United States v. Lopez , 427 F. App'x 561 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              APR 14 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 06-50611
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. CR-04-00262-EHC-13
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    RANFERIS LOPEZ, aka Zexto Patin
    Ayala; et al.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Submitted April 11, 2011 **
    Pasadena, California
    Before: D.W. NELSON, BYBEE, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Ranferis Lopez (“defendant”) appeals his jury conviction for conspiracy to
    possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C.
    §§ 846, 841(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and carrying a firearm during and in relation to
    a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
    Defendant first argues that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were
    violated because of improper limitations on the cross-examination of Officer
    Bolon. When a defendant fails to raise a Confrontation Clause objection in the
    district court, we review for plain error. United States v. Hagege, 
    437 F.3d 943
    ,
    956 (9th Cir. 2006). In this case, the defense cross-examined Officer Bolon at
    length regarding the circumstances of the traffic stop. Defendant was not
    precluded from addressing prior inconsistent statements or any other relevant
    matter. The district court only precluded defendant from litigating a suppression
    motion in front of the jury. This did not constitute error, let alone plain error.
    Defendant also argues for the first time on appeal that the government
    violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963), by failing to
    produce Officer Bolon’s arrest report and his testimony at a state court preliminary
    hearing. We review Brady claims that were not raised before the district court for
    plain error. United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 
    573 F.3d 865
    , 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
    The government produced Officer Bolon’s arrest report, and defendant utilized the
    report to cross-examine Officer Bolon at trial. Defendant was not prejudiced by
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    any delay. See United States v. Alvarez, 
    86 F.3d 901
    , 905 (9th Cir. 1996). There
    was also no plain error with respect to the transcript of the preliminary hearing in
    state court. Defendant does not identify any material inconsistent statements in the
    prior testimony, and there is no showing that the government had knowledge of
    and access to the records in the state court proceeding. See United States v.
    Shryock, 
    342 F.3d 948
    , 983–84 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Finally, defendant argues that the district court failed to rule on his joinder in
    co-defendant Beltran-Garcia’s wiretap suppression motion and that the wiretap
    evidence against defendant should have been suppressed because the affidavit
    supporting the wiretap application did not demonstrate necessity. In a minute
    order on August 24, 2004, the district court ruled on Beltran-Garcia’s motion to
    suppress and defendant’s joinder, finding that both Beltran-Garcia and defendant
    lacked standing. We review the district court’s legal conclusion on standing de
    novo, and we review the findings of fact related to this conclusion for clear error.
    United States v. Sarkisian, 
    197 F.3d 966
    , 986 (9th Cir. 1999). A “defendant may
    move to suppress the fruits of a wire-tap only if . . . he was a participant in an
    intercepted conversation[] or if such conversation occurred on his premises.”
    United States v. King, 
    478 F.2d 494
    , 506 (9th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted).
    Defendant’s declaration did not establish that he was a participant in any
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    conversation in which Beltran-Garcia was intercepted. Accordingly, the district
    court did not err in concluding that defendant lacked standing to challenge the
    intercepted conversations that were the subject of Beltran-Garcia’s motion.
    Furthermore, there was no abuse of discretion when the issuing judge approved the
    application of September 30, 2003, for the interception of wire communications
    based upon a finding of probable cause and necessity. See United States v.
    Canales Gomez, 
    358 F.3d 1221
    , 1224–26 (9th Cir. 2004).
    All motions currently pending before the court are hereby denied.
    AFFIRMED.
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