Mulnix v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections , 254 F. App'x 763 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                     FILED
    ________________________         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    November 16, 2007
    No. 06-12110                  THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________                CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 03-00500-CV-T-30-MSS
    MICHAEL MULNIX,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (November 16, 2007)
    Before BLACK, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    In 1998, petitioner-appellant Michael Mulnix was convicted of second
    degree murder. After completing his direct appeal, Mulnix filed a timely pro se
    habeas petition under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . The district court denied the petition for
    habeas relief. Although Mulnix had exhausted his state court remedies with
    respect to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge under state law, the district court
    concluded he had not fairly presented a federal sufficiency of the evidence claim
    on direct appeal.
    This Court issued a certificate of appealability on the question of whether
    the district court erred in finding Mulnix’s claim procedurally barred. Having
    reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, Atwater v. Crosby, 
    451 F.3d 799
    ,
    809 (11th Cir. 2006), we conclude that, under the particular facts and
    circumstances of this case, Mulnix’s federal due process challenge to the
    sufficiency of the evidence was exhausted and thus is not procedurally barred.
    Before bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    ,
    a prisoner is required to exhaust all available state court remedies, either on direct
    appeal or in a state post-conviction motion. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (b), (c). To exhaust
    state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his federal claims to the state
    court, providing it with “an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the
    facts bearing upon them.” Henry v. Dep’t of Corr., 
    197 F.3d 1361
    , 1366 (11 th Cir.
    2
    1999) (citing Picard v. Connor, 
    404 U.S. 270
    , 275, 
    92 S. Ct. 509
    , 512 (1971)).
    The reason for this rule is simple: “If state courts are to be given the opportunity to
    correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must . . . be alerted to
    the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States
    Constitution.” Duncan v. Henry, 
    513 U.S. 364
    , 365-66, 
    115 S. Ct. 887
    , 888
    (1995).
    Florida courts assess the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict
    criminal defendants under a legal standard identical to the one used by federal
    courts in deciding federal due process challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.
    In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, Florida courts review whether, after
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
    could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Simmons v. State, 
    934 So. 2d 1100
    , 1111 (Fla. 2006). This is identical to
    the federal standard for reviewing due process challenges based on the sufficiency
    of the evidence, as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789 (1979 ) (standard is “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”).1
    1
    The Supreme Court held in In Re Winship, 
    397 U.S. 358
    , 364, 
    90 S. Ct. 1068
    , 1073
    (1970), that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
    3
    The Supreme Court has made clear that a prisoner does not exhaust federal
    claims merely by raising similar state claims. Picard, 
    404 U.S. at 277-78
    ;
    Anderson v. Harless, 
    459 U.S. 4
    , 6, 
    103 S. Ct. 276
    , 277 (1982). In this case,
    however, Mulnix’s state and federal claims were not merely similar: they were
    identical. The purpose of fair presentment is to permit state courts to efficiently
    address prisoners’ challenges to their state court convictions, ideally providing a
    single forum in which to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ rights under state
    and federal law. In this case, the state court analyzed Mulnix’s due process
    sufficiency of the evidence claim using a standard identical to the one required
    under federal law. Under these circumstances, we conclude Mulnix’s federal claim
    has been exhausted. Cf. Jackson v. Edwards, 
    404 F.3d 612
    , 619 (2d Cir. 2005).
    Therefore, the district court’s order is vacated, and the case is remanded solely for
    consideration under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d) of Mulnix’s due process challenge to the
    sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him in state court.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
    charged.” The Supreme Court later extended Winship to the habeas context, holding that a
    prisoner challenging a state criminal conviction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     is entitled to habeas
    corpus relief under the Due Process Clause when the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient
    to permit a rational trier of fact to find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 
    99 S. Ct. at 2791-2792
    .
    4