Clark v. Hebert , 236 F. App'x 903 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    for the Fifth Circuit                   May 30, 2007
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-30957
    RONALD COLEMAN CLARK,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    MARK HEBERT, WARDEN, ST. MARY PARISH LAW ENFORCEMENT CENTER;
    DAVID A. NAQUIN, SHERIFF, ST. MARY PARISH,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    (6:05-cv-00100)
    Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellant Ronald Coleman Clark (“Clark”) appeals the decision
    of the district court dismissing with prejudice his civil rights
    lawsuit as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which
    relief could be granted. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
    I.
    In 2004, Clark was in the custody of the Sheriff of St. Mary
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
    the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Parish, Louisiana awaiting trial for murder. According to Clark,
    Officer Charlene Joseph (“Officer Joseph”), a correctional officer
    who was a cousin of his alleged victim, placed Clark in the same
    dormitory as another cousin of his alleged victim. Subsequently,
    Clark was attacked by the detainee cousin, causing Clark to become
    blind in one eye. Clark filed an administrative grievance with the
    Warden of the detention facility, arguing that the “entiler [sic]
    facility” was responsible for his injury because of inadequate
    manpower and security cameras. At the first level of review, it was
    determined that Clark’s grievance was unfounded, and the Warden
    agreed with this disposition on further review. Clark never sought
    review by the Sheriff, which would have been the third and final
    step in the administrative grievance process.
    Clark later brought a 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     lawsuit against the
    Sheriff of St. Mary Parish, David A. Naquin, and the Warden of the
    detention facility, Mark Hebert, for violating his constitutional
    rights. He sought $100 million in damages. In his complaint, which
    he filed pro se, Clark alleged that the defendants had violated his
    right to protection while in custody by providing inadequate
    manpower and security cameras. He did not name Officer Joseph as a
    defendant, and he did not provide any other reason why the Sheriff
    or   the   Warden   should   be   held   liable.   The   Magistrate   Judge
    recommended that Clark’s complaint (1) be dismissed with prejudice
    as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief
    could be granted or, in the alternative, (2) be dismissed without
    2
    prejudice for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies.
    Clark   filed   an   objection    to    the    Magistrate’s   recommendation,
    stating summarily that he should be allowed to amend his complaint
    because of “ineffective assistance and law library” and that he had
    exhausted his administrative remedies because he “wasn’t gaven
    [sic] a Request For Sheriff’s Review.” The district judge entered
    judgment against Clark, dismissing his suit with prejudice as
    frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief could
    be granted.
    II.
    Typically, we review the dismissal of an in forma pauperis
    complaint as frivolous for abuse of discretion, Stanley v. Foster,
    
    464 F.3d 565
    , 569 (5th Cir. 2006); however, where, as here, the
    district court also finds that the complaint fails to state a claim
    upon which relief may be granted, we review the entire complaint de
    novo, see Gieger v. Jowers, 
    404 F.3d 371
    , 373 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Clark argues on appeal that (1) the district court should have
    permitted him to amend his complaint to add Officer Joseph as a
    defendant; (2) the district court should have permitted him to
    conduct   discovery,      which        would    have   revealed    deliberate
    indifference with respect to the Sheriff and the Warden; and (3)
    the district court should have stayed the lawsuit to allow him to
    exhaust available administrative remedies. Because the district
    court did not dismiss Clark’s lawsuit for failure to exhaust, we do
    3
    not consider Clark’s third point of error.
    Generally, a district court errs if it dismisses a pro se
    complaint     for   failure   to    state    a   claim   without   giving    the
    complainant an opportunity to amend. Jones v. Greninger, 
    188 F.3d 322
    , 326 (5th Cir. 1999). However, Jones recognizes that
    if the protections afforded public officials are not to
    ring hollow, plaintiffs cannot be allowed to continue to
    amend or supplement their pleading until they stumble
    upon a formula that carries them over the threshold. Such
    a protracted process is likely to disrupt public
    officials from their duties. . . . At some point a court
    must decide that a plaintiff has had a fair opportunity
    to make his case; if, after that time, a cause has not
    been established, the court should finally dismiss the
    suit.
    
    Id.
     (quoting Jacquez v. Procunier, 
    801 F.2d 789
    , 792 (5th Cir.
    1986)). In this vein, if it is evident that the plaintiff has
    pleaded his best case, there is no need to give him an opportunity
    to amend his pleadings. Jacquez, 
    801 F.2d at 793
    . Here, the
    Magistrate Judge found, “Plaintiff’s complaint and the copies of
    his ARP Grievances specifically detail his theories of liability
    with respect to each named defendant. The thoroughness of the
    complaint convinces the undersigned that [P]laintiff has pled his
    best case and need not be afforded any further opportunity to
    amend.” After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find no fault
    with   this   finding.   Throughout        the   grievance   process   and   the
    district court proceedings, Clark consistently complained about
    general security problems at the detention facility, not Officer
    Joseph’s alleged bad acts.         Clark had ample opportunity to lodge a
    4
    formal complaint against Officer Joseph; he chose instead to
    complain about the general security conditions in the facility in
    which he was housed. It would be disruptive to permit Clark to
    amend his complaint at this late date, especially considering that
    he has not exhausted any available administrative remedies with
    respect to Officer Joseph.
    Further, the district court did not err in dismissing Clark’s
    complaint without permitting discovery because Clark failed to
    state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Clark alleged
    only negligence on the Sheriff and the Warden’s part in securing
    the facility, and negligence does not give rise to a § 1983 cause
    of action. See Jacquez, 
    801 F.2d at 792
     (“Recently, the Supreme
    Court specifically held [in Davidson v. Cannon, 
    474 U.S. 344
    (1986)] that a § 1983 civil rights claim cannot be based on a
    negligent failure to protect.”). Moreover, the Sheriff and the
    Warden cannot be held liable on any theory of respondeat superior
    or vicarious liability. See Gobert v. Caldwell, 
    463 F.3d 339
    , 350
    n.37 (5th Cir. 2006). To prevail against them as supervisors, Clark
    would have had to allege facts supporting a failure to supervise,
    
    id.,
     and he did not.
    III.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with
    prejudice of Clark’s civil rights lawsuit as frivolous and for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
    5
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-30957

Citation Numbers: 236 F. App'x 903

Judges: DeMOSS, Garwood, Per Curiam, Smith

Filed Date: 5/30/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023