Angelique Smith v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      JUL 12 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANGELIQUE SMITH,                                No.    21-35652
    Plaintiff-Appellant,          D.C. No. 4:20-cv-05096-EFS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 7, 2022**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: CLIFTON and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and SEEBORG, ***
    District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Chief United States District Judge
    for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    Angelique Smith appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
    Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits
    under Title II of the Social Security Act. We review the district court’s order de novo
    and reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence or
    if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,
    
    807 F.3d 996
    , 1002 (9th Cir. 2015). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    ,
    and we affirm.
    1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s weighing of Drs. Marks, Dowell,
    Smiley and Kraft’s opinions. The ALJ gave Dr. Marks’s opinion little weight
    because it had internal inconsistencies. For example, Dr. Marks found that Smith
    had marked learning limitations in one part, but “no significant learning problems”
    in another. Inconsistencies are “specific and legitimate” reasons for rejecting an
    opinion. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2008).
    The ALJ adequately incorporated Dr. Dowell’s recommendations into the
    Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). See Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006 (the ALJ does
    not ignore findings if they are incorporated into the RFC). For example, Dr. Dowell
    opined that Smith would have minimal difficulty interacting with coworkers, and the
    ALJ exceeded that recommendation by limiting Smith’s RFC to “superficial”
    relationships and “no teamwork.”
    2
    The ALJ rejected Dr. Smiley’s opinion that Smith would have two
    unscheduled absences per month. The ALJ discounted that finding because it was
    speculative and it was inconsistent with Dr. Smiley’s previous conclusion that Smith
    had mild-to-moderate limitations and with the longitudinal medical records,
    including Smith’s intermittent treatment. See Sousa v. Callahan, 
    143 F.3d 1240
    ,
    1244 (9th Cir. 1998) (the ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion by referring to
    specific medical evidence).
    Further, the ALJ incorporated Dr. Kraft’s findings in the RFC. But Smith
    argues that the ALJ did not account for Dr. Kraft’s opinion that she needed
    “reasonable rest breaks” in the RFC. The ALJ, however, noted that Smith needed
    “regularly scheduled breaks” in the RFC. Smith contends Kraft’s opinion meant that
    she needed two unscheduled 30-minute breaks, which the vocational expert testified
    precludes competitive employment. But nothing compels that conclusion that Dr.
    Kraft’s opinion about “reasonable rest breaks” equates to unscheduled 30-minute
    breaks. In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s weight distribution to the
    foregoing opinions.
    2. The ALJ did not discuss Smith’s fibromyalgia in conjunction with her other
    impairments, but any error was harmless because Smith did not meet her initial
    burden of presenting objective medical evidence to support her claim that she meets
    the Listing 14.09D, or another listing. See Burch v. Barnhart, 
    400 F.3d 676
    , 683 (9th
    3
    Cir. 2005) (claimant bears the burden of proving that her impairment meets or equals
    the criteria of an impairment listing); Lewis v. Apfel, 
    236 F.3d 503
    , 514 (9th Cir.
    2001) (the ALJ did not discuss claimant’s combined impairments but found the error
    harmless because claimant offered no objective evidence to support the claim). So,
    it was not reversible error for the ALJ not to discuss Smith’s fibromyalgia
    equivalence in combination with other impairments.
    3. Based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ determined at step five
    that Smith is not disabled and is capable to work other jobs within the national
    economy. Because the “hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the [vocational expert]
    contained all of the limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by
    substantial evidence in the record,” the “ALJ’s reliance on testimony the [vocational
    expert] gave in response to the hypothetical therefore was proper.” See Bayliss v.
    Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
    AFFIRMED.
    4