Michael Brown v. John Salazar , 431 F. App'x 579 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 05 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL FRANCIS BROWN, No. 08-56548
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:06-cv-01441-AG-PJW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JOHN SALAZAR, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 20, 2011 **
Before: RYMER, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Michael Francis Brown appeals from the district
court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we vacate and remand.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Brown contends that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary because it
was induced by a misrepresentation that he would receive a sentence of no more
than five years in prison. He argues that the 20-year prison sentence he received
violates his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the case should be
remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
Brown has never received an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his
guilty plea, despite providing: (1) detailed allegations in his pro se habeas petitions
to the California Supreme Court and the District Court, (2) supporting declarations
from three attorneys who witnessed the underlying events, (3) a corroborating
letter from his trial court counsel, and (4) requests for an evidentiary hearing with
each habeas petition he filed.
If true, Brown’s allegations are sufficient to warrant habeas relief. An
involuntary guilty plea is “a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment.”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (1977). Accordingly, the California
Supreme Court’s summary denial of Brown’s petition was an unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. __ (2011); see also Blackledge, 431 U.S.
at 75-76; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
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The district court abused its discretion by denying Brown’s habeas petition
without an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his plea. See Earp v.
Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]here the petitioner establishes
a colorable claim for relief and has never been afforded a state or federal hearing
on this claim, we must remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.”);
see also Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1987).
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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