Joseph Clig v. D. Wettlanfer , 713 F. App'x 660 ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH CLIG, No. 17-35395
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00514-JE
v.
MEMORANDUM*
D. WETTLANFER; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Clig, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056
(9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Clig
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent in treating Clig’s clubfoot condition or staph infection.
See id. at 1057-60 (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; medical
malpractice, negligence, or a difference in medical opinion concerning the
course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clig’s motion
to appoint counsel because Clig failed to show exceptional circumstances.
See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth
standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clig’s motion
to compel discovery because Clig failed to set forth particular facts that he
expected to uncover through discovery. See Hatch v. Reliance Ins., 758 F.2d
409, 416 (9th Cir. 1985) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clig’s motion
seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) because Clig failed
to demonstrate that the discovery he requested would preclude summary
judgment. See Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2011)
2 17-35395
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that a plaintiff must show that
the discovery sought would have precluded summary judgment).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and
argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2
(9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-35395