Ray Vaughn v. Hood , 670 F. App'x 962 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              NOV 22 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RAY LEE VAUGHN,                                  No. 15-17406
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02235-MCE-
    KJN
    v.
    HOOD, Correctional Officer, High Desert          MEMORANDUM*
    State Prison; ROLLANDS, Correctional
    Officer, High Desert State Prison,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 16, 2016**
    Before:      LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    California state prisoner Ray Lee Vaughn appeals pro se from the district
    court’s judgment dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action arising from defendants’ alleged failure to protect him from
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    an assault. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo.
    Albino v. Baca, 
    747 F.3d 1162
    , 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (legal rulings on
    exhaustion); Knievel v. ESPN, 
    393 F.3d 1068
    , 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Vaughn’s action for failure to state a
    claim because it is clear from the face of the complaint and its attachments that
    Vaughn failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies by failing to appeal
    separately the third-level cancellation decision. See Woodford v. Ngo, 
    548 U.S. 81
    ,
    90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . means using all
    steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses
    the issues on the merits).” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks
    omitted)); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (“[W]here a failure to exhaust is clear from the
    face of the complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss under Rule
    12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.”); see also Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of
    Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 
    228 F.3d 1043
    , 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (in
    determining whether the complaint states a claim for relief, “we may consider facts
    contained in documents attached to the complaint”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider
    Vaughn’s contention – raised for the first time in his objections to the magistrate
    2                                      15-17406
    judge’s findings and recommendations – that his failure to exhaust should be
    excused because administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Brown
    v. Roe, 
    279 F.3d 742
    , 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and
    stating that district judge has discretion to decide whether to consider evidence
    presented for the first time in a party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s
    recommendation).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. See United
    States v. Elias, 
    921 F.2d 870
    , 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not
    presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     15-17406