Song He v. Coles Properties ( 2018 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    SONG HE, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees,
    v.
    COLES PROPERTIES LLC, Intervenor/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 17-0561
    FILED 10-23-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2016-053018
    The Honorable Steven K. Holding, Judge Pro Tempore
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    The Kozub Law Group, PLC, Scottsdale
    By William A. Kozub, Richard W. Hundley
    Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees
    Evans Dove Nelson Fish & Grier, PLC, Mesa
    By Douglas N. Nelson, Trevor J. Fish, Thomas J. Grier
    Counsel for Intervenor/Appellant
    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge James P. Beene and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
    M O R S E, Judge:
    ¶1             Coles Properties LLC ("Coles") appeals the superior court's
    order denying Coles' motion to set aside default judgment under Arizona
    Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 60(b).1 The superior court found that Coles
    was not a party and did not have standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b).
    Because Coles was a party with standing, we vacate the superior court's
    order and remand for the superior court to decide the merits of Coles'
    motion.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Coles and Appellee Song He both claim to be victims of fraud
    perpetrated by Darrell Knoch and Imagine Enterprises, LLC ("Imagine").
    This appeal concerns Coles' and Song He's claims to real property
    ("Property") that Imagine purchased in early 2016 but that Coles currently
    owns.
    ¶3            On September 28, 2016, Appellees filed suit against Imagine
    for fraud and other misdeeds, seeking, among other things, an equitable
    mortgage on the Property, which Imagine owned at that time. Two days
    later, Appellees recorded a lis pendens, giving notice of the pending lawsuit
    and claims against the Property. Upon learning of the lis pendens and
    lawsuit, Coles convinced Imagine to quitclaim the property to it, and on
    December 8, 2016, Coles recorded a quitclaim deed transferring the
    Property from Imagine to Coles. On December 13, 2016, Coles sent
    Appellees a demand letter, telling Appellees that it held legal title to the
    property and requesting that Appellees quitclaim any of their interest to
    Coles. On the same day, Appellees moved for default judgment against
    Imagine and Knoch, requesting, among other forms of relief, that the court
    1     The parties' filings and the superior court's order cite to Rule 60(c).
    The Rules were amended in 2017, and what was previously Rule 60(c) is
    currently numbered Rule 60(b). See Ariz. R. Civ. P., prefatory cmt. to the
    2017 amendments.
    2
    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    grant a "constructive trust and/or equitable mortgage" against the Property
    and "that Defendant Imagine Enterprises, LLC, be ordered to hold such
    Property as constructive trustees and/or equitable mortgagees for the
    benefit of Plaintiffs."
    ¶4           Appellees did not notify the superior court that Coles was the
    new owner of the Property, and they did not seek to join Coles as a party
    pursuant to Rule 19. Appellees also did not notify Coles of the default
    proceedings. On January 4, 2017, the superior court entered default
    judgment against Imagine and Knoch. Among other relief, the judgment
    granted Song He an equitable mortgage on the Property and, as requested
    by Appellees, ordered Imagine to hold the property "as constructive
    trustees and/or equitable mortgagees for the benefit of Plaintiffs."
    ¶5            On January 10, 2017, Coles moved to intervene. For reasons
    not important to this appeal, the parties and the superior court determined
    that intervention at that time was not in the interests of the parties, and for
    that reason the court denied the motion without prejudice. Coles later
    renewed its motion to intervene and on May 8, 2017, the court granted
    Coles' motion, finding that Coles met the requirements for a permissive
    intervention under Rule 24(b), and also was entitled to intervention as a
    matter of right under Rule 24(a).
    ¶6            Upon successfully intervening, Coles moved to set aside the
    part of the default judgment that granted Song He an equitable mortgage
    on the Property, arguing excusable neglect and other extraordinary
    circumstances under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). The superior court denied the
    motion, finding that Coles was not a party under Rule 60(b), and that Coles
    did not have standing. The court entered final judgment, Coles timely
    appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the
    Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-
    120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            Generally, we review rulings on a motion for relief under
    Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion. See Gonzalez v. Nguyen, 
    243 Ariz. 531
    ,
    534, ¶ 11 (2018) ("The rule . . . creat[es] a very broadly worded ground for
    relief, which we construe as investing extensive discretion in trial courts.").
    However, whether a person has standing is a legal question which we
    review de novo. Aegis of Ariz., L.L.C. v. Town of Marana, 
    206 Ariz. 557
    , 562,
    ¶ 16 (App. 2003).
    3
    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    ¶8              Coles has standing under traditional standing principles
    because the judgment imposes a mortgage and lessens the value of Coles'
    Property. See Biggs v. Cooper ex rel. County of Maricopa, 
    236 Ariz. 415
    , 418,
    ¶ 8 (2014) ("To have standing, 'a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable
    injury.'" (quoting Sears v. Hull, 
    192 Ariz. 65
    , 69, ¶ 16 (1998))). Appellees
    argue, however, that Coles cannot seek relief under Rule 60(b) because
    Coles was not specifically mentioned in the judgment and was not a party
    to this action when default judgment was entered. However, Rule 60(b)
    provides that "the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from
    a final judgment," and does not explicitly limit relief to those who were
    parties at the time of the judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Coles successfully
    intervened and, therefore, was "a party" at the time the court ruled on the
    motion for relief under Rule 60(b).
    ¶9             In addition, Coles is Imagine's "legal representative" because
    it stands in the same position as Imagine with respect to the Property. See
    11 Charles Allan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
    § 2852 (3d ed. 2018) ("The reference to the party's legal representative has
    been construed to refer solely to persons who effectively stand in the shoes
    of a party, such as a trustee or guardian, and not to include the lawyer for
    the party."); Matter of El Paso Refinery, LP, 
    37 F.3d 230
    , 234 (5th Cir. 1994)
    ("The term was intended to reach 'only those individuals who were in a
    position tantamount to that of a party or whose legal rights were otherwise
    so intimately bound up with the parties that their rights were directly
    affected by the final judgment.'" (quoting Kem Mfg. Corp. v. Wilder, 
    817 F.2d 1517
    , 1520 (11th Cir. 1987))); In re Lovitt, 
    757 F.2d 1035
    , 1040 (9th Cir. 1985)
    (interpreting "legal representative" to mean a party's "privy").2
    ¶10          Liston v. Butler, 
    4 Ariz. App. 460
     (1966), is instructive. In that
    case, the superior court allowed a non-party to intervene and set aside a
    judgment that imposed a lien on his property without naming him. This
    Court affirmed, stating:
    We believe that one whose interests are directly affected by a
    judgment in a proceeding to which he is not a party, may
    timely move to set aside such judgment, and the trial court
    2      Rule 60(b) is identical in all material respects to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
    "Although a federal court's interpretation of a federal procedural rule is not
    binding in the construction of our rule, we recognize its instructive and
    persuasive value and that uniformity in interpretation of our rules and the
    federal rules is highly desirable." Flynn v. Campbell, 
    243 Ariz. 76
    , 80, ¶ 9
    (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    4
    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    after notice and hearing may set aside said judgment and
    grant a motion to intervene.
    Id. at 466. Thus, even if Coles had not intervened and was not yet a named
    party to the lawsuit when it moved to set aside the judgment, the superior
    court could consider and grant Rule 60(b) relief and allow it to intervene at
    the same time because its "interests are directly affected by [the] judgment."
    Id.; cf. Woodbridge Structured Funding, LLC v. Ariz. Lottery, 
    235 Ariz. 25
    , 30,
    ¶ 23 (App. 2014) ("Because Genex had no right to intervene, it is not entitled
    to Rule 60 relief from the trial court's entry of judgment . . . .").
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11           For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the superior court's
    order denying Coles' motion to set aside and remand for consideration of
    the motion on the merits. As the successful party, Coles is entitled to costs
    on appeal. We defer Coles' request for attorney fees on appeal to the
    superior court's discretion pending resolution of the matter on the merits.
    See Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 
    216 Ariz. 195
    , 204, ¶ 37
    (App. 2007).
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5