Mark Kazalonis v. Harney County, Oregon ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 18 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARK KAZALONIS,                                 No. 21-35509
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01605-SU
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    HARNEY COUNTY, OREGON; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    UNKNOWN PARTY, Unknown Assistant
    District Attorney for Harney County Oregon;
    et al.,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 12, 2022**
    Before:      SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Mark Kazalonis appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    656 F.3d 1034
    ,
    1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Kazalonis’s claims regarding 2002
    civil forfeiture proceedings as barred by the statute of limitations. See Maldonado
    v. Harris, 
    370 F.3d 945
    , 954 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In determining the proper statute of
    limitations for actions brought under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , we look to the statute of
    limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state.”); 
    Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110
    (1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also
    
    Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.160
    (3)-(4) (allowing five years of tolling for persons with a
    “disabling mental condition”); Simonsen v. Ford Motor Co., 
    102 P.3d 710
    , 719
    (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (“[I]n general, ORS 12.110(1), tolled by ORS 12.160, allows a
    plaintiff suffering such a disability to commence an appropriate action a maximum
    of seven years after the date of the injury.”).
    The district court properly dismissed Kazalonis’s claims regarding his 2014
    arrest because Kazalonis failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible
    claims. See Baker v. McCollan, 
    443 U.S. 137
    , 143-44 (1979) (generally no
    constitutional violation for arrest based on facially valid warrant); United States v.
    2                                    21-35509
    Gavilanes-Ocaranza, 
    772 F.3d 624
    , 628 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]here is no Sixth
    Amendment right to a speedy ‘trial’ in supervised release revocation proceedings
    . . . .”); United States v. Soto-Olivas, 
    44 F.3d 788
    , 789 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[D]ouble
    jeopardy does not preclude criminal prosecution for conduct which also serves as
    the basis for a parole or probation revocation.” (emphases omitted)); see also Bell
    Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007) (a complaint must give each
    “defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
    rests”).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                       21-35509