Clidy M. Davis v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart , 186 F. App'x 965 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 21, 2006
No. 06-11021 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00678-CV-WS-L
CLIDY M. DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(July 21, 2006)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Clidy Davis appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security Administration’s (Commissioner) denial of her
applications for disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and supplemental
security income, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). On appeal, Davis argues that the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in concluding that she could perform the
full range of medium work on a sustained basis because her hyperthyroidism and
hypertension are severe impairments and, by definition, they are non-exertional
impairments that limit her ability to do basic work activities. Further, Davis argues
that the ALJ erred in determining that Davis’s depression was not a severe
impairment.
We review a social security case to determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir.
1997). “We will not disturb the Commissioner’s decision if, in light of the record
as a whole, it appears to be supported by substantial evidence.” Id.A. Medium Work
An individual who applies for Social Security disability benefits or
supplemental security income must prove their disability. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1512; 20 C.F.R. § 416.912. Disability is defined as the “inability to do any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
2
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.905(a). To determine the physical exertion requirements of work in the
national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium,
heavy, and very heavy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Medium work is defined as work
that involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time, with frequent lifting or
carrying objects that weigh 25 pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). If an individual
can perform medium work, then they are also capable of performing light or
sedentary work. Id.After reviewing the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s determination that Davis could perform a full range of medium work.
First, an Alabama state medical consultant performed a residual functional capacity
examination using Davis’s medical records and found that she could perform a full
range of medium exertional work. The consultant found that Davis had the
capacity to occasionally lift 50 pounds and frequently lift 25 pounds. Davis could
also stand or sit for six hours of an eight-hour work day. The consultant found that
Davis had no other physical limitations that would prohibit her from performing
the full range of medium work. There is also evidence that Davis appeared, at
3
times, to be asymptomatic for any particular impairments. Additionally, medical
evidence shows that Davis’s hyperthyroidism and hypertension can be treated with
medication and radiation therapy. Lastly, Dr. Schulte indicated that Davis could
regain her condition through exercise.
B. Depression
An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” if it “significantly
limits [the] claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). “Basic work activities” include the abilities to: (1) walk,
stand, sit, lift, pull, reach, or carry; (2) see, hear, and speak; (3) understand, carry
out, and remember simple instructions; (4) use judgment; (5) respond appropriately
to supervision, co-workers, and unusual work situations; and (6) deal with changes
in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). An impairment is not severe
only if the abnormality is so slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly
“not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of
age, education, or work experience.” McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031
(11th Cir. 1986). The severe impairment either must have lasted or must be
expected to last for at least 12 months. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 216,
(2002).
The ALJ must state with particularity the weight given different medical
4
opinions and the reasons for doing so, and the failure to do so is reversible error.
Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). Generally, the opinions of
examining physicians are given more weight than non-examining, treating more
than non-treating, and specialists on issues within their areas of expertise more
weight than non-specialists. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (2) & (5). The ALJ is
free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary
conclusion. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s implicit determination that Davis’s depression was not a severe
impairment. Dr. Smith, an evaluating doctor, stated that Davis’s diagnosis was a
“toss up” between no diagnosis and adjustment disorder, and he noted that Davis’s
impairments were not grave. Further, the ALJ clearly noted that he gave little
weight to Dr. Crum’s opinion because Dr. Crum had noted that Davis overstated
her problems, indicating that she exaggerated symptoms. Similarly, the ALJ found
that Dr. Tocci’s opinion was self-contradictory because it simultaneously noted the
opposite impressions that Davis was both “mildly distressed” and living with
“major depression.” Having clearly noted the little weight he gave to Doctors
Crum and Tocci’s opinions, the ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. Smith that
Davis’s depression was not grave. The ALJ articulated his reasons for discrediting
5
the other evaluating doctors’ opinions, which is supported by the record.
Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Davis could
perform the full range of medium work and that Davis’s depression was not a
severe impairment, we affirm the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits.
AFFIRMED.
6