Lijuan Bian v. Jefferson Sessions , 677 F. App'x 385 ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FEB 21 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LIJUAN BIAN, No. 14-70444
Petitioner, Agency No. A087-719-592
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 16, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and HELLERSTEIN,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Lijuan Bian, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a final
order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on her
application for relief from removal through asylum, withholding of removal, and
the Convention Against Torture based on an adverse credibility determination. As
the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We deny the
petition.
We review adverse credibility determinations under the substantial evidence
standard and require that the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) “state explicitly the factors
supporting his or her adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590
F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). The substantial evidence standard of review
“precludes relief absent a conclusion that no reasonable factfinder could have
reached the agency’s result.” Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2005)). An IJ must
consider the totality of the circumstances when making a credibility determination,
including demeanor, candor, responsiveness, inherent plausibility, consistency,
inaccuracies, or falsehoods. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
The BIA and IJ’s decisions were based on a series of inconsistencies in
Bian’s testimony that suggested her conversion to Christianity was not legitimate.
Bian’s testimony was inconsistent in four material respects.
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First, she lied to consular officers multiple times while trying to obtain a visa
to the United States. On one occasion, she falsely told consular officers that she
worked for an import/export company and that she was traveling to the United
States on business. On another occasion she falsely told consular officers that she
was traveling for sightseeing purposes. Both instances took place before Bian had
converted to Christianity and was allegedly fleeing persecution in China, and thus
were not justifiable as necessary lies for a refugee fleeing persecution.
Second, Bian’s explanation for why she converted to Christianity was
inconsistent. Bian testified that she converted because she was unhappy with her
job and never promoted. But the supporting documentation Bian submitted
indicated that she was promoted from the position of “Traditional Physician” to the
position of “physician-in-charge” in 1994, and she held that position until she left
her job in 2005. Bian argued on appeal that her conversion was the culmination of
her resignation, financial problems, and depression, not just her dissatisfaction with
not being promoted. But, “our review of an IJ’s adverse credibility finding is
significantly restricted.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041 (internal citation omitted).
Bian’s assertion that her resignation from her employment combined with a
general bad mood and bad health does not compel a contrary conclusion to the IJ’s
finding that her conversion to Christianity was not credible.
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Third, Bian testified inconsistently regarding evidence of her arrest in China.
Bian’s fear that she will be persecuted if she is returned to China is largely
grounded on her testimony that she was arrested, detained for a week, and beaten
for practicing Christianity in an illegal church. The IJ stated that “the Court has no
direct evidence that [Bian] was ever arrested or detained in China or ever reported
to a local police station[,]” because Bian could not produce her bail receipt to the
court. Bian testified that her husband refused to discuss the bail receipt with her
because he wanted her to focus on her recovery. But she also testified that he
threw the bail receipt away.
We have held that “[a]lthough inconsistencies no longer need to go to the
heart of the petitioner’s claim, when an inconsistency is at the heart of the claim it
doubtless is of great weight.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1046-47. Here, the BIA put
particular weight on Bian’s inconsistencies in her testimony about the bail receipt
because her arrest “formed the basis of her past persecution claim and the
conditions attached to her release form the basis of her fear of future persecution.”
While Bian did produce some corroborating evidence of her arrest, it is not enough
to compel a contrary conclusion to the agency’s holding.
Fourth, the BIA and IJ focused on inconsistencies in Bian’s testimony
regarding where she was actually living during her time in China versus the
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address listed on her official household registry. Bian testified that she could not
relocate within China and would be found and persecuted if she returned to China
because she must live where she was officially registered. But she did not live
where she was officially registered for much of her time in China. Thus, the IJ
correctly determined that “her belief that she cannot live elsewhere safely is
undercut.”
Given this court’s deferential standard of review to agency credibility
determinations and that Bian has not produced sufficient evidence to compel a
contrary conclusion, we deny the petition.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED
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