, as
    CUERO V. CATE                        27
    determined by the Supreme Court of the
    United States; or
    (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in
    light of the evidence presented in the State
    court proceeding.”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d). “This is a ‘difficult to meet’ and ‘highly
    deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which
    demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
    doubt.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 
    563 U.S. 170
    , 181 (2011)
    (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 102 (2011);
    Woodford v. Visciotti, 
    537 U.S. 19
    , 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
    Contrary to the majority’s suggestion that the § 2254(d)
    “exceptions authorize a grant of habeas relief,” Maj. Op. at 7,
    these clauses prescribe conditions that are necessary, but not
    sufficient, for habeas relief under AEDPA.              Other
    requirements exist. Most importantly for this case, § 2254(d)
    “does not repeal the command of § 2254(a) that habeas relief
    may be afforded to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground’ that
    his custody violates federal law.” Wilson v. Corcoran,
    
    562 U.S. 1
    , 5–6 (2010) (per curiam).
    For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal
    law” is “the governing legal principle or principles set forth
    by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its
    decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 
    538 U.S. 63
    , 71–72 (2003)
    (citations omitted). It “includes only the holdings, as opposed
    to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions.” Woods v.
    Donald, 
    135 S. Ct. 1372
    , 1376 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting
    White v. Woodall, 
    134 S. Ct. 1697
    , 1702 (2014)).
    28                         CUERO V. CATE
    B
    A threshold problem with the opinion’s analysis is its
    failure to identify the appropriate state-court decision before
    us. The majority concludes that we should “look through”
    the opinion of the California Court of Appeal on direct review
    to the earlier reasoned decision of the San Diego Superior
    Court. Maj. Op. at 8. However, the look-through doctrine
    only applies “[w]here there has been one reasoned state
    judgment rejecting a federal claim,” Ylst v. Nunnemaker,
    
    501 U.S. 797
    , 803 (1991), and we cannot “look through”
    when the federal claim at issue was not “adjudicated on the
    merits” in the prior reasoned decision, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d); Casey v. Moore, 
    386 F.3d 896
    , 918 n.23 (9th Cir.
    2004); Medley v. Runnels, 
    506 F.3d 857
    , 870–71 (9th Cir.
    2007) (en banc) (Ikuta, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
    part) (“[W]e do not ‘look through’ to a state decision which
    does not address the constitutional claim.”); see also Murray
    v. Schriro, 
    745 F.3d 984
    , 997 (9th Cir. 2014)4 (“[W]e ‘look
    through’ to the last state-court decision that provides a
    reasoned explanation capable of review.” (emphasis added));
    Ortiz v. Yates, 
    704 F.3d 1026
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e
    look through state-court summary denials to the last reasoned
    state-court opinion on the claim at issue.” (emphasis added)).
    Here, the superior court never did adjudicate the merits of
    Cuero’s claim that the second amendment of the complaint
    constituted a breach of his plea agreement in violation of due
    process, entitling him to specific performance. In Cuero’s
    brief in opposition to the motion to amend and in oral
    4
    I note that the majority relies on one of Murray’s statements of law that
    has been undermined by a subsequent Supreme Court decision. See
    Woodall, 
    134 S. Ct. at 1706
    ; contra Maj. Op. at 7–8.
    CUERO V. CATE                                29
    argument on the motion, he exclusively argued that the
    superior court should exercise its discretion under state law
    to deny leave to amend.5 Cuero did not argue that the second
    amendment of the complaint would violate due process. He
    did not argue that any plea agreement prohibited the second
    amendment of the complaint, nor that he was entitled to
    specific performance, nor that the state court was required to
    construe plea agreements in accordance with state contract
    law. Indeed, Cuero argues to us that his trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to raise Cuero’s due process claim
    before the superior court.
    Thus, Cuero never raised a due process claim, and the
    superior court did not decide one. As a result, Cuero’s claim
    that the second amendment of the complaint breached a pre-
    existing plea agreement and thereby violated due process was
    not adjudicated on the merits by the superior court. Such
    claim was indeed adjudicated on the merits by a single state-
    court decision: the opinion of the California Court of Appeal
    5
    Cuero cited only California Penal Code § 969.5(a), Alvarado, and
    People v. Jackson, 
    48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838
     (Ct. App.), review granted and
    opinion superseded, 
    914 P.2d 831
     (Cal. 1996). I do not understand why
    the majority criticizes the superior court for then addressing these sources
    of law in its decision. Maj. Op. at 18–19 & n.13, 22. The majority also
    suggests that it grants relief because the superior court did not
    “recognize[]” or “acknowledge” (unspecified) Supreme Court precedents
    in its decision. Maj. Op. at 6, 22. But a “state court need not cite or even
    be aware of [the Supreme Court’s] cases under § 2254(d).” Richter,
    56 U.S. at 98 (citing Early v. Packer, 
    537 U.S. 3
    , 8 (2002) (per curiam)
    (“Avoiding these pitfalls does not require citation of our cases—indeed,
    it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the
    reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”)).
    30                         CUERO V. CATE
    on direct review, the only dispositive “decision” with respect
    to which the petition for habeas corpus has been brought.6
    C
    Of course, “[w]here a state court’s decision is
    unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s
    burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable
    basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at
    98. In such a situation, we must ask “what arguments or
    theories. . . could have supported[] the state court’s decision”
    and then determine “whether it is possible fairminded jurists
    could disagree that those arguments or theories are
    inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the
    Supreme Court. Id. at 102. “Thus, when the state court does
    not supply reasoning for its decision, we are instructed to
    engage in an independent review of the record and ascertain
    whether the state court’s decision was objectively
    unreasonable. Crucially, this is not a de novo review of the
    constitutional question, as even a strong case for relief does
    not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
    unreasonable.” Murray, 745 F.3d at 996–97 (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted).
    “Adherence to these principles serves important interests
    of federalism and comity. AEDPA’s requirements reflect a
    ‘presumption that state courts know and follow the law.’”
    Donald, 
    135 S. Ct. at 1376
     (quoting Visciotti, 
    537 U.S. at 24
    ).
    6
    This statement requires a slight caveat. With respect to Cuero’s
    ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the relevant state-court decision
    is that of the California Court of Appeal on collateral review. While the
    majority does not reach the issue, I would affirm the denial of the writ
    with respect to such claims.
    CUERO V. CATE                         31
    “When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral
    review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due
    respect by overturning their decisions only when there could
    be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong. Federal
    habeas review thus exists as ‘a guard against extreme
    malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a
    substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.’” 
    Id.
    (quoting Richter, 
    562 U.S. at
    102–03.).
    III
    In order to prevail in his petition for habeas corpus, Cuero
    must demonstrate (among other things) that: (1) on December
    8, 2005, he had a plea agreement with terms that prohibited
    amendment of the complaint; (2) such plea agreement had
    constitutional significance before the entry of judgment, so
    that breaching it would violate due process; and (3) rescission
    of such plea agreement (withdrawal of the plea) was not a
    constitutionally acceptable remedy for the breach of the plea
    agreement. Contrary to the majority’s analysis, under the
    Supreme Court’s holdings in existence at the time of the
    California Court of Appeal’s decision, he cannot.
    A
    The majority erroneously concludes that, when Cuero
    initially pleaded guilty on December 8, 2005, he had a
    “written plea agreement” in which the government
    guaranteed that punishment would be no greater than 14
    years, 4 months in prison. Maj. Op. at 4–5, 5, 6, 11–15 &
    nn. 8–9, 19, 21–22. To the contrary, fairminded jurists could
    readily conclude that Cuero’s initial guilty plea was not
    induced by any agreement with the State, let alone an
    agreement that the State would never amend its complaint.
    32                        CUERO V. CATE
    On December 8, 2005, Cuero signed a standard change of
    plea form. As completed, that document states:
    I, the defendant in the above-entitled case, in
    support of my plea of Guilty/No Contest,
    personally declare as follows: . . .
    2. I have not been induced to enter this plea
    by any promise or representation of any kind,
    except: (State any agreement with the District
    Attorney.)
    STC[7] – NO DEALS W/ PEOPLE.
    Appendix A at 1 ¶ 2. Cuero’s initials appear next to the line
    indicating “STC – NO DEALS W/ PEOPLE.” 
    Id.
     Cuero
    declared that he has “read, understood, and initialed each item
    above . . . and everything on the form . . . is true and correct.”
    
    Id.
     at 3 ¶ 13. In his plea colloquy that same day, Cuero
    confirmed that he had read, understood, and thoroughly
    reviewed with his attorney the plea form submitted, that he
    had signed and initialed the document, and that he had no
    questions about it.8
    What about the “14 year, 4 month maximum promised by
    the government,” Maj. Op. at 22, relied upon so heavily by
    the majority? Such a promise is a figment of the majority’s
    7
    Based on the judge’s statements at the plea hearing, it appears that
    “STC” stands for “sentence for the court.”
    8
    Because the majority and I cannot seem to agree on the basic facts of
    what was said at the plea hearing on December 8, 2005, I attach the
    transcript of that hearing as Appendix B to my dissent.
    CUERO V. CATE                              33
    imagination. The only statement signed by the prosecutor on
    the change of plea form was the following: “The People of
    the State of California, plaintiff, by its attorney, the District
    Attorney for the County of San Diego, concurs with the
    defendant’s plea of Guilty/No Contest as set forth above.”
    Appendix A at 3. And at the hearing prosecutor Kristian
    Trocha said three words before Cuero entered his plea. Those
    words were “Kristian Trocha” to identify himself in his initial
    appearance, and “Yes” in the context of the following
    exchange:
    THE COURT: It is a sentence for the court,
    no deals with the People. His maximum
    exposure is 14 years, 4 months in state prison,
    4 years on parole and a $10,000 fine. That’s
    the most he could receive by way of this plea;
    true, Mr. Tamayo?
    MR. TAMAYO: It is.
    THE COURT: Mr. Trocha?
    [MR. TROCHA9]: Yes.
    See Appendix B at 1, 2 (emphasis added). Thus, the court
    confirmed that there were “no deals with the People.” And
    the prosecutor did not promise to refrain from ever doing
    9
    The transcript actually says that someone named Dan Rodriguez said
    “Yes.” Appendix B at 2. The record does not indicate who Dan
    Rodriguez is, so the court of appeal could easily have concluded that the
    prosecutor only said his name before Cuero entered his plea. Because it
    does not matter for purposes of this dissent, I assume that this was a
    transcription error and that Mr. Trocha was the person who responded to
    the court.
    34                         CUERO V. CATE
    anything, such as amending the complaint, that would result
    in a longer sentence. He simply agreed, as a descriptive
    matter, that 14 years, 4 months, was the maximum prison
    term Cuero was facing at the time.10
    Both Cuero’s appellate counsel’s brief and the California
    Court of Appeal’s decision imply that the initial plea was not
    induced by a plea agreement. In his brief on appeal, Cuero’s
    counsel stated that Cuero initially “pled guilty,” with no
    mention of a plea agreement. In contrast, the brief states that
    the second guilty plea was made “pursuant to a plea
    agreement” and sets forth the terms of the charge bargain.
    Similarly, the Court of Appeal refers to the initial “guilty
    pleas” and the subsequent “negotiated guilty plea,” which
    strongly implies that the court of appeal determined that no
    10
    The majority suggests that, in the plea hearing, the State
    (1) “identified [the document in Appendix A] as the written plea
    agreement,” Maj. Op. at 14–15 n.9; (2) “stood before Judge Ervin and
    expressed [its] intent to ‘settle this case today,’” Maj. Op. at 11; and
    (3) “assented” “that the plea agreement was as to the charge and not to the
    specific sentence,” Maj. Op. at 11–12. It simply did not. See Appendix
    B. Nowhere in the attached transcript will the reader find the statements
    that the majority ascribes to the State. One will search in vain for any
    reference by the Deputy District Attorney, or by the Deputy Public
    Defender, for that matter, to a “plea agreement.”
    The majority reasonably notes that the superior court referred to a
    “plea agreement,” and it reasonably speculates that a “charge bargain”
    existed and that Cuero believed he would never face more than 14 years,
    4 months in prison. But the record contains no promise or agreement by
    the State to drop any charges or to refrain from amending the complaint.
    In that regard, the majority confuses actions taken after the plea was
    accepted with promises to take such actions. Trocha moved to “[d]ismiss
    in light of the plea.” Appendix B at 8. But the State never indicated, in
    either the change of plea form or the plea hearing, that such dismissal was
    required by the terms of any agreement.
    CUERO V. CATE                       35
    plea agreement existed for the initial plea. Such
    determination would not constitute an unreasonable
    determination of the facts.
    Given Cuero’s express declaration that he was not
    “induced to enter this plea by any promise or representation
    of any kind” and that there were no deals with the People, a
    fairminded jurist could readily conclude that the government
    did not promise Cuero anything, let alone that it would never
    amend its complaint.
    B
    Even if there were a plea agreement with terms that
    prohibited the State from amending its complaint, Cuero
    would still need to show that, under the Supreme Court’s
    holdings at the time of the California Court of Appeal’s
    decision, a fairminded jurist could not possibly conclude
    either that the plea agreement lacked constitutional
    significance before the entry of judgment or that rescission
    was a constitutionally acceptable remedy for a breach of the
    plea agreement.
    In his briefing before our Court, Cuero contends that the
    California Court of Appeal’s decision was an objectively
    unreasonable application of Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
     (1971). Apparently unsatisfied with the arguments that
    Cuero made on his own behalf, the majority regrettably adds
    some selective quotation of Mabry v. Johnson, 
    467 U.S. 504
    (1984), and Ricketts v. Adamson, 
    483 U.S. 1
     (1987), to
    36                         CUERO V. CATE
    support its grant of the writ.11 I respectfully suggest that the
    Court of Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an
    unreasonable application of, Santobello, Johnson, or
    Adamson.
    1
    In Santobello, the Supreme Court addressed “whether the
    State’s failure to keep a commitment concerning the sentence
    recommendation on a guilty plea required a new trial.”
    
    404 U.S. at
    257–58. There, as part of a plea bargain, the
    prosecution had agreed to make no recommendation as to the
    sentence, and Santobello had agreed to plead guilty to a
    lesser-included offense. 
    Id. at 258
    . At sentencing, the
    prosecutor instead recommended the maximum sentence,
    which the judge imposed. 
    Id.
     at 259–60. Upon certiorari, the
    Court vacated and remanded for the state court to consider the
    appropriate remedy for breach of the agreement. 
    Id.
     at
    262–63.
    As part of its reasoning, the Court indeed made the broad
    statement upon which the majority relies: “[W]hen a plea
    rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of
    the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
    inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”
    
    Id. at 262
    .
    11
    The majority’s opinion, like much of our circuit precedent, vacillates
    between conclusions under the “contrary to” and “unreasonable
    application of” clauses of § 2254(d)(1). Maj. Op. at 10, 15 (“contrary
    to”); Maj. Op. at 15, 19 (“unreasonable application of”). We should be
    more precise. The “‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application of’
    clauses in § 2254(d)(1) are distinct and have separate meanings.” Moses
    v. Payne, 
    555 F.3d 742
    , 751 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Andrade, 
    538 U.S. at
    73–75).
    CUERO V. CATE                              37
    However, this general, isolated statement does not, by
    itself, constitute the entire holding of Santobello.12 With
    respect to the proper remedy for the government’s breach, the
    Court remanded to the state court and held:
    The ultimate relief to which petitioner is
    entitled we leave to the discretion of the state
    court, which is in a better position to decide
    whether the circumstances of this case require
    only that there be specific performance of the
    agreement on the plea, in which case
    petitioner should be resentenced by a different
    judge, or whether, in the view of the state
    court, the circumstances require granting the
    relief sought by petitioner, i.e., the
    opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.
    
    Id.
     at 262–63. The Court noted that if “the state court decides
    to allow withdrawal of the plea, the petitioner will, of course,
    plead anew to the original charge on two felony counts.” 
    Id.
    at 263 n.2.
    Thus, contrary to the majority’s analysis, the Court in
    Santobello did not hold that literally every plea agreement
    offered by the prosecution and accepted by the defendant is
    enforceable by specific performance. Rather, the Court held
    that, when a trial court’s judgment of conviction is based on
    a plea induced by a promise later broken by the state, the
    judgment must be vacated. The Court further held that the
    12
    Accurate identification of the Supreme Court’s holdings is a critical
    step in our analysis under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1) because “clearly
    established Federal law” includes only the holdings, as opposed to the
    dicta, of the Supreme Court’s decisions. See Donald, 
    135 S. Ct. at 1376
    .
    38                      CUERO V. CATE
    ultimate relief would be left “to the discretion of the state
    court, which [was] in a better position to decide whether the
    circumstances of [the] case” required specific performance or
    withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id. at 263.
    2
    The majority’s grant of the petition rests entirely on the
    premise that “[u]nder clearly established Supreme Court law,
    Cuero stood convicted and his plea agreement became
    binding the moment the first Superior Court judge accepted
    his guilty plea.” Maj. Op. at 8–9. Johnson undercuts such
    premise.
    In Johnson, the Supreme Court addressed “whether a
    defendant’s acceptance of a prosecutor’s proposed plea
    bargain creates a constitutional right to have the bargain
    specifically enforced.” 
    467 U.S. at 505
    . There, the
    prosecutor proposed that, in exchange for a plea of guilty, the
    prosecutor would recommend a 21-year sentence served
    concurrently with other sentences. 
    Id.
     at 505–06. When the
    defendant’s counsel called the prosecutor and communicated
    acceptance of the offer, the prosecutor told defense counsel
    “that a mistake had been made and withdrew the offer.” 
    Id. at 506
    . The prosecutor then made a second offer to
    recommend a 21-year sentence to be served consecutively to
    the other sentences, which the defendant ultimately accepted.
    
    Id.
     “In accordance with the plea bargain, the state trial judge
    imposed a 21-year sentence to be served consecutively to the
    previous sentences.” 
    Id.
    In its analysis, the Court reasoned:
    CUERO V. CATE                                39
    A plea bargain standing alone is without
    constitutional significance; in itself it is a
    mere executory agreement which, until
    embodied in the judgment of a court, does not
    deprive an accused of liberty or any other
    constitutionally protected interest. It is the
    ensuing guilty plea that implicates the
    Constitution. Only after respondent pleaded
    guilty was he convicted, and it is that
    conviction which gave rise to the deprivation
    of respondent’s liberty at issue here.
    
    Id.
     at 507–08 (footnote omitted). The majority completely
    ignores the reasonable conclusion that a fairminded jurist
    could draw from the first sentence of this passage: a “plea
    bargain . . . is without constitutional significance . . . until
    embodied in the judgment of a court.” Id.13 In other words,
    it is the judgment, not the acceptance of a guilty plea, that
    “seals the deal between the state and the defendant.” Contra
    Maj. Op. at 9.14
    13
    The majority distorts this passage by selectively pairing three words
    from the second sentence with three words from the first sentence: “A
    defendant’s guilty plea thus ‘implicates the Constitution,’ transforming the
    plea bargain from a ‘mere executory agreement’ into a binding contract.”
    Maj. Op. at 9. However, such tortured paraphrasing does not remotely
    reflect the passage above or the holding of Johnson.
    14
    Some confusion could arise from the Court’s use of “convicted” and
    “conviction” in this passage and in Boykin v. Alabama, 
    395 U.S. 238
    , 242
    (1969), upon which the majority relies. I note that the word “conviction”
    has multiple meanings about which fairminded jurists can disagree. “It is
    certainly correct that the word ‘conviction’ can mean either the finding of
    guilt or the entry of a final judgment on that finding.” Deal v. United
    States, 
    508 U.S. 129
    , 131 (1993); see also 
    id.
     at 143–46 (Stevens, J.,
    dissenting). Here, the Supreme Court used “conviction” in the latter
    40                          CUERO V. CATE
    The Johnson Court further explained that “only when it
    develops that the defendant was not fairly apprised of its
    consequences can his plea be challenged under the Due
    Process Clause.” 
    467 U.S. at 509
    . The Court then applied
    that rule:
    [Johnson’s] plea was in no sense induced by
    the prosecutor’s withdrawn offer; unlike
    Santobello, who pleaded guilty thinking he
    had bargained for a specific prosecutorial
    sentencing recommendation which was not
    ultimately made, at the time respondent
    pleaded guilty he knew the prosecution would
    recommend a 21-year consecutive sentence.
    [Johnson] does not challenge the District
    Court’s finding that he pleaded guilty with the
    advice of competent counsel and with full
    awareness of the consequences—he knew that
    the prosecutor would recommend and that the
    judge could impose the sentence now under
    attack.
    
    Id. at 510
    .
    The Court concluded that Johnson’s “inability to enforce
    the prosecutor’s offer is without constitutional significance.”
    
    Id.
     Johnson “was not deprived of his liberty in any
    sense, i.e. the entry of a final judgment on a finding of guilt. Having just
    stated that a plea bargain “does not deprive an accused of liberty or any
    other constitutionally protected interest” “until embodied in the judgment
    of a court,” the Court did not state two sentences later that a guilty plea
    gives rise to the deprivation of a defendant’s liberty before the entry of
    judgment. And, even if this understanding of the Court’s use of
    “conviction” in Johnson is wrong, it is not objectively unreasonable.
    CUERO V. CATE                        41
    fundamentally unfair way. [He] was fully aware of the likely
    consequences when he pleaded guilty; it is not unfair to
    expect him to live with those consequences now.” 
    Id. at 511
    .
    Thus, the Court in Johnson held that a defendant’s
    inability to enforce a plea offer withdrawn before the entry of
    judgment is without constitutional significance, not that every
    breach of a plea agreement after a guilty plea violates the
    Constitution. Consequently, there is no due process violation
    so long as the prosecution fulfills the promises that induced
    the plea upon which the judgment of conviction is based.
    More importantly, Johnson clarified the holding in
    Santobello. The Court noted that “Santobello expressly
    declined to hold that the Constitution compels specific
    performance of a broken prosecutorial promise as the remedy
    for such a plea” and that “permitting Santobello to replead
    was within the range of constitutionally appropriate
    remedies.” 
    Id.
     at 510–11 n.11 (citing Santobello, 
    404 U.S. at
    262–63; 
    id.
     at 268–69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
    dissenting in part)).       “It follows that [Johnson’s]
    constitutional rights could not have been violated. Because
    he pleaded after the prosecution had breached its ‘promise’ to
    him, he was in no worse position than Santobello would have
    been had he been permitted to replead.” 
    Id.
    3
    The majority also concludes, erroneously, that the state
    court was “constitutionally obligated to construe the
    agreement in accordance with state contract law” and that a
    “state court must supply a remedy for a breached plea
    agreement that comports with state contract law.” Maj. Op.
    at 18, 20. Although the majority relies heavily on Adamson
    42                          CUERO V. CATE
    for these propositions, I respectfully suggest that case does
    not support, let alone require, such conclusions.
    In Adamson, the Supreme Court addressed “whether the
    Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution of [a defendant]
    for first-degree murder following his breach of a plea
    agreement under which he had pleaded guilty to a lesser
    offense, had been sentenced, and had begun serving a term of
    imprisonment.” Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at 3
    .15 There, the
    Arizona Supreme Court held that a written plea agreement16
    required Adamson to testify at the retrial of the other two
    individuals, that he violated the terms of the plea agreement
    by refusing to testify at the retrials, and that the terms of the
    plea agreement required the original first-degree murder
    charge to be reinstated automatically. 
    Id. at 5
    . The Supreme
    Court held that the subsequent prosecution did not violate the
    Double Jeopardy Clause. It reasoned that “terms of the
    agreement could not be clearer: in the event of [Adamson’s]
    breach occasioned by a refusal to testify, the parties would be
    returned to the status quo ante, in which case [Adamson]
    would have no double jeopardy defense to waive.” 
    Id. at 10
    .
    Thus, the Court held in Adamson that the Double Jeopardy
    Clause does not bar a state from vacating a judgment of
    conviction and reinstating criminal charges pursuant to the
    express terms of a plea agreement.
    15
    Given this description, one might get the sense that the holding of
    Adamson is unlikely to bear on the instant case.
    16
    Our Court published the entirety of the eighteen-paragraph plea
    agreement in an appendix. See Adamson v. Ricketts, 
    789 F.2d 722
    ,
    731–33 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 
    483 U.S. 1
    . Contrast that plea agreement
    with the change of plea form in this case, which expressly states that there
    was no plea agreement. See Appendix A at 1 ¶ 2.
    CUERO V. CATE                        43
    The majority does not rely on the holding of Adamson for
    its erroneous propositions, but rather on part of a sentence in
    dictum contained in a footnote of the Court’s opinion. In
    footnote 3, the Court addressed Adamson’s contention that
    the Arizona Supreme Court had misconstrued the terms of the
    plea agreement:
    We will not second-guess the Arizona
    Supreme Court’s construction of the language
    of the plea agreement. While we assess
    independently the plea agreement’s effect on
    respondent’s double jeopardy rights, the
    construction of the plea agreement and the
    concomitant obligations flowing therefrom
    are, within broad bounds of reasonableness,
    matters of state law, and we will not disturb
    the Arizona Supreme Court’s reasonable
    disposition of those issues. The dissent’s
    discourse on the law of contracts is thus
    illuminating but irrelevant. The questions
    whether the plea agreement obligated the
    respondent to testify at the retrial of Dunlap
    and Robison and, if so, whether the
    respondent breached this duty are matters
    appropriately left to the state courts. . . .
    Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at
    6 n.3 (emphasis added to the clause
    upon which the majority relies). As the Supreme Court
    eloquently once stated in an unrelated context: “Most
    importantly, the statement is pure dictum. It is dictum
    contained in a rebuttal to a counterargument. And it is
    unnecessary dictum even in that respect.” Kirtsaeng v. John
    Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
    133 S. Ct. 1351
    , 1368 (2013).
    44                        CUERO V. CATE
    Even if not dictum, the footnote has been misinterpreted
    by the majority. The majority, consistent with precedent of
    our circuit,17 focuses solely on the statement that “the
    construction of the plea agreement and the concomitant
    obligations flowing therefrom are, within broad bounds of
    reasonableness, matters of state law.” Maj. Op. at 15.
    However, in context it is clear that the Supreme Court was
    not stating that state courts are “constitutionally obligated to
    construe the agreement in accordance with state contract law”
    and that they violate the Constitution by failing to do so.
    Maj. Op. at 18. And the footnote does not remotely support
    the contention that a state court violates the Constitution if it
    does not “supply a remedy for a breached plea agreement that
    comports with state contract law.” Maj. Op. at 20. Quite the
    opposite. Respecting important interests of federalism and
    comity, the Court explained that the construction of plea
    agreements and whether a breach has occurred are matters of
    state law which are “appropriately left to the state courts.”
    Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at
    6–7 n.3. Federal courts must not
    “second-guess[] the finding of a breach” and they have no
    “license to substitute a federal interpretation of the terms of
    a plea agreement for a reasonable state interpretation.” 
    Id.
    Thus, the Adamson footnote, upon which the majority relies,
    is about deference to state courts, not about imposing new
    constitutional requirements on state courts.
    17
    Buckley v. Terhune, 
    441 F.3d 688
    , 694–95 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc);
    Davis v. Woodford, 
    446 F.3d 957
    , 962 (9th Cir. 2006). As discussed
    below, we should not follow these decisions because they are
    irreconcilable with intervening decisions of the Supreme Court. See infra
    note 20.
    CUERO V. CATE                        45
    C
    The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not
    “contrary to” Santobello, Johnson, or Adamson. “Because
    none of [the Supreme Court’s] cases confront ‘the specific
    question presented by this case,’ the state court’s decision
    could not be ‘contrary to’ any holding from” the Supreme
    Court. Donald, 
    135 S. Ct. at 1377
     (quoting Lopez v. Smith,
    
    135 U.S. 1
    , 4 (2014) (per curiam)).
    In Santobello, the defendant pleaded guilty in reliance
    upon the promises in the prosecution’s original offer, the
    prosecution broke a promise contained in its original offer,
    and the court entered judgment on the basis of the plea
    induced by the unfulfilled promise. Unlike Santobello, here
    the superior court’s judgment was not entered on the basis of
    the initial plea, purportedly induced by unfulfilled promises.
    Rather, judgment was entered on the basis of the subsequent
    plea, which was induced by promises that have been fulfilled.
    In Johnson, the prosecution withdrew its original offer before
    the defendant pleaded guilty. Unlike Johnson, here the
    prosecutor purportedly breached a plea agreement after the
    defendant pleaded guilty. Finally, Adamson does not
    remotely resemble this case. There, the defendant breached
    his plea bargain, and the question was whether or not the
    Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the state from vacating
    the conviction and reinstating criminal charges.
    Therefore, Santobello, Johnson, and Adamson do not
    address the specific question presented by this case: whether
    the Constitution requires specific performance of a plea
    bargain after a defendant has pleaded guilty but before the
    court has entered judgment. As a result, the state court’s
    46                      CUERO V. CATE
    decision could not be “contrary to” any holding from the
    Supreme Court. See Donald, 
    135 S. Ct. at 1377
    .
    D
    Nor was the California Court of Appeal’s decision an
    “unreasonable application of” the Court’s holdings in
    Santobello, Johnson, and Adamson. As discussed above,
    fairminded jurists could easily conclude that Cuero’s initial
    plea did not rest “on a promise or agreement of the
    prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement
    or consideration.” Santobello, 
    404 U.S. at 262
    ; see Appendix
    A at 1 ¶ 2 (“I have not been induced to enter this plea by any
    promise or representation of any kind, except: . . . NO
    DEALS W/ PEOPLE.”).18
    Even assuming that the State did make a promise not to
    amend its complaint, fairminded jurists could readily
    conclude that, under Johnson, Cuero’s inability to enforce the
    original plea agreement, which was withdrawn before the
    entry of judgment, is “without constitutional significance.”
    Johnson, 
    467 U.S. at
    507–08, 510. Moreover, fairminded
    jurists could conclude that, if the prosecution did breach some
    binding agreement with Cuero, “permitting [Cuero] to replead
    was within the range of constitutionally appropriate
    18
    Without any plea agreement to construe, Adamson’s purported
    requirement to construe the plea agreement in accordance with state
    contract law has no application here.
    CUERO V. CATE                              47
    remedies.” Johnson, 
    467 U.S. at
    510–11 n.11 (explaining
    Santobello); Santobello, 
    404 U.S. at
    263 & n.2.19
    Therefore, the state court’s ruling on the claim presented
    here was not “so lacking in justification that there was an
    error well understood and comprehended in existing law
    beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
    Richter, 
    562 U.S. at 103
    . As a result, the state court’s ruling
    was not an unreasonable application of Santobello, Johnson,
    or Adamson.
    IV
    Perhaps the majority’s faulty analysis can best be
    explained by its erroneous reliance on (1) perceived errors of
    state law; (2) circuit precedent (to bridge the gap between the
    Supreme Court’s holdings and this case); (3) a Supreme
    Court decision that post-dates the California Court of
    Appeal’s decision; and (4) issues of law framed at the highest
    levels of generality. Making matters worse, the majority
    misconstrues many of the sources of law upon which it
    improperly relies.
    A
    1
    The majority erroneously relies on perceived errors of
    state law. Maj. Op. at 15–22 & n.10; see Swarthout v. Cooke,
    19
    Adamson indirectly reinforces this conclusion with its repeated
    emphasis that returning the defendant to the status quo ante—i.e.,
    restoring his trial rights fully—resulted in no double jeopardy violation.
    See Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at
    10–11.
    48                      CUERO V. CATE
    
    562 U.S. 216
    , 219–22 (2011) (per curiam); Wilson v.
    Corcoran, 
    562 U.S. 1
    , 5 (2010) (per curiam); Estelle v.
    McGuire, 
    502 U.S. 62
    , 67 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 
    497 U.S. 764
    , 780 (1990); Pulley v. Harris, 
    465 U.S. 37
    , 41 (1984);
    Rose v. Hodges, 
    423 U.S. 19
    , 21–22 (1975) (per curiam).
    Specifically, it holds that the writ must issue because the
    state court failed “to interpret Cuero’s plea agreement
    consistently with California contract law” and failed to
    “supply a remedy for a breached plea agreement that
    comports with state contract law.” Maj. Op. at 20. “But it is
    only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s
    criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the
    federal courts. The habeas statute unambiguously provides
    that a federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner ‘only
    on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
    Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”
    Corcoran, 562 U.S. at 5 (quoting 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (a)). The
    Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that ‘federal habeas
    corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    McGuire, 
    502 U.S. at 67
    ). “It is not the province of a federal
    habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-
    law questions.” 
    Id.
     (quoting McGuire, 
    502 U.S. at
    67–68)
    (alteration omitted).
    The majority protests that these cases “do not speak to the
    situation where, as here, the Supreme Court has clearly held
    that the federal constitutional due process right is itself
    defined by reference to principles of state law.” Maj. Op. at
    16 n.10. One would expect a citation to Supreme Court
    precedent to follow such a strong statement, but none exists.
    The majority cites our Buckley case, which cites Adamson.
    Maj. Op. at 16 n.10. But Adamson held no such thing. In
    fact, Adamson does not contain the words “due process”
    CUERO V. CATE                              49
    anywhere in the Court’s opinion. “No opinion of [the
    Supreme Court] supports converting California’s [contract
    law] into a substantive federal requirement.” Cooke,
    
    562 U.S. at
    220–21.20
    2
    Even if the court could grant habeas relief on the basis of
    state law, the majority misconstrues California state law.
    California state law did not prohibit the second
    amendment of the complaint. Several provisions of the
    California Penal Code expressly permit a prosecutor to amend
    an information or complaint. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 969a,
    969.5(a), 1009. “Under section 1009, the People may amend
    an information without leave of court prior to entry of a
    defendant’s plea, and the trial court may permit an
    amendment of an information at any stage of the
    proceedings.” People v. Lettice, 
    163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862
    , 868
    (Ct. App. 2013). Sections 969a and 969.5(a) specifically deal
    with amendment of the complaint to add allegations of prior
    felonies, and § 969.5(a), upon which the State relied,
    addresses amendment of a complaint after a guilty plea:
    20
    Just as we did in Cooke, our Court in Brown v. Poole, 
    337 F.3d 1155
    (2003), Buckley, and Davis relied upon a perceived error of state law to
    conclude that the federal Due Process Clause was violated. Accordingly,
    with respect to its analysis regarding the required remedy, the reasoning
    of these cases has been undermined to the point that it is clearly
    irreconcilable with Corcoran and Cooke. See Lair v. Bullock, 
    798 F.3d 736
    , 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Miller v. Gammie, 
    335 F.3d 889
    , 892–93
    (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). Brown, Buckley, and Davis are of no help to
    the majority’s analysis.
    50                     CUERO V. CATE
    Whenever it shall be discovered that a
    pending complaint to which a plea of guilty
    has been made under Section 859a does not
    charge all prior felonies of which the
    defendant has been convicted either in this
    state or elsewhere, the complaint may be
    forthwith amended to charge the prior
    conviction or convictions and the amendments
    may and shall be made upon order of the
    court.
    
    Cal. Penal Code § 969.5
    (a). None of these statutes indicate
    that a prosecutor’s ability to amend the information is limited
    to situations in which a plea agreement has been entered.
    In People v. Valladoli, the California Supreme Court
    interpreted both § 969a and former § 969 ½ in determining
    whether an information could be amended to allege prior
    felonies after a defendant was found guilty at trial. 
    918 P.2d 999
     (Cal. 1996). Discussing former § 969 ½, the predecessor
    to § 969.5(a), the court said that if the defendant had “pleaded
    guilty before the magistrate under section 859a, . . . the
    express terms of section 969 ½ would have permitted the
    People to amend the information to charge his prior
    convictions after the guilty plea.” Id. at 1005; see also
    People v. Tindall, 
    14 P.3d 207
    , 212 (Cal. 2000) (citing
    Valladoli for this proposition). The court continued, “An
    obvious motivating force underlying section 969 ½ is to
    prevent one accused of a crime from quickly pleading guilty
    before a magistrate and thereby limiting the amount of time
    the prosecutor has to investigate, discover, and charge the
    accused’s prior felony convictions.” Valladoli, 918 P.2d at
    1005.
    CUERO V. CATE                               51
    Thus, the state statutory scheme and Valladoli permit a
    prosecutor to request to file an amended complaint to allege
    prior convictions after entering a plea agreement. The
    majority fails to cite any California case which has
    definitively held that a prosecutor may not amend a complaint
    after the court accepts a plea agreement.21
    Ultimately, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that
    a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one
    announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction,
    binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v.
    Richey, 
    546 U.S. 74
    , 76 (2005) (per curiam). Here, both the
    superior court and the appellate court determined that
    amendment of the complaint was permissible under state law.
    We must defer to those interpretations and conclude that there
    was no error of state law. Rather than deferring, the
    majority’s decision severely undermines the California
    Legislature’s determination, in enacting sections 969.5(a) and
    1009, that prosecutors should have the ability, with the
    approval of the court, to amend a complaint after a plea to
    allege all prior felonies.
    21
    In Lettice, the California Court of Appeal was presented with a case
    similar to this one, but did not decide this issue. On appeal, because the
    defendant did not argue that the prosecutor was precluded from filing an
    amended information after entering the plea agreement, the court of appeal
    expressly did not decide that issue. Lettice, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 871 n.12.
    The court of appeal remanded to the superior court with instructions to
    exercise its discretion to determine whether to permit the amendment of
    the complaint. Id. at 873.
    52                    CUERO V. CATE
    B
    1
    The majority erroneously relies (heavily) on circuit
    precedent to bridge the gap between the Supreme Court’s
    cases and this one. See Glebe v. Frost, 
    135 S. Ct. 429
    , 431
    (2014) (per curiam); Lopez v. Smith, 
    135 S. Ct. 1
    , 4 (2014)
    (per curiam); Marshall v. Rodgers, 
    133 S. Ct. 1446
    , 1450–51
    (2013) (per curiam); Parker v. Matthews, 
    132 S. Ct. 2148
    ,
    2155–56 (2012) (per curiam); Renico v. Lett, 
    559 U.S. 766
    ,
    778–79 (2010).
    Specifically, the majority relies on circuit precedent for
    the following propositions, which are not supported by the
    Supreme Court’s decisions:
    (1) The “federal constitutional due process
    right is itself defined by reference to
    principles of state law,” Maj. Op. at 16
    n.10 (citing Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at 695
    ); a
    state court is “constitutionally obligated to
    construe the [plea] agreement in
    accordance with state contract law.” Maj.
    Op. at 18 (citing Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at 696
    ); “[u]nder AEDPA, we . . . must
    consider whether the [state court] decision
    is consistent with a proper application of
    state contract law in interpreting the plea
    agreement . . . .” Maj. Op. at 15 (quoting
    Davis, 
    446 F.3d at 962
    ).
    (2) “[W]here the state has already received
    the benefit it bargained for—a plea of
    CUERO V. CATE                        53
    guilty and a conviction—specific
    performance is the best remedy, unless the
    defendant, whose choice it becomes,
    ‘elect[s] instead to rescind the agreement
    and take his chances from there.’” Maj.
    Op. at 20 (quoting Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at
    699 n.11).
    (3) “Because Cuero had already performed,
    ‘fundamental fairness demands that the
    state be compelled to adhere to the
    agreement as well.’” Maj. Op. at 21
    (quoting Brown, 
    337 F.3d at 1162
    ).
    Take the first proposition. As discussed above, Adamson
    does not even contain the words “due process,” so the notion
    that the “federal constitutional due process right is itself
    defined by reference to principles of state law” comes solely
    from Buckley. Similarly, footnote 3 of Adamson says nothing
    about state contract law. See Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at
    6 n.3
    (construction and breach determinations are “matters of state
    law”). So the majority’s restriction of the relevant state law
    to contract law comes solely from circuit precedent in
    Buckley and Davis. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 18 n.12 (rejecting
    argument under § 969.5(a) because that section “is irrelevant
    to the interpretation of a court-approved plea agreement under
    state contract principles”). Finally, no Supreme Court
    decisions remotely support the notion that specific
    performance is required when a defendant has pleaded guilty
    and the court has accepted that plea. Such notions are
    inventions of our circuit.
    The Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized [that]
    circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established
    54                      CUERO V. CATE
    Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’” Frost,
    
    135 S. Ct. at 431
     (quoting 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1)). “It
    therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under
    AEDPA.” Matthews, 
    132 S. Ct. at 2155
    . And “Circuit
    precedent cannot ‘refine or sharpen a general principle of
    Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that
    [the Supreme Court] has not announced.’” Smith, 
    135 S. Ct. at 4
     (quoting Rodgers, 
    133 S. Ct. at 1450
    ). In the past three
    years, the Supreme Court has caught us three times trying to
    evade this rule. See Frost, 
    135 S. Ct. at 431
     (“The Ninth
    Circuit acknowledged this rule, but tried to get past it . . . .”);
    Smith, 
    135 S. Ct. at 4
     (“The Ninth Circuit attempted to evade
    this barrier . . . .”); Rodgers, 
    133 S. Ct. at
    1450–51. It is
    unwise to think that we will slip through this time around.
    2
    Even if the majority could properly rely on our decisions
    in Brown, Buckley, and Davis, those cases not compel the
    conclusion that the majority reaches.
    For instance, Brown and Buckley acknowledged that there
    are “two available remedies at law for the breach of [a] plea
    agreement: withdrawal of [the] plea (i.e., rescission of the
    contract) and specific performance.” Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at 699
    ; Brown, 
    337 F.3d at 1161
    . In choosing between those
    remedies in Buckley, the en banc court “express[ed] no view
    on what the proper remedy would be in a case with other
    facts.” 
    Id.
     at 699 n.11.
    Cuero’s circumstances are readily distinguishable from
    those in Brown and Buckley. In both cases, we ordered
    specific performance because rescission of the contract was
    “impossible” under the circumstances and the petitioners
    CUERO V. CATE                         55
    could not “conceivably be returned to the status quo ante.”
    Brown, 
    337 F.3d at 1161
    ; Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at 699
    . The
    petitioners had “paid in a coin that the state cannot refund” by
    testifying and/or serving their bargained-for sentences.
    Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at 699
     (quoting Brown, 
    337 F.3d at 1161
    ).
    Here, when the superior court granted permission to amend
    the complaint, Cuero had not performed in a way that could
    not be undone. Instead, to the extent Cuero had performed,
    the “coin” he paid was fully refunded when his relinquished
    trial rights were fully restored. Thus, specific performance
    was not required by our precedents because rescission was
    still possible for Cuero.
    In addition, Cuero’s case differs from Davis, Buckley, and
    Brown because the petitioners were incarcerated on the basis
    of pleas induced by plea agreements that the state breached.
    See Davis, 
    446 F.3d at
    959–63; Buckley, 
    441 F.3d at
    691–93;
    Brown, 
    337 F.3d at
    1157–58. Thus, those cases were much
    closer to Santobello. Here, the initial plea, purportedly
    induced by a plea agreement which the state breached, was
    withdrawn and does not form the basis of Cuero’s
    incarceration. Cuero’s case is much closer to Johnson. He
    “was not deprived of his liberty in any fundamentally unfair
    way. [He] was fully aware of the likely consequences when
    he pleaded guilty; it is not unfair to expect him to live with
    those consequences now.” Johnson, 
    467 U.S. at 511
    .
    C
    1
    The majority erroneously relies upon a Supreme Court
    opinion—and numerous other authorities—issued after all of
    the state court decisions that related to Cuero. See Greene v.
    56                       CUERO V. CATE
    Fisher, 
    132 S. Ct. 38
    , 44–45 (2011); Cullen v. Pinholster,
    
    563 U.S. 170
    , 182 (2011); Andrade, 
    538 U.S. at
    71–72; see
    also Woodall, 
    134 S. Ct. at 1706
    .
    Specifically, the panel relies on Puckett v. United States,
    
    556 U.S. 129
     (2009), for the following propositions:
    (1) “A state court must supply a remedy for a
    breached plea agreement that comports
    with state contract law.” Maj. Op. at 20
    (citing Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 137
    ).22
    (2) The purported breach of Cuero’s plea
    agreement was “undoubtedly a violation
    of the defendant’s rights.” Maj. Op. at 6
    (quoting Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 136
    ).
    (3) “[P]lea bargains are essentially contracts.”
    Maj. Op. at 15 (quoting Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 137
    ).
    Section 2254(d)(1) “requires federal courts to focus on what
    a state court knew and did, and to measure state-court
    decisions against [the Supreme Court’s] precedents as of the
    time the state court renders its decision.” Greene, 
    132 S. Ct. at 44
     (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted)
    (emphasis in original). “Obviously, a state-court decision
    cannot be contrary to clearly established Federal law that was
    not yet in existence.” Murray, 745 F.3d at 997. Thus,
    22
    The majority also cites Adamson, 
    483 U.S. at
    5 n.3, and Davis,
    
    446 F.3d at 962
    , for this proposition. Maj. Op. at 20. None of the
    authorities cited support the majority’s contention, let alone clearly
    establish such contention.
    CUERO V. CATE                          57
    because Puckett was issued after the California Court of
    Appeal’s decision, it was not “clearly established Federal
    law” at the time the state court rendered its decision.
    Consequently, the majority cannot rely on Puckett.
    The majority also relies on a number of other authorities
    issued after the state court’s decision to state the principles of
    law that the state court should have applied. See Maj. Op. at
    9 (relying on Doe v. Harris, 
    640 F.3d 972
    , 975 (9th Cir.
    2011)); id. at 16 (relying on People v. Segura, 
    188 P.3d 649
    ,
    656 (Cal. 2008)); 
    id. at 17
     (relying on Sateriale v. R.J.
    Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
    697 F.3d 777
    , 791 (9th Cir. 2012));
    
    id. at 20
     (relying on In re Timothy N., 
    157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 78
    ,
    88 (Ct. App. 2013)); 
    id.
     at 20–21 n.14 (relying on 5 Wayne R.
    LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.2(e) (4th ed. 2015)).
    This reliance, too, was impermissible, for the state court
    cannot be expected to apply rules of law stated in authorities
    not yet in existence.
    2
    Even if the majority could rely on Puckett, that case
    cannot support the weight of the majority’s argument.
    The Supreme Court in Puckett stated that “[w]hen a
    defendant agrees to a plea bargain, the Government takes on
    certain obligations. If those obligations are not met, the
    defendant is entitled to seek a remedy, which might in some
    cases be rescission of the agreement, allowing him to take
    back the consideration he has furnished, i.e., to withdraw his
    plea.” 
    556 U.S. at 137
    . Clearly, withdrawal of the plea is a
    constitutionally permissible remedy, and Cuero received that
    remedy. The Puckett Court did not remotely suggest that the
    determination of which remedy to afford is a matter of state
    58                    CUERO V. CATE
    contract law. Also, the Puckett Court acknowledged that,
    although “plea bargains are essentially contracts,” “the
    analogy may not hold in all respects.” 
    Id.
     This undermines
    the majority’s proposition that only state contract law can be
    used to determine whether amendment of the complaint was
    permitted.
    D
    Finally, the majority erroneously frames legal issues at
    the highest levels of generality. See Donald, 
    135 S. Ct. at 1377
    ; Smith, 
    135 S. Ct. at 4
    ; Nevada v. Jackson, 
    133 S. Ct. 1990
    , 1994 (2013) (per curiam); cf. City & County of San
    Francisco v. Sheehan, 
    135 S. Ct. 1765
    , 1775–76 (2015) (“We
    have repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in
    particular—not to define clearly established law at a high
    level of generality.” (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. 731
    , 742 (2011))). “By framing [the Supreme Court’s]
    precedents at such a high level of generality, a lower federal
    court could transform even the most imaginative extension of
    existing case law into ‘clearly established Federal law, as
    determined by the Supreme Court.’” Jackson, 
    133 S. Ct. at 1994
     (quoting 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1)). Such an “approach
    would defeat the substantial deference that AEDPA requires.”
    
    Id.
    The majority can only grant habeas relief if the Supreme
    Court’s cases clearly establish that a defendant has a due
    process right to specific performance of a plea agreement
    before the entry of judgment. But none of the Supreme
    Court’s cases addresses that specific issue. See Smith, 135 S.
    Ct. at 4.
    CUERO V. CATE                          59
    Instead, the best the majority can do is to point to
    Adamson for the general proposition that “the construction of
    [a] plea agreement and the concomitant obligations flowing
    therefrom are, within broad bounds of reasonableness,
    matters of state law.” 
    483 U.S. at
    6 n.3. “This proposition is
    far too abstract to establish clearly the specific rule [Cuero]
    needs.” Smith, 135 S. Ct. at 4.
    The majority treats the door supposedly opened by
    Adamson’s general proposition as license to engage freely in
    de novo determination of what California contract law
    requires, both for the construction of the agreement and the
    remedy for a breach. Maj. Op. at 15–22. Again, however, no
    California cases establish that specific performance is
    required when the State amends its complaint after entry of a
    plea but before judgment. As a result, the majority is forced
    to frame principles of California law at the highest level of
    generality in order to conclude that specific performance is
    required. The majority rests its decision on the very general
    principle that “the remedy for breach must ‘repair the harm
    caused by the breach.’” Maj. Op. at 20 (quoting People v.
    Toscano, 
    20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 923
    , 927 (Ct. App. 2004)). Such a
    general proposition obviously does not establish, under
    California law, that specific performance was the only
    remedy in this situation that could repair the harm caused by
    the breach.
    To supply that final conclusion, the majority relies purely
    on its own de novo, ipse dixit analysis. Note that the key last
    paragraph before its conclusion section contains only a single
    citation to a source of law, and that citation does not establish
    that specific performance is required here. Ultimately, the
    court’s decision rests on its own determinations that it would
    be unfair not to require specific performance, Maj. Op. at 21,
    60                         CUERO V. CATE
    and that “specific performance is necessary to maintain the
    integrity and fairness of the criminal justice system,” Maj.
    Op. at 20–21 n.14.23 These conclusions are not dictated by
    state or federal law.
    V
    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully conclude that the
    majority erroneously orders reversal of the district court and
    grant of the writ. In accordance with Supreme Court law, a
    fairminded jurist could conclude that Cuero’s plea was not
    induced by any promise by the prosecutor. See Appendix A.
    Even assuming there was such a promise, a fairminded jurist
    could conclude that the plea agreement was without
    constitutional significance before the entry of judgment.
    And, even if there were a breach of a constitutionally binding
    plea agreement, nothing in any Supreme Court decision
    clearly establishes that the state court was required to order
    specific performance. Thus, the state court’s decision was
    neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of
    “clearly established Federal law.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1).
    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    23
    The majority determines that “specific performance is necessary to
    maintain the integrity and fairness of the criminal justice system” on the
    basis of a treatise, a 1977 Washington Supreme Court decision, and an
    article in the second volume of the now-defunct University of San
    Fernando Valley Law Review. Maj. Op. at 20–21 n.14. These hardly
    constitute “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
    Court.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1).
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