Dobson Industrial v. Iron Workers , 237 F. App'x 39 ( 2007 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0375n.06
Filed: June 5, 2007
No. 06-1023
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DOBSON INDUSTRIAL, INC., )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
v. )
)
IRON WORKERS LOCAL UNION ) OPINION
No. 25, INTERNATIONAL )
ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, )
STRUCTURAL, ORNAMENTAL AND )
REINFORCING IRON WORKERS, )
AFL-CIO, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
BEFORE: BOGGS, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge; and MILLS,
District Judge.*
RICHARD MILLS, District Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Dobson Industrial, Inc. filed a complaint in an attempt to
enjoin a grievance filed by Defendant-Appellee Iron Workers Local Union No. 25.
*
The Honorable Richard Mills, United States District Judge for the Central
District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
In granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the district court held that
the grievance was substantively arbitrable and that the Joint Grievance Board’s
decision was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. Finding no error,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant Dobson Industrial, Inc. and Defendant-Appellee Iron
Workers Local Union No. 25 (“Local 25” or “the Union”) are parties to a Structural
Agreement which governs the erection and installation of structural steel. The
Agreement is between the Union and “the Associated General Contractors of
America, Greater Detroit Chapter, Inc., the Great Lakes Fabricators and Erectors
Association, and the Michigan Conveyor Manufacturers Association, Inc.,
(Association), representing its members (Employer or Employers).” Dobson was a
member of the Great Lakes Fabricators and Erectors Association. At the time of the
grievances, Dobson had three owners: the trust of James Dobson, and individuals
Norman Vlk and Dale Bash.1 Dobson’s business consists of steel fabrication, steel
erection services, rigging services, door services and storage services. In the course
of its business, Dobson regularly employs about twelve members of Local 25 on an
1
Dobson states that following the death of Norman Vlk on October 8, 2005,
his shares passed to his son, Christopher Vlk.
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hourly basis.
A collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) exists between Dobson and the
Union, which provides for a joint grievance board (“JGB”) “to hear and decide all
grievances regarding the interpretation of this Agreement or conditions of
employment existing between the Association (including any Employer members of
the Association) or any other employer signatory to this Agreement and the Union.”
The CBA was amended, effective June 1, 2004, to include Article 30(E), which
provides, “A signatory Employer may not avoid application of this Agreement by
double breasting or similar device.”
In October 2004, Dobson submitted a bid to the National Gypsum Company
for a project that required the removal and installation of a dust collector system.
Later that month, Local 25 learned that another company, IMM, Inc., was installing
the dust collection system at the National Gypsum Project. According to the Union,
this job involved work which was covered by the Structural Agreement. The IMM
employees on the National Gypsum Project were not members of Local 25.
On November 4, 2004, Local 25 filed two identical grievances alleging that
“Dobson . . . is operating a non-union alter ego named IMM, Inc. and using IMM to
perform bargaining unit work at the National City Gypsum facility in violation of
virtually every provision of the collective bargaining agreement.” The Union
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requested the following relief: “[a]ll lost wages and benefits because of the contract
violation at the National City Gypsum facility, cease operation of the non-union alter
ego, IMM; repayment of targeting money received by Dobson . . . and suspension of
all target monies pendings [sic].” The Union notes that the grievance did not seek
an accretion of IMM employees into the Local 25-represented bargaining unit at
Dobson, that IMM be bound to the Structural Agreement or that IMM be held liable
for Dobson’s contract violation. At the time the grievances were filed, the
shareholders of IMM were the trust of James E. Dobson, and the individuals, Dale A.
Bash and Christopher K. Vlk.
On December 15, 2004, a hearing was held before the JGB. In accordance with
Article 31 of the Structural Agreement, the JGB consisted of three Union
representatives and three representatives of the Association. Local 25 claims that it
presented evidence of common ownership between Dobson and IMM; shared
management between Dobson and IMM; that work at the Gypsum Project was
covered by the Structural Agreement and that work on the Gypsum Project involved
approximately 600 hours of structural iron work.
The Union claims that Chris Vlk, President of IMM and Director of Operations
for Dobson, stated at the hearing that he served as President of IMM without pay; that
Dobson and IMM have jointly solicited bids and provided marketing services; that
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work has been traded back and forth between Dobson and IMM in accordance with
which party is best able to perform the work; that IMM performed structural work
when Dobson was unable to solicit work from customers requiring low-wage
workers; and that Dobson has diverted work to IMM during the bidding process. Vlk
also complained about the high wage and benefit rates in the Structural Agreement.
Dobson’s attorney also appeared at the hearing and presented evidence to the JGB.
Dobson disputes some of the above allegations. It claims that Chris Vlk was
compensated for his services as President at IMM in the form of stock options.
Moreover, Dobson and IMM have never jointly solicited bids on structural iron
projects, structural work has not been traded back and forth between Dobson and
IMM in accordance with which party is best able to perform the work, and Dobson
has never diverted work to IMM during the bidding process. Vlk stated that the two
companies remain independent and distinct. Dobson claims those are just some of
the erroneous factual assertions made by Local 25.
Dobson contends that the Union’s most egregious misrepresentation concerns
Vlk’s role at the JGB hearing. As Dobson’s Director of Operations, Vlk attended the
JGB hearing solely for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction. Dobson consistently
maintained that “the subject and circumstances presented by the Grievance are not
arbitrable under the contract” and requested “that the JGB decline to exercise any
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authority over the grievance, and leave the parties to explore, if they choose, other
alternatives.”
Article 31(B) of the CBA provides in pertinent part, “Within seven (7) days
after the grievance has been heard by the Joint Board, the Board will issue its
decision.” The original complaint in this case was filed on December 13, 2004,
which was two days before the JGB hearing. A first amended complaint was filed on
December 22, 2004. On January 13, 2005 (29 days after the hearing), having
received no response or decision from the JGB, Dobson filed its second amended
complaint, to reflect the fact that the hearing had been held and to complain about the
tardiness of the JGB decision. Dobson also requested that the court quash any
decision of the JGB. On January 28, 2005, the JGB issued its decision granting Local
25's grievance filed under the Structural Agreement and dismissing the grievance
filed under the Rigging Agreement. Specifically, the JGB concluded that “a close
business relationship exists between Respondent Dobson and IMM, Inc., sufficient
to find that an alter-ego situation exists.” The Union was awarded lost wages and
benefits.
Local 25 states that during this litigation, each of the facts found by the JGB
was confirmed to be true. Moreover, Local 25's members would have performed
much of the work on the National Gypsum Project if Dobson had done the job.
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On February 7, 2005, Local 25 filed with the district court its counterclaim to
enforce final and binding grievance decision. On August 26, 2005, Dobson filed its
motion for summary judgment and Local 25 filed a motion to enforce final and
binding grievance decision. The district court granted Local 25's motion to enforce
and denied Dobson’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Dobson raises several issues on appeal. It alleges that the district court erred
in holding that the decision of the JGB was not preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”). It further contends that the district court erred in declining
to vacate the JGB’s decision which disregarded the law on alter ego. Dobson also
asserts that the JGB’s decision exceeded that entity’s powers by substantially
affecting the rights of an independent third party. It also claims that the JGB’s
decision was fundamentally unfair in part because it was not appealable. Finally,
Dobson alleges that the district court should have vacated the JGB’s decision because
it was untimely.
II. DISCUSSION
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act authorizes district
courts to hear “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). This is an appeal from a final order of the district
court dated November 7, 2005. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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In cases in which the district court enforces or refuses to vacate an arbitration
award, we review findings of fact only for clear error. Questions of law are reviewed
de novo. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Utility Workers Local 227, 440 F.3d
809, 812 (6th Cir. 2006).
(A)
Dobson contends that the district court erred as a matter of law when it
declined to vacate the JGB’s decision which it asserts was preempted by the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Section 9(b) of the NLRA authorizes the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) to determine “the unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining.” 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). Dobson alleges the JGB’s decision that
the IMM was an alter ego of Dobson, thereby entitling Local 25 members to “lost
wages and benefits equal to those that would have been paid had the work been
performed by Dobson at the National City Gypsum Facility under the Structural
Agreement,” rests on an impermissible conclusion that IMM’s employees are an
extension of Dobson and, therefore, covered by Local 25's representation agreement.
Dobson asserts that the JGB’s conclusion involves an accretion of IMM’s employees
into the representative unit of the Union, a decision that Dobson claims falls within
the exclusive province of the NLRB. Dobson cites Lexington Cartage Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 713 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1983), for the general
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proposition that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction for adjudicating questions of
representation or unfair labor practices.
The Union claims that Lexington Cartage Co. is inapposite. That case concerns
whether the NLRB has jurisdiction to determine if an employer has a duty to bargain
with a union when there is an issue regarding whether the union has the support of
a majority of the employees. 713 F.2d at 195. Unlike this case, Lexington Cartage
Co. does not involve a grievance, arbitrability, or double-breasting.
Dobson further contends that its argument is supported by decisions of the
NLRB. See Asbestos Carting Corp. and Local 813, 302 N.L.R.B. 197 (1991) (“These
single employer/alter ego and accretion issues involve application of statutory policy,
standards, and criteria and thus are matters for decision of the Board rather than an
arbitrator.”). Dobson claims the issues here should not be decided by an arbitrator.
It maintains that Local 25 impermissibly sought a ruling from the JGB that IMM is
Dobson’s alter ego, a determination that must be made by the NLRB. Dobson
contends that because the JGB lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue, the district
court should have vacated its decision.
Local 25 asserts this case differs from Asbestos Carting Corp. because in that
case, the union requested that the NLRB recognize it as the bargaining representative
for the employer’s employees. 302 N.L.R.B. at 197. Conversely in this case, Local 25
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did not demand recognition of IMM’s employees, nor did it request that the JGB
decide a representation issue. Local 25 contends, therefore, that because a
representation issue was not raised by the grievance or the decision of the JGB in this
case, NLRA preemption is not an issue in this case.
Dobson alleges that the end result of having an arbitrator decide these issues
is that there is neither finality nor any guidance to the parties as to how to behave in
the future. Dobson speculates that until the issue is submitted to the NLRB for a final
determination, the Union will continue to file grievances each time IMM successfully
bids a project.2 According to Dobson, the result is that Local 25 will have the power
to decide what entities, like IMM,3 are represented by the parties’ CBA. Because
such a decision is within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, Dobson requests that the
decision of the district court and JGB be vacated.
2
In a letter of supplemental authority, Dobson states that a second suit
between the parties was filed by it following receipt of another grievance from the
Union premised solely on the “alter ego” theory. That case is before Chief Judge
Friedman in the Eastern District of Michigan. USDC-EDM Case No. 05-74610:
Dobson Industrial, Inc. vs. Iron Workers Local Union No. 25, International
Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers,
AFL-CIO.
3
In its letter of supplemental authority, Dobson also states that IMM, Inc.,
has filed a § 8(e) Charge and Position Statement with the NLRB. Case No. 7-CE-
61: IMM, Inc., Charging Party vs. Iron Workers Local Union No. 25, International
Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers,
Respondent Union.
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The Union alleges there is no support for Dobson’s claim that the JGB’s
decision was preempted by the NLRA because it accreted IMM’s employees into the
bargaining unit represented by Local 25 at Dobson. The Union notes that the JGB
ordered Dobson to pay it lost wages and benefits. The decision did not accrete
IMM’s employees into Local 25's bargaining unit at Dobson. The Union claims that
IMM employees are not even discussed in the JGB’s decision. IMM’s employees
were not represented by Local 25 when the grievance was filed and remain non-union
today.
Local 25 further contends that even if a representation issue was implicated in
this case, Dobson’s claim that all matters related to such issues are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding
in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). That case involved
a dispute between an employer and two unions over whether certain employees in one
union were doing the work of the employees represented by another union. Id. at
262. The employer refused to arbitrate on the basis that the dispute involved a
representation matter for the NLRB. Id. at 262-63. The Court concluded that
whether the dispute involved work assignment or representation, there was no bar to
the use of the arbitration procedure. Id. at 272. Thus, even if this case did involve
a representation issue, the Union claims there was no NLRA preemption.
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Dobson further alleges that the result of the JGB’s decision is that every time
employees of IMM perform a job that Local 25 deems to be covered by the CBA,
Local 25 enjoys the rewards and enrichment as if IMM’s employees are Union
members, despite not offering the protections and benefits of membership to these
same employees from which Local 25's benefit is derived. Local 25 is awarded wages
and benefits, while the IMM employees who actually perform the work do not enjoy
pensions and other benefits of union membership. Dobson contends, moreover, that
this serves effectively to require it to pay Local 25 for work done by employees that
are not covered by their collective bargaining agreement and that may not be
members of the same bargaining unit even if they are Local 25 members. Dobson
asserts this violates the NLRA because the NLRB is authorized to determine these
matters. Dobson asks this Court to vacate the district court’s decision on the basis of
lack of jurisdiction.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the JGB’s decision was not
preempted by the NLRA. This case concerns a grievance that the Union filed
wherein it sought lost wages and benefits from the signatory contractor for breach of
the parties’ Structural Agreement. Any determination as to the contract interpretation
would not affect the Union’s status as bargaining representative for any particular
employees. As the district court observed, “There were no third parties involved in
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being able to interpret this contract,” though certain facts about IMM were relevant
to the overall inquiry. This case did not involve a demand for recognition of IMM’s
employees, nor did it concern a request that the JGB decide a representation issue.
Even if this case involved a representation issue, we would not necessarily be
without jurisdiction. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71 v. Trafftech,
Inc., 461 F.3d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 2006). In Trafftech, this Court observed:
Since Carey, this court has drawn the following dichotomy
between disputes implicating the exclusive initial jurisdiction of the
Board . . . and those implicating the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal
courts under § 301. When a dispute is “primarily representational”
under § 7 or § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, “simply referring
to the claim as a ‘breach of contract’ [is] insufficient for the purposes of
§ 301 federal courts’ jurisdiction,” but “matter[s] primarily of contract
interpretation, whi[ch] potentially implicat[e] representational issues,”
remain within the federal courts’ § 301 jurisdiction.
Id. at 694-95 (citations omitted). Thus, contract disputes which touch on
representational issues may be subject to federal jurisdiction.
Like the district court, we believe that the JGB’s decision drew its essence from
the contract. The CBA provided that Dobson “may not avoid application of this
Agreement by double breasting or similar device.” The JGB reasonably determined
that this language forbade using an alter ego. Given that the Structural Agreement
has a broad arbitration clause, the Union’s grievance against Dobson was arbitrable.
This is particularly true in light of the federal labor policy that strongly favors
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arbitration. Detroit Typographical Union v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 283 F.3d
779, 786 (6th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we conclude the district court correctly
determined that the JGB did not exceed its jurisdiction.
(B)
Dobson next alleges that assuming that the issue of alter ego was properly
before the JGB, the JGB’s decision was also made in manifest disregard of this
court’s precedent on alter ego. An arbitration decision must be set aside when the
decision “fl[ies] in the face of clearly established legal precedent.” Lynch v. Johnson,
70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995). “When faced with questions of law, an arbitration
panel does not act in manifest disregard of the law unless (1) the applicable legal
principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the
arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.” Id.
The test for the alter ego doctrine is “whether the two enterprises have
substantially identical management, business, purpose, operation, equipment,
customers, supervision and ownership.” National Labor Relations Board v. Fullerton
Transfer & Storage Ltd., Inc., 910 F.2d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
Dobson asserts there are many factors which demonstrate the independence of IMM
from Dobson. The two entities have only six common customers. As for the type of
business, the only two areas of overlap between Dobson and IMM are structural
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services and steel fabrication service, both of which amount to less than ten percent
of IMM’s business. Dobson contends, moreover, that IMM regularly subcontracts
to Dobson and has used Dobson’s services for eleven separate projects in the last two
years. Dobson alleges that the two companies have separate business locations,
management, labor policies, bidding structure, customers and work. Moreover, IMM
and Dobson do not share any common equipment. Based on the foregoing, Dobson
claims it is impossible to conclude that IMM is Dobson’s alter ego for any purpose.
The Union contends that the district court properly found that the JGB’s
decision drew its essence from the terms of the Structural Agreement. “A double-
breasted, or dual shop, employer maintains one company that is a signatory to a CBA
while maintaining a second, non-union company in the same line of work in order to
utilize non-union labor.” Becker Electric Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
No. 212, 927 F.2d 895, 896 (6th Cir. 1991).
Local 25 notes that Dobson and IMM have common ownership, common
management and common directors. They also had a common officer. The Union
further alleges that IMM began its operations with two loans from Dobson’s banker
to Dobson and IMM. Dobson also purchased equipment for IMM. Dobson has an
iron worker division that erects and installs structural steel; IMM has a field services
department that erects and installs structural steel. The Union notes that Dobson and
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IMM operate in the same geographical location and have at least a few common
customers. Based on these factors, Local 25 contends that Dobson operates a non-
union company, IMM, to avoid the application of the Structural Agreement. Dobson
asserts that Local 25 has misconstrued and/or mischaracterized many of these factors.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court correctly
sustained the arbitrator’s decision. Examining whether a party to an arbitration
agreement with a double-breasting clause has an “alter ego” is a reasonable way to
determine whether that party is violating that clause. In other words, the inquiry
undertaken by the JGB demonstrates that it was “arguably construing” the agreement.
Accordingly, the district court properly held that the JGB’s decision must be
sustained. Mich. Family Res., Inc. v. SEIU Local 517M, 475 F.3d 746, 756 (6th Cir.
2007) (en banc).
(C)
Dobson contends the district court erred by failing to vacate the JGB’s decision
when it exceeded its powers by substantially affecting the rights of an independent
third party. A federal court may vacate an arbitration award if “the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). This court has observed, “Some circuits
have specifically held that arbitrators exceed their powers when they determine rights
and obligations of individuals who are not parties to the arbitration proceedings.”
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NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Dobson claims that in this case, the JGB exceeded its powers by substantially
impairing the right of IMM to subcontract with Dobson. Moreover, other companies
have expressed concern about doing business with IMM during this ongoing labor
dispute. Dobson claims that because the JGB has substantially impaired the rights of
an entity that is not a party to the CBA between Dobson and Local 25, the district
court erred in failing to vacate the decision.
We conclude the district court correctly determined that the JGB did not exceed
its powers by substantially affecting the rights of an independent third party. While
the JGB’s decision may affect IMM’s ability to subcontract with Dobson, Article
30(E) of the Structural Agreement prohibits Dobson from double-breasting. If
Dobson’s argument were accepted, then Article 30(E) would have little meaning.
Enforcement of a contractual restriction on the actions of one party is not invalid
because the restrictions affect the party’s participation in the marketplace. Dobson’s
agreement to the CBA here did not affect any rights of IMM; it merely prevented
Dobson from agreeing to certain dealings with IMM. The JGB’s decision simply
enforced the way in which Dobson itself had limited the freedom of its partial alter
ego.
(D)
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Dobson next contends that the district court erred by failing to vacate the
decision of the JGB when Dobson was allowed no right to appeal that decision.
Dobson further alleges that it was otherwise denied fundamental fairness. The district
court erroneously found that Dobson could have appealed the JGB’s decision to an
arbitration panel. Article 31(C) of the parties’ CBA allows either party to appeal only
upon a deadlock decision of the JGB. The Union claims that the error was harmless.
“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 61
Dobson also alleges that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct that
amounted to a denial of fundamental fairness as to the proceeding, in violation of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Dobson claims there is no guidance
given to members of the JGB regarding how to make a decision. Moreover, the
hearing was informal, no evidence was formally presented, no witnesses were sworn
and no record or transcript maintained.
“Arbitrators are not bound by formal rules of procedure and evidence, and the
standard for judicial review of arbitration proceedings is merely whether a party to
arbitration has been denied a fundamentally fair hearing.” Nat’l Post Office
Mailhandlers v. U.S. Postal Service, 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1985). Both sides
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presented evidence and arguments at the hearing. If Dobson wanted a more formal
or structured hearing process, it could have sought to negotiate one as part of the
Structural Agreement.
Dobson also contends that the district court erred by failing to vacate the JGB’s
decision which was tainted by partiality when half of the JGB’s members were direct
competitors of Dobson. Article 31(A) of the CBA provides, “A Joint Grievance
Board will be established consisting of three (3) individuals appointed by the
Association and three (3) individuals appointed by the Union.” Dobson notes that the
interests of both the Association and Union were aligned against its interests in that
both the Association and Union had an interest in equalizing wages. Dobson claims
that because of these competing interests, it did not receive unbiased and neutral
consideration by the JGB.
The Union notes that Dobson’s attorney admitted she was not aware of any
specific evidence of bias or prejudice on the part of JGB members. Moreover,
Dobson agreed to a JGB comprised of three management members and three union
members. It is too late to object to those terms now.
We conclude that the district court’s error regarding the right to appeal was
harmless. It is mentioned almost in passing at the very end of the hearing and does
not appear to be the basis of the court’s ruling. Dobson’s other arguments about
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procedural unfairness and the make-up of the JGB are also unpersuasive. The parties
agreed to the terms in the Structural Agreement. Dobson could have objected if it had
problems with any provisions.
(E)
Dobson also contends that the district court committed error by failing to
vacate the untimely decision of the JGB, which Dobson claims was issued after the
time period permitted under the parties’ CBA. Article 31(B) provides that the JGB
will issue a decision within seven days after the grievance has been heard. In this
case, the JGB issued its decision 44 days after the hearing. Citing Jones v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 257 (6th Cir. 1984), Dobson asserts the JGB
exceeded its authority and the district court erred in failing to vacate the untimely
decision. In Jones, the arbitration agreement provided that the board would render
its decision within fifteen days of the hearing date. 728 F.2d at 264. The court
therefore considered whether the parties’ agreement stated that the arbitrators would
lose jurisdiction if they rendered a decision more than fifteen days after the hearing
date. Id. at 265. After determining there was no such provision, the court concluded
that the board retained jurisdiction to resolve the dispute “until a reasonable time
thereafter” the fifteen-day period. Id. The court held that because the fourteen-month
delay in Jones was unreasonable, the board lost jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.
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Id.
In this case, Dobson notes that in filing its second amended complaint on
January 13, 2005–almost one month after the JGB hearing–it clearly objected to the
JGB’s jurisdiction based on its failure to issue a timely decision. Dobson alleges,
moreover, that the delayed decision caused it and IMM irreparable injury to their
business reputations.
The Union alleges that the district court correctly held that the seven-day
provision is not a mandatory term which extinguished the JGB’s jurisdiction.
Moreover, Local 25 claims the court properly determined that a decision issued 44
days after the hearing did not constitute unreasonable delay.
In this case, the CBA does not provide that the JGB will lose jurisdiction by
failing to issue a decision within seven days of the hearing. We find that a decision
rendered 37 days thereafter was reasonable. Although Dobson alleges in a
conclusory fashion that the delay caused irreparable injury to its business reputation,
Dobson has not shown that it was prejudiced by the late decision. We conclude that
because the JGB’s decision was issued within a reasonable time after the hearing, the
JGB did not exceed its authority under the CBA.
For the reasons set about above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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