Sara Sanchez-Resendiz v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SARA SANCHEZ-RESENDIZ, No. 17-73511
Petitioner, Agency No. A078-048-655
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 6, 2022**
Portland, Oregon
Before: WATFORD, R. NELSON, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Sara Sanchez-Resendiz petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motion to reopen or reconsider her
removal proceedings. We have limited jurisdiction to review for legal or
constitutional error, see Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016), and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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we deny the petition.
In Sanchez-Resendez v. Lynch, 608 F. App’x 537, 538 (9th Cir. 2015), we
held that Sanchez-Resendiz’s conviction for facilitating the unlawful transportation
of marijuana for sale constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. We concluded
that Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-3405(A)(4), which contains the substantive
offense underlying Sanchez-Resendiz’s conviction, is divisible. Id. We then
applied the modified categorical approach to determine that Sanchez-Resendiz’s
conviction included a “for sale” element and therefore constituted a drug-
trafficking offense involving moral turpitude. Id.
Sanchez-Resendiz argues that intervening decisions from both the Supreme
Court and this court have demonstrated that our prior decision was erroneous. But
in Walcott v. Garland, 21 F.4th 590, 596–98 (9th Cir. 2021), we confirmed that
§ 13-3405(A)(4) is divisible and that the “transport for sale” offense it
encompasses can involve moral turpitude. Although we held that Walcott’s
convictions in that case did not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude,
Walcott was convicted under § 13-3405(A)(4) and (B)(10) for an offense involving
less than two pounds of marijuana. Id. at 598. Here, Sanchez-Resendiz pleaded
guilty to violating § 13-3405(A)(4) and (B)(11), meaning her offense involved two
pounds or more of marijuana.
Because § 13-3405(A)(4) is divisible, and because § 13-3405(B)(11) does
Page 3 of 3
not encompass very small amounts of marijuana like the provision at issue in
Walcott, Sanchez-Resendiz can point to no intervening precedent undermining our
conclusion that her conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. See
Barragan-Lopez v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 899, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2007). Sanchez-
Resendiz has thus failed to demonstrate that the BIA’s decision denying sua sponte
reopening or reconsideration contains legal or constitutional error, and we lack
jurisdiction to further review that decision or any other arguments she makes in
support. See Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.