Dennis Barnett v. Brian Duffey , 621 F. App'x 496 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              NOV 02 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DENNIS RAY BARNETT,                               No. 13-16564
    Petitioner - Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:08-cv-01604-RMW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    BRIAN DUFFEY,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 20, 2015
    San Francisco, California
    Before: D.W. NELSON, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Dennis Barnett, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Barnett raised several different
    ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his pro se petition, but the claim at issue
    in this appeal—stemming from the alleged failure of trial counsel to raise Barnett’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    competency following Barnett’s testimony at trial—was “buried,” by Barnett’s
    own description, amid hundreds of pages of evidentiary exhibits appended to his
    petition. We conclude that Barnett did not adequately plead the contested
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim and affirm the dismissal of his petition.
    A pro se habeas petition is “given the benefit of liberal construction,” Porter
    v. Ollison, 
    620 F.3d 952
    , 958 (9th Cir. 2010), but even “a liberal interpretation . . .
    may not supply . . . [a] claim that [was] not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of
    Univ. of Alaska, 
    673 F.2d 266
    , 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, it is well
    established that “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that
    govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 
    814 F.2d 565
    , 567 (9th Cir. 1987),
    overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 
    693 F.3d 896
    (9th Cir.
    2012) (en banc). Here, “Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus
    Cases . . . instructs the petitioner to ‘specify all the grounds for relief available to
    [him]’ and to ‘state the facts supporting each ground.’” Mayle v. Felix, 
    545 U.S. 644
    , 649 (2005) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, a federal habeas petitioner
    adequately pleads an otherwise ambiguous claim by making “clear and repeated”
    references to an appended supporting brief that presents the claim with sufficient
    particularity. Dye v. Hofbauer, 
    546 U.S. 1
    , 4 (2005).
    2
    Barnett failed to plead the ineffective assistance of counsel claim at issue in
    this appeal with the requisite specificity. The petition’s general references to
    hundreds of pages of attached exhibits are insufficient to incorporate the claim.
    See 
    Dye, 546 U.S. at 4
    ; cf. Baldwin v. Reese, 
    541 U.S. 27
    , 32 (2004). Although
    Barnett’s state habeas petition contains the ineffective assistance of counsel claim
    at issue in this appeal, Barnett did not make clear and repeated references to the
    attached state petition in his federal habeas petition. Of the thirty pages of his
    federal habeas petition, Barnett made only two references to his state habeas
    petition and neither reference clearly indicates that he intended to incorporate into
    his federal petition the claims of his state petition. “Habeas claims that are not
    raised before the district court in the petition are not cognizable on appeal.”
    Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 
    37 F.3d 504
    , 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing King v.
    Rowland, 
    977 F.2d 1354
    , 1357 (9th Cir. 1992)).
    Barnett asserts that the district court should have considered an amended pro
    se habeas petition that he mailed to the district court in December 2008. Barnett
    does not suggest that the proposed amended petition should have been filed.
    Rather, Barnett’s argument appears to be that the district court should have treated
    the document as further evidence informing the evaluation of whether Barnett’s
    original federal habeas petition indicated an intent to incorporate the contested
    3
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Barnett cites no authority for the
    proposition that a district court is obligated to look beyond the petition and
    attached exhibits when determining whether that petition adequately pleads a
    claim. See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
    District Courts (directing the inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage to “the petition
    and any attached exhibits”).
    AFFIRMED.
    4