George Chapman, Jr. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust , 649 F. App'x 638 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 13 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE P. CHAPMAN, Jr. and No. 14-15927
BRENDA J. GULLY CHAPMAN,
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00228-RCJ-VPC
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY, as Trustee, a German
national corporation; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 11, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: KLEINFELD, IKUTA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
1. The district court had jurisdiction to dismiss George and Brenda
Chapman’s wrongful foreclosure and quiet title claims for failure to state a claim
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Page 2 of 3
upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A panel of this
court previously vacated the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over these
claims because an unlawful detainer claim concerning the same res had been filed
earlier and was pending in state court at the time of removal. See Marshall v.
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006). However, the panel also remanded the case to
the district court with instructions that it could choose to proceed if the state court
action had been terminated. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 531
F. App’x 832, 833 (9th Cir. 2013). Because the unlawful detainer claim had been
dismissed before the case was remanded, the district court permissibly elected to
reopen the proceedings pursuant to the panel’s instructions.
The panel’s ruling did not unlawfully authorize the district court to proceed
with the case. Although the “prior exclusive jurisdiction” doctrine mandates that a
court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over in rem and quasi in rem actions
when a different court has already exercised jurisdiction over a claim pertaining to
the same res, the doctrine itself is prudential, not jurisdictional. See Sexton v.
NDEX West, LLC, 713 F.3d 533, 536 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013). The district court
correctly found that the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction were met
at the time the claims were removed, and this court affirmed that determination.
See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1045 n.2 (9th
Page 3 of 3
Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Once abstention was no longer mandated, the district
court was free to exercise jurisdiction over the claims that were properly before it.
See Sexton, 713 F.3d at 537.
2. Because the Chapmans have not challenged the merits of the district
court’s order dismissing their claims, we need not address those issues here.
AFFIRMED.