Alberto Solorio v. Clovis Unified School District ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 15 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALBERTO SOLORIO; et al., No. 17-16625
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
1:16-cv-01319-LJO-BAM
v.
CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 20, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: M. SMITH, NGUYEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
J.S., by and through her parents Alberto and Alicia Solorio, appeals the
district court’s affirmance of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision finding
that, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400 et seq., Clovis Unified School District’s 2016 individualized education
program (IEP) was a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
restrictive environment (LRE). We affirm.
1. The district court did not err in giving due weight to the ALJ’s decision,
which was careful, thorough, well-reasoned, sensitive to the complexity of the
relevant legal issues, and thus entitled substantial weight. See Ojai Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1993). With respect to the
persuasiveness of Patricia McVay’s testimony, the ALJ was in the best position to
determine the credibility of the relevant witnesses, see Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J.
v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2001), and he offered sound
reasons for finding McVay’s testimony to be unpersuasive.
2. There is sufficient evidence to support the determination that Clovis’s
proposed IEP constitutes a FAPE in the LRE. In balancing the relevant Rachel H.1
factors, the ALJ found that the factors concerning educational and non-academic
benefits weighed in favor of a conclusion that the proposed IEP was a FAPE in the
LRE, and that those factors outweighed the disruptiveness and cost factors. The
district court agreed. Those findings were permissible under our case law, see,
e.g., Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 826 F.3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir.
2016), and we will not disturb them, see Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch.
Dist., 502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007).
AFFIRMED.
1
Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H. ex rel.
Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994).
2