Dara Parvin v. Cna Financial Corp , 646 F. App'x 562 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 29 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DR. DARA PARVIN, No. 13-36026
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 6:10-cv-06332 TC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CNA FINANCIAL CORPORATION dba
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY; and
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY
COMPANY
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Thomas M. Coffin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2016
Portland, Oregon
Before: BERZON and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and SAMMARTINO, District
Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
Dr. Dara Parvin appeals the district court’s dismissal of his negligence,
fraud, and tortious breach of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing causes of
action and summary adjudication of his breach of contract cause of action against
his malpractice liability insurer, CNA Financial Corporation and Casualty
Insurance Company (collectively, “CNA”). As the facts and procedural history are
familiar to the parties, we do not recite them here except as necessary to explain
our disposition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not err in summarily adjudicating and dismissing Dr.
Parvin’s causes of action. CNA introduced evidence—which the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting, see Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc.,
541 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2008)—demonstrating that the Oregon Medical
Association Professional Consultation Committee (“PCC”) consented to the Mason
settlement. Dr. Parvin failed to identify any evidence showing that there was a
genuine issue for trial regarding the PCC’s consent to settle. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986). Given the PCC’s declarations of consent,
Dr. Parvin’s breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and bad faith causes of action
necessarily fail. The district court, therefore, did not err in dismissing and
summarily adjudicating these claims. See Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d
1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We . . . may affirm a judgment on any ground
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supported by the record, regardless of whether the district court relied upon,
rejected, or even considered that ground.”).
Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing CNA to
file a second motion for summary judgment on Dr. Parvin’s breach of contract
cause of action or in construing CNA’s motions in limine concerning Dr. Parvin’s
other causes of action as successive motions for summary judgment. Successive
motions for summary judgment are generally permissible. See Hoffman v.
Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 910–12 (9th Cir. 2010).
Lastly, Dr. Parvin waived any challenge to the district court’s partial award
of costs. See United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168–69 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that an appellant “waived [an] issue on appeal” where it
“present[ed] th[e] argument in a lone footnote and fail[ed] to cite any authority in
support”).
AFFIRMED.
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