Sharron Lefay v. William Lefay , 673 F. App'x 722 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 22 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHARRON LEFAY; et al., No. 15-15029
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
1:13-cv-01362-AWI-MJS
v.
WILLIAM CHARLES LEFAY; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
SHARRON LEFAY; et al., Nos. 15-15235
15-15489
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
D.C. No.
v. 1:13-cv-01362-AWI-MJS
WILLIAM CHARLES LEFAY,
Defendant,
and
ERIC PANABAKER, Fresno Police
Officer; et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 13, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: KOZINSKI, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Sharron LeFay (“Sharron”) appeals the district court’s summary judgment
ruling that Officer Darryll Van Deursen had probable cause to place her on a
seventy-two-hour mental health hold pursuant to California Welfare and
Institutions Code section 5150. The City of Fresno, along with several Fresno
Police Officers, filed a cross-appeal, seeking review of the district court’s order
granting Plaintiffs attorney’s fees as a discovery sanction. We affirm.
1. A detention under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150
must be supported by probable cause. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th
Cir. 2007). “Probable cause exists under section 5150 if facts are known to the
officer ‘that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or to
entertain a strong suspicion, that the person detained is mentally disordered and is
a danger to himself or herself.’” Id. (quoting People v. Triplett, 192 Cal. Rptr. 537,
540–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
2
The Fresno Police Department dispatched Officer Van Deursen to the LeFay
residence after Sharron’s husband, William LeFay (“William”), called and reported
that Sharron had “jumped on him.” The dispatcher informed Officer Van Deursen
that a male and female were arguing and that other officers had been dispatched to
the residence early that evening. Upon his arrival at the residence, William
reported to Officer Van Deursen that Sharron was delusional, had not eaten in
days, and was in a “gradual mental decline.” William also reported that Sharron
was falsely accusing him of stealing her purse and poisoning her food. Officer
Van Deursen then attempted to confirm the information he had received from
William by speaking with Sharron. Sharron stated she had not eaten a meal in
three days and could not recall the last time she had consumed liquid. Sharron
explained that she was being treated for depression, fibromyalgia, and other body
pain. She also expressed concern that William was stealing her purse. Finally,
Officer Van Deursen observed that Sharron had trouble walking, that she appeared
malnourished and dehydrated, and that she was wearing dirty clothing, as if she
had not changed in several days. These “specific and articulable facts” support a
“rational inference” that Sharron was mentally disordered and a danger to herself.
Id. (quoting Triplett, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 541). Therefore, we find Officer Van
Deursen had probable cause to place Sharron on a section 5150 mental health hold.
3
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Officer Van Deursen on Sharron’s Fourth Amendment claim, actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
2. “[W]e review every discovery sanction for an abuse of discretion, [and]
we give particularly wide latitude to the district court’s discretion to issue
sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259
F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) allows a
court to exclude from trial or a hearing, any witness or evidence that has not been
properly identified in accordance with Rule 26(a) or (e). However, there are two
express exceptions to this general rule: “The information may be introduced if the
parties’ failure to disclose the required information is substantially justified or
harmless.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)). “In addition to or instead of this
sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard . . . may
order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the
failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A).
Under Rule 26(a)(2), parties must “disclose the identity of each expert
witness ‘accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness.’”
Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)). Defendants
failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2) by the deadline the district court set in a
4
scheduling order. LeFay v. LeFay, No. 1:13-cv-1362, 2014 WL 6473725, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2014). Defendants then asked the district court to modify the
scheduling order to give them additional time to identify their expert witnesses and
submit their expert reports. Id. In ruling on this motion, the district court analyzed
whether allowing Defendants to present their expert witnesses at trial would harm
Plaintiffs by determining whether Plaintiffs would suffer any prejudice. Id. at *6
(“So the Court then turns to the question of harmlessness, or its corollary, prejudice
. . . .”). Ultimately, the district court chose not to exclude Defendants’ expert
witnesses from trial. Id. The district court concluded that one of Rule 37(c)(1)’s
express exceptions applied: Defendants’ failure to timely disclose the identity and
written reports of their expert witnesses would not prejudice Plaintiffs, and thus
was harmless, so long as Defendants satisfied certain conditions. Id. The district
court also awarded Plaintiffs the reasonable attorney’s fees they had incurred in
arguing the motion to modify the scheduling order. Id. at *7. The award of
attorney’s fees was necessary to ensure Plaintiffs—who had incurred fees opposing
a motion Defendants had filed to fix their own shortcomings—were not harmed.
Although another jurist might not have awarded Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees
under these circumstances, or in this manner, that is not the relevant inquiry. See
Halaco Eng’g Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1988). We find that the
5
district court did not make “a clear error of judgment,” and thus did not abuse its
discretion, in awarding Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees. Id.
Later, after the district court ruled on Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment, Plaintiffs filed a motion to recover their attorney’s fees pursuant to the
district court’s order. The district court then held a hearing to give the parties an
opportunity to be heard before awarding the fees. We find that under these
circumstances Rule 37(c)(1)’s procedural requirements were met.
Finally, we reject Sharron’s contention that the cross-appeal is so lacking in
merit that sanctions are appropriate. Although we are affirming the district court’s
award of fees, we cannot conclude that “the result is obvious or the . . . arguments
are wholly without merit.” Glanzman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir.
1989) (quoting McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981)).
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
6