Aaron Stribling v. C. Tobias , 690 F. App'x 972 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MAY 11 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    AARON L. STRIBLING,                             No.    16-16738
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00399-MCE-EFB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    C. TOBIAS; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 8, 2017**
    Before:      REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    California state prisoner Aaron L. Stribling appeals pro se from the district
    court’s judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging constitutional
    claims. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a
    dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 
    213 F.3d 443
    , 447 (9th
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Cir. 2000). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Stribling’s due process claim involving
    a rules violation because Stribling failed to allege facts sufficient to show a
    protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 483-85 (1995) (a
    prisoner has no federal or state protected liberty interest when the sanction
    imposed neither extends the length of his sentence nor imposes an “atypical and
    significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
    life”); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro
    se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual
    allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in severing the excessive force
    claims against defendants Blessing, DeFazio, and Guffee because Stribling failed
    to demonstrate that these claims arose out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or
    series of transactions or occurrences” and involve a “question of law or fact
    common to all defendants.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); see also Coughlin v. Rogers,
    
    130 F.3d 1348
    , 1351 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth standard of review and
    explaining the requirements for permissive joinder).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                     16-16738