Ralph Coleman v. Arnold Schwarzenegger , 428 F. App'x 743 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 22 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RALPH COLEMAN; et al., No. 10-17546
Plaintiffs - Appellees, D.C. No. 2:90-cv-00520-LKK-
JFM
v.
EDMUND G. BROWN, Governor of MEMORANDUM**
California; et al.,*
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 12, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
California government officials challenge two post-judgment district court
orders requiring an increase in the rate of admission from five to ten inmate-
*
Edmund G. Brown, Jr. is substituted for his predecessor, Arnold
Schwarzenegger, as Governor of the State of California. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
patients per week in two intermediate mental health care facilities at the Salinas
Valley State Prison Psychiatric Program. The two October 2010 orders at issue
required that inmates be admitted until the two 58-bed facilities reached full
capacity.
Plaintiffs move to dismiss as moot because the facilities became fully
occupied as of February 2011 and defendants have thereby complied with the
orders they appeal. We deny plaintiffs’ motion because the challenged action is
capable of repetition, yet evading review. See Enyart v. Nat’l Conference of Bar
Examiners, Inc., 630 F.3d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2011). That the plaintiff class in
this longstanding and ongoing litigation has requested an order to accelerate
admissions at a similar rate in another mental health facility supports a “reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again,” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam), and that
such a controversy would be “in the ordinary course of affairs . . . very likely to
escape review.” Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss as moot is therefore denied.
Defendants contend that the orders violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“the Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 3626, by imposing prospective relief beyond what is
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necessary to vindicate plaintiffs’ federal rights.1 We decline to decide whether the
Act applies to the two orders at issue because its requirements are satisfied in any
event. The district court expressly relied in its orders on the expansive record in
this case, spanning over two decades and thousands of entries. This record
contains ample evidence of the unconstitutional conditions under which the over
400 seriously mentally ill inmates in the plaintiff class languished, as defendants
repeatedly failed to comply with the district court’s previous orders to provide
them with the necessary inpatient hospital care. That two inmate-patients
committed suicide while awaiting transfer to the mental health facilities is among
the many facts that collectively are more than sufficient to demonstrate that
plaintiffs “have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm.” Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
By ordering accelerated admissions to the mental health facilities, the district
court has not “enmeshed [itself] in the minutiae of prison operations” beyond what
is necessary to vindicate plaintiffs’ federal rights. Id. at 362 (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)). Nor, in view of the lengthy and detailed
1
Plaintiffs contend that defendants failed to preserve their challenge under
the Act by neglecting to raise such an argument below. We reject plaintiffs’
waiver contention because the instant appeal constitutes defendants’ first
opportunity to challenge both district court orders on the merits.
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record in this case, could “the same vindication of federal rights . . . have been
achieved with less involvement by the court in directing the details of defendants’
operations.” Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010).
In sum, we conclude that in imposing the accelerated admissions rate, the district
court complied fully with the Act’s requirements that prospective relief be
“narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right,” and be accomplished by “the least intrusive means necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right.” § 3626(a)(1).
Accordingly, the two orders below are AFFIRMED.
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