Matter of Romena Q. v. Edwin Q. , 33 N.Y.S.3d 504 ( 2016 )


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  •                           State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: June 2, 2016                      520906
    ________________________________
    In the Matter of ROMENA Q.,
    Respondent,
    v                                     MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    EDWIN Q.,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   April 22, 2016
    Before:   Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Mulvey, JJ.
    __________
    Ivy M. Schildkraut, Monticello, for appellant.
    Cliff Gordon, Monticello, for respondent.
    Jane Bloom, Monticello, attorney for the child.
    __________
    Garry, J.P.
    Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Sullivan County
    (McGuire, J.), entered March 6, 2015, which granted petitioner's
    application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 8,
    for an order of protection.
    Petitioner and respondent were married and resided together
    with respondent's daughter until the summer of 2014. At that
    time, the parties separated and respondent moved out of the
    marital home. In September 2014, petitioner commenced this
    proceeding alleging that respondent had committed certain family
    -2-                520906
    offenses during an incident at the home.1 Following a fact-
    finding hearing, Family Court found that respondent had committed
    the family offense of criminal mischief in the fourth degree and
    issued a two-year order of protection in favor of petitioner.
    Respondent appeals.
    A petitioner in a family offense proceeding must establish
    that the offense has been committed by "a fair preponderance of
    the evidence" (Family Ct Act § 832; see Matter of Elizabeth X. v
    Irving Y., 132 AD3d 1100, 1101 [2015]; Matter of Lynn TT. v
    Joseph O., 129 AD3d 1129, 1130 [2015]). As is relevant here, the
    offense of criminal mischief in the fourth degree required proof
    that, "having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to
    believe that he . . . [had] such right, [respondent] . . .
    [i]ntentionally damage[d] property of another person" (Penal Law
    § 145.00).
    At the fact-finding hearing, Family Court heard the
    testimony of petitioner, respondent and the police officer who
    responded to the incident. The testimony established that
    respondent had returned to the former marital residence, a rental
    property, to pick up his daughter and retrieve his belongings.
    Petitioner testified that, upon arriving and finding the front
    door locked, respondent began insulting petitioner and banging
    and pounding on the door, ultimately causing damage to the door
    frame, lock and screen door. Petitioner called the police. The
    officer who responded testified that, upon his arrival, he
    observed damage to the front door, including cracks and damage to
    the lock. Respondent testified that he was not aware of causing
    damage to the door. In his testimony, respondent described
    approaching the front door of the residence and observing
    petitioner inside with some of his belongings. Upon attempting
    to open the door, he found that it was locked, and, nevertheless,
    he continued to "push on the door," demanding that petitioner
    give him his belongings.
    1
    Petitioner also commenced a custody proceeding that was
    the subject of a prior appeal (Matter of Romena Q. v Edwin Q.,
    133 AD3d 1148 [2015]).
    -3-                  520906
    Family Court sits in a superior position to observe and
    evaluate the testimony and, thus, "'its determinations regarding
    the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
    appeal'" (Matter of Christina KK. v Kathleen LL., 119 AD3d 1000,
    1001 [2014], quoting Matter of Shana SS. v Jeremy TT., 111 AD3d
    1090, 1091 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]; see Matter of
    Mauzy v Mauzy, 40 AD3d 1147, 1148 [2007]). Upon review of the
    record, we agree that the evidence was sufficient to establish
    that respondent committed the family offense of criminal mischief
    in the fourth degree by intentionally causing damage to the front
    door of the residence. Although respondent denied intending to
    damage the door, "[i]ntent may be inferred from the act itself,
    from a [respondent's] conduct and statements, and from the
    surrounding circumstances" (People v Hodges, 66 AD3d 1228, 1230
    [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 939 [2010]; see Matter of Carlos M., 32
    AD3d 686, 687 [2006]). The court was free to reject respondent's
    explanation (see Matter of Shana SS. v Jeremy TT., 111 AD3d at
    1092; Matter of Jenna T. v Mark U., 82 AD3d 1512, 1513 [2011]),
    and we find no error in the determination.
    Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Mulvey, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 520906

Citation Numbers: 140 A.D.3d 1232, 33 N.Y.S.3d 504

Filed Date: 6/2/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023