Hollister v. US Postal Ser , 142 F. App'x 576 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2005 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-25-2005
    Hollister v. US Postal Ser
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 04-3083
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    Recommended Citation
    "Hollister v. US Postal Ser" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 785.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/785
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 04-3083
    ________________
    JOHN S. HOLLISTER,
    Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-02281)
    District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
    _______________________________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    July 12, 2005
    BEFORE: RENDELL, AMBRO and FUENTES, CIRCUIT JUDGES
    (Filed: July 25, 2005)
    _______________________
    OPINION
    _______________________
    PER CURIAM
    In December 2003, John S. Hollister, a licensed Pennsylvania attorney, filed a
    complaint against the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) concerning the alleged loss
    of $2000 in United States currency, which Hollister had mailed to France via Global
    Express Mail. The USPS moved to dismiss the complaint. Hollister responded by filing
    a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss and an amended complaint. The USPS then
    moved to dismiss the amended complaint. Hollister failed to file any response to the
    USPS’s motion to dismiss his amended complaint. Several weeks after Hollister’s
    response was due, the District Court granted the USPS’s motion to dismiss as unopposed
    pursuant to Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 7.6. Hollister timely appeals.1
    We will affirm. The District Court did not abuse its discretion treating the USPS’s
    motion to dismiss as unopposed. Hollister, although acting pro se in the District Court, is
    a licensed attorney who failed to file a brief in opposition to the USPS’s motion to
    dismiss his amended complaint as required by Local Rule 7.6. Under the particular
    circumstances of this case, Hollister’s failure to file a responsive brief indicated that the
    USPS’s motion to dismiss was unopposed. See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 
    951 F.2d 29
    , 30 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that if a party represented by counsel fails to oppose a
    motion to dismiss, the district court may treat the motion as unopposed and subject to
    dismissal without a merits analysis).
    On appeal, Hollister claims that because the brief he filed in response to the
    USPS’s first motion to dismiss was not specifically dismissed as moot, and because he
    1
    We note that Hollister filed an untimely motion for reconsideration in the
    District Court. The District Court was not required to address the motion because it was
    untimely and thus “void and of no effect.” Amatangelo v. Borough of Donora, 
    212 F.3d 776
    , 780 (3d Cir. 2000).
    had clearly opposed in that brief all elements of the USPS’s second motion to dismiss, he
    did, in fact, oppose the second motion to dismiss. Hollister also claims that he informed
    counsel for the USPS that he did not intend to file another brief. Hollister, however,
    never informed the District Court that he intended to rely on his first opposition brief.
    Because Hollister failed to respond in any way to the USPS’s second motion to dismiss,
    the District Court did not err in treating the USPS’s motion to dismiss as unopposed.
    In any event, we can also affirm the District Court’s order on the basis that
    Hollister’s claims lack merit. See Stackhouse, 
    951 F.2d at 30
    . We are not persuaded by
    Hollister’s argument that his claims relate to “contractual indemnity” and are thus not
    barred by 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (b). Moreover, by simply reading the Express Mail Label that
    he used, Hollister would have learned that “[i]ndemnity is not paid for items containing
    coins, banknotes, currency notes (paper money).” 2
    Hollister’s equitable estoppel argument fails as a matter of law because he did not
    establish any affirmative misconduct on the part of the USPS. See Dipeppe v.
    Quarantillo, 
    337 F.3d 326
    , 335 (3d Cir. 2003). His bad faith claim under 42 Pa. Cons.
    Stat. Ann. § 8371 fails as a matter of law because the USPS’s insurance policy
    unambiguously shows that indemnity is not paid for lost currency. See Frog, Switch &
    Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
    193 F.3d 742
    , 745 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999). Finally,
    2
    Parenthetically, an argument also exists that the District Court lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction over Hollister’s claims relating to the lost currency because the USPS
    has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to “[a]ny claim arising out of the
    loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (b).
    because Hollister is not a “prevailing party,” he is not eligible for attorney’s fees under
    the Equal Access to Justice Act. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
    (d)(1).
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.