United States v. Sanchez , 277 F. App'x 494 ( 2008 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    May 8, 2008
    No. 06-20193                   Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    NORMA GONZALEZ SANCHEZ, also known as Norma Gonzalez Campos,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:03-CR-221-9
    ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
    Before KING, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This case returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court for further
    consideration in light of the Court’s decision in Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    (2007).
    Before the district court, Norma Gonzalez Sanchez (“Sanchez”) pleaded
    guilty to one count of conspiracy to transport undocumented aliens within the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 06-20193
    United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. We assume familiarity with our
    prior decision in this case, United States v. Sanchez, 
    484 F.3d 803
    (5th Cir.
    2007), which fully articulates the relevant background to Sanchez’s offense.
    However, for ease of understanding, we include the following selection from our
    prior decision:
    On May 14, 2003, state and federal authorities discovered an
    abandoned refrigeration trailer near a truck stop in Victoria, Texas.
    Inside and around the opened trailer were the bodies of seventeen
    deceased individuals. Two others found near the trailer later died
    at an area hospital. The ensuing criminal investigation uncovered
    a large-scale alien smuggling network operating out of the Rio
    Grande Valley. Comprising the network were various smuggling
    organizations, each with its own network of participants who were
    responsible for transporting aliens to the Mexico/United States
    border, facilitating their illegal entry into the United States,
    harboring them temporarily in drop-houses throughout the Rio
    Grande Valley, and arranging transportation for them to various
    locations north of the Border Patrol checkpoints and into the
    interior of the United States. Investigators discovered that Karla
    Patricia Chavez-Joya (“Chavez”), who headed one of the smuggling
    organizations, would coordinate the pooling of the other smuggling
    organizations and arrange for the bulk transport of aliens inside
    tractor-trailer rigs. Investigators further determinated that on May
    13, 2003, at least seventy-three undocumented aliens had been
    secreted in the trailer found in Victoria, which had been part of a
    tractor-trailer rig driven by a member of the alien smuggling
    conspiracy from Harlingen, Texas to Victoria. Autopsies of the
    nineteen aliens who died revealed that they had all succumbed to
    hyperthermia, suffocation, and dehydration due to the deplorable
    conditions inside the trailer.
    Sanchez was identified as a participant in the trafficking
    operation. Investigators learned that Sanchez owned and operated
    a restaurant in Houston, Texas, where she would meet with
    individuals to discuss arrangements and collect fees for smuggling
    their relatives into the United States. She would forward some
    portion of the fees to her contacts in the Rio Grande Valley
    smuggling operation, with whom she would then work to coordinate
    the transportation of her clients’ relatives. Investigators further
    2
    No. 06-20193
    discovered that it was Sanchez who had arranged for the smuggling
    of two of the undocumented aliens transported in the abandoned
    trailer: Faviola Angelica Gonzalez-Buendia (“Gonzalez”) and
    Elisendo Cabañas (“Cabañas”). Cabañas was one of the nineteen
    aliens who died.
    
    Sanchez, 484 F.3d at 806
    –07 (footnote omitted).
    The district court calculated Sanchez’s applicable sentencing range at 57
    to 71 months. 
    Id. at 809.
    After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court
    sentenced Sanchez to 30-months imprisonment, which the court altered to “time
    served” after learning that Sanchez had already served 33 months. 
    Id. at 809–10.
    The government appealed. We entered a judgment vacating the
    sentence and remanding for resentencing because the district court’s sentence
    unreasonably failed to reflect the statutory sentencing factors set forth in 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
    Id. at 806.
          In our prior decision, we identified five defects in the district court’s
    sentence. To begin, we noted that the district court’s reasoning reflected “at
    least two clearly erroneous factual determinations.” 
    Id. at 811.
    First, we
    concluded that the record did not support the district court’s finding that the
    offense in this case involved “multiple conspiracies,” rather than the single
    conspiracy charged in the indictment. 
    Id. at 811–12.
    Second, because the record
    did not support the multiple conspiracy finding, we further concluded that the
    district court clearly erred in relying on Sanchez’s purported participation in a
    lesser conspiracy to find that certain consequences of the overarching
    conspiracy—the death of some aliens as a result of the dangerous methods used
    to smuggle them into the country—were not reasonably foreseeable to her. 
    Id. at 812.
    We held that these clearly erroneous factual determinations infected the
    district court’s balancing of the § 3553(a) factors, thus providing an insufficient
    basis for imposing a non-Guidelines sentence. 
    Id. 3 No.
    06-20193
    As a third defect, we noted the possibility that the district court
    misinterpreted an applicable sentencing enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6),
    (4) (2004). The 2004 version of that enhancement provided for an 8-level
    increase in the offense level for alien smuggling “[i]f any person died.”
    § 2L1.1(b), (6). We stated that under this enhancement “Sanchez was not being
    held accountable for nineteen deaths; she was being held accountable for only
    one.” 
    Sanchez, 484 F.3d at 813
    . Thus, to the extent that the district court
    deviated from the Guidelines range—and this enhancement—on the basis that
    Sanchez could not have foreseen the deaths of eighteen additional aliens, this
    was not a sufficient justification for deviating from the Guidelines range, which
    specifically accounted for only one of those deaths. 
    Id. at 812–13.
          Fourth, we stated that the district court erred by failing to give sufficient
    weight to the “history and characteristics of the defendant,” as required by 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
    Sanchez, 484 F.3d at 813
    . Fifth, we stated that the district
    failed adequately to consider whether the sentence it imposed would create
    significant disparities between Sanchez and other similarly situated defendants,
    see § 3553(a)(6). 
    Sanchez, 484 F.3d at 813
    .
    The Supreme Court granted Sanchez’s petition for writ of certiorari,
    vacated this court’s judgment, and remanded the case to us for further
    consideration in light of Gall. We have carefully reconsidered our prior decision
    in light of Gall and, for the following reasons, reenter our judgment, vacating the
    sentence, and remanding for resentencing.
    Our “review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they
    are ‘reasonable.’” 
    Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594
    . We review the district court’s
    sentence, regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the
    Guidelines range, under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. 
    Id. at 597.
    Our review proceeds in two parts.
    4
    No. 06-20193
    First, we examine the sentence to ensure that the district court
    “committed no significant procedural error.” 
    Id. Such procedural
    errors include
    “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating
    the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting
    a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
    chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
    Guidelines range.” 
    Id. At this
    first stage of the inquiry, we continue to review
    the “district court’s interpretation or application of the Sentencing
    Guidelines . . . de novo, and its factual findings . . . for clear error.” United
    States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 
    517 F.3d 751
    , 764 (5th Cir. 2008).
    Second, assuming the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally
    sound, we “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
    imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” 
    Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597
    . In
    doing so, we “take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the
    extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” 
    Id. We may
    not apply a
    presumption of unreasonableness to a sentence imposed outside the Guidelines
    range. 
    Id. Rather, “we
    must give due deference to the district court’s decision
    that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” 
    Id. Our reasonable
    disagreement with the sentence imposed is insufficient to justify
    reversal of the district court. 
    Id. Applying Gall
    to the defects identified in our prior decision, we conclude
    that the district court’s clearly erroneous factual determinations infected the
    sentence and constitute significant procedural errors that warrant vacating the
    sentence and remanding for resentencing.         See 
    Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597
    (identifying “selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts” as one
    example of “significant procedural error”). As to the remaining errors identified
    in our prior decision and outlined above, we decline to decide whether those
    errors, standing alone, would lead us to conclude that the district court abused
    5
    No. 06-20193
    its discretion in sentencing. However, we remind the district court on remand
    of the following:
    If [the district court] decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is
    warranted, [the court] must consider the extent of the deviation and
    ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
    degree of the variance. We find it uncontroversial that a major
    departure should be supported by a more significant justification
    than a minor one. After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the
    court] must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for
    meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
    sentencing.
    
    Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597
    .
    We therefore VACATE the sentence and REMAND for resentencing.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-20193

Citation Numbers: 484 F.3d 803, 277 F. App'x 494

Judges: Garza, King, Per Curiam, Prado

Filed Date: 5/8/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023