Rsa-Tumon, LLC v. Sherif Philips ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 18 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RSA-TUMON, LLC,                                 No. 21-16185
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00025
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    SHERIF A. PHILIPS,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    PITT COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
    INC.,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Guam
    Frances Tydingco-Gatewood, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 12, 2022**
    Before:      SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
    Sherif A. Philips appeals pro se from the district court’s orders remanding to
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    state court the interpleader action brought against Philips, denying reconsideration,
    and awarding attorney’s fees to RSA-Tumon, LLC. We dismiss in part and affirm
    in part.
    As we held previously, we lack jurisdiction to review the portion of the
    district court’s March 30, 2021 order granting the motion to remand this action to
    the Superior Court of Guam. See RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Philips, et al., No. 21-15578
    (9th Cir. April 15, 2021) (order); see also Merritt v. Mackey, 
    932 F.2d 1317
    , 1320
    (9th Cir. 1991) (under the law of the case doctrine, one panel of an appellate court
    will not reconsider questions that another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the
    same case). We also lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying
    Philips’s motion for reconsideration of the order remanding the action. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (d); Branson v. City of Los Angeles, 
    912 F.2d 334
    , 336 (9th Cir.
    1990) (denial of reconsideration of non-appealable order is itself not appealable);
    cf. Seedman v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 
    837 F.2d 413
    , 414 (9th Cir.
    1988) (prohibition on the review of remand orders extends to the district court’s
    own ability to entertain a motion for reconsideration). Accordingly, this portion of
    the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
    We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders granting RSA-
    Tumon, LLC’s motion for fees and costs under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (c). See Gardner
    v. UICI, 
    508 F.3d 559
    , 560-61 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court did not abuse its
    2                                   21-16185
    discretion by awarding attorney’s fees and costs under § 1447(c) in the amount of
    $4,770.59 because Philips lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal and
    the record supports the district court’s calculation under the lodestar method. See
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (c); Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 
    518 F.3d 1062
    , 1065 (9th
    Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “‘[a]bsent unusual
    circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the
    removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal’”
    (quoting Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 
    546 U.S. 132
    , 141 (2005)); see also
    Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 
    523 F.3d 973
    , 978-79 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (discussing proper application of the lodestar method and the district court’s “great
    deal of discretion” to determine the reasonableness of the fee (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    We reject as unsupported by the record Philips’s contention that the district
    court was not impartial.
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    DISMISSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.
    3                                    21-16185