Geraldine Trice v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 672 F. App'x 679 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                DEC 22 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GERALDINE TRICE,                                 No. 16-15663
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01614-APG-
    NJK
    v.
    JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; et                   MEMORANDUM*
    al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 14, 2016**
    Before:      WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    Geraldine Trice appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    her action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure
    proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
    Thompson v. Paul, 
    547 F.3d 1055
    , 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Trice’s fraudulent misrepresentation
    claim because Trice failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants Larsen,
    Weber and the law firm Smith Larsen & Wixom (the “Attorney Defendants”) made
    false representations to her. See Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 
    825 P.2d 588
    , 592
    (Nev. 1992) (setting forth elements of fraudulent misrepresentation claim under
    Nevada law).
    The district court properly dismissed Trice’s claim for civil rights violations
    under 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
    , 1985 and 1986 because Trice failed to establish that any
    of the appellees were acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988) (elements of a claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    ); Sever v. Alaska Pulp
    Corp., 
    978 F.2d 1529
    , 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (elements of claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1985
    (3)); Trerice v. Pedersen, 
    769 F.2d 1398
    , 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] cause
    of action is not provided under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1986
     absent a valid claim for relief
    under [§] 1985.”).
    The district court properly dismissed Trice’s Racketeer Influenced and
    Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim because Trice failed to allege facts
    2                                     16-15663
    sufficient to state a plausible claim against the Attorney Defendants. See Ashcroft
    v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain
    sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
    on its face” (citation omitted)); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 
    625 F.3d 550
    , 557
    (9th Cir. 2010) (elements of RICO claim).
    The district court properly dismissed the RICO claim against defendants
    JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and California Reconveyance Company as barred by
    the doctrine of issue preclusion because the claim was predicated on issues that
    have been resolved against Trice in her prior state court actions against these
    defendants. LaForge v. State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 
    997 P.2d 130
    , 133
    (Nev. 2000) (“The general rule of issue preclusion is that if an issue of fact or law
    was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the
    determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties” (citation
    omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Trice’s
    complaint without leave to amend because an amendment would have been futile.
    See Albrecht v. Lund, 
    845 F.2d 193
    , 195 (9th Cir. 1988) (setting forth standard of
    review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is not an abuse of
    discretion if amendment would be futile).
    3                                     16-15663
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    All pending motions and requests are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                      16-15663