Planet Aid, Inc. v. Reveal ( 2022 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PLANET AID, INC., A Massachusetts         No. 21-15690
    Corporation which has its principal
    place of business in Howard County,          D.C. No.
    Maryland; LISBETH THOMSEN, An             3:17-cv-03695-
    alien and permanent resident of               MMC
    Chilangoma, Malawi,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    OPINION
    v.
    REVEAL; CENTER FOR
    INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING; MATT
    SMITH; AMY WALTERS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 14, 2022
    San Francisco, California
    Filed August 11, 2022
    Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Ronald M. Gould, and
    Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge S.R. Thomas
    2                     PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    SUMMARY*
    California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute
    The panel affirmed the district court’s order granting the
    Reporters with the Center for Investigative Reporting
    (“CIR”)’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint alleging
    defamation under California law.
    Matt Smith and Amy Waters were reporters with CIR
    (“Reporters”) and they published stories alleging misuse of
    funds by two charitable organizations, Planet Aid, Inc., and
    Development Aid from People to People Malawi (“DAPP
    Malawi”). In response, Planet Aid and the director of DAPP
    Malawi, Lisbeth Thomsen, filed a defamation suit.
    In a number of decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court
    established that public officials and public figures claiming
    defamation must prove that an allegedly defamatory
    statement was made with “actual malice.” The Supreme
    Court identified two types of public figures: all purpose
    public figures and limited-purpose public figures. All-
    purpose public figures must prove actual malice for virtually
    any subject of defamation, while limited-purpose public
    figures, who have assumed prominence on a limited range of
    issues, need only prove actual malice for speech touching
    upon those issues. In Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 
    715 F.3d 242
     (9th Cir. 2013), this court articulated a three-prong test to
    determine whether an individual or entity is a limited-purpose
    figure.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                        3
    The panel held that the district court correctly found that
    Planet Aid and Thomsen were limited-purpose public figures
    and that the Reporters did not act with “actual malice” within
    the meaning of New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 
    376 U.S. 254
     (1964). The panel agreed with the district court’s
    determination in applying the Makaeff test that: (i) there was
    an existing public controversy with respect to Planet Aid and
    Lisbeth Thomsen’s use of charitable funds; (ii) the Reporters’
    alleged defamation was relevant to this preexisting
    controversy; and (iii) the voluntariness requirement—which
    examines whether the plaintiff voluntarily injected itself into
    the controversy for the purpose of influencing the
    controversy’s ultimate resolution—was satisfied. The panel
    further agreed with the district court, for the reasons stated by
    the district court in its order, that a reasonable factfinder
    could not find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
    Reporters acted with actual malice. The panel therefore
    affirmed the district court’s grant of the Reporters’ motion to
    strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.
    COUNSEL
    Samuel Rosenthal (argued), Nelson Mullins LLP,
    Washington, D.C.; James M. Wagstaffe and Michael von
    Loewenfeldt, Wagstaffe von Loewenfeldt Busch & Radwick
    LLP, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Thomas R. Burke (argued), Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, San
    Francisco, California; Ambike K. Doran, Davis Wright
    Tremaine LLP, Seattle, Washington; Brendan Charney and
    Andrew G. Row, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Los Angeles,
    California; Simon J. Frankel, Alexa Hansen, Alison Wall,
    Annie Shi, and Miriam Arghavani, Covington & Burling
    4                 PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    LLP, San Francisco, California; Eric Chung, Covington &
    Burling LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.
    Deborah J. Dewart, Hubert, North Carolina, for Amicus
    Curiae Liberty, Life, and Law Foundation.
    Elizabeth M. Locke, Joseph R. Oliveri, and Daniel D. Mauler,
    Clare Locke LLP, Alexandria, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae
    Clare Locke LLP.
    Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. and Michael H. Dore, Gibson Dunn
    & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, California; Katie Townsend,
    Sarah S. Matthews, and Charles Hogle, Reporters Committee
    for Freedom of the Press, Washington, D.C.; for Amici
    Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and
    32 Media Organizations.
    OPINION
    S.R. THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
    In this appeal we must determine whether a charity and
    the director of a charity are limited-purpose public figures
    under the First Amendment. Reporters with the Center for
    Investigative Reporting published stories alleging misuse of
    funds by two charitable organizations, Planet Aid, Inc.
    (“Planet Aid”) and Development Aid from People to People
    Malawi (“DAPP Malawi”). In response, Planet Aid and the
    director of DAPP Malawi, Lisbeth Thomsen, filed a
    defamation suit. The district court granted the Reporters’
    motion to strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP
    statute, correctly finding that Planet Aid and Thomsen are
    limited-purpose public figures and that the reporters did not
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                        5
    act with “actual malice” within the meaning of New York
    Times Company v. Sullivan, 
    376 U.S. 254
     (1964). We affirm.
    I
    The Center for Investigative Reporting (“CIR”) is a
    California-based, nonprofit, investigative news organization.
    CIR publishes its reporting on various platforms, including its
    news website Reveal (www.revealnews.org), national radio
    show, and podcast. Matt Smith and Amy Walters were
    reporters with CIR. Between 2014 and 2017, CIR, Smith,
    and Walters (collectively, “CIR” or the “Reporters”)
    investigated and published a series of articles and podcasts
    reporting on the misuse of charitable funds by Planet Aid and
    its affiliate organization DAPP Malawi.
    A
    Planet Aid is a nonprofit charitable organization
    headquartered in Maryland with the stated mission of helping
    impoverished populations throughout the world. Planet Aid
    is recognized by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
    as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charity. It resells used clothing
    donated by the public, obtains government grants, and solicits
    corporate donations to generate funds. Since its inception in
    1997, Planet Aid claims to have provided more than
    $100 million to support projects on three continents in the
    areas of education, teacher training, nutrition, and agricultural
    and economic development.
    Planet Aid’s fundraising efforts are highly successful and
    recognizable. It fundraises by going door to door to solicit
    donations as well as setting up clothing donation bins that
    have become nearly ubiquitous across the United States. In
    6                  PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    partnership with schools, business groups, religious
    institutions, nonprofits, and various organizations across the
    country, Planet Aid placed over 20,000 donation bins
    nationwide. Its signature, bright-yellow bins are present in
    20 states and have achieved a degree of celebrity in popular
    culture. For example, the bins were featured in an episode of
    the popular television series “The Big Bang Theory,” which
    Planet Aid eagerly promoted on its social media pages.
    Planet Aid regularly engages with the press and actively
    cultivates a public image. It issues frequent press releases to
    generate attention regarding its charitable programs and
    activities. For instance, Planet Aid issued numerous press
    releases over the years to advertise the environmental benefits
    of its efforts to collect and resell donated clothing. Other
    examples of Planet Aid’s public self-promotion abound. In
    March of 2014, Planet Aid distributed press releases
    regarding a teacher training program it helped fund in
    Malawi. In June of 2016, it issued press releases regarding
    dignitaries’ visits to a nutritional program it was running for
    schoolchildren in Mozambique. It has hosted large galas to
    celebrate its charitable successes and promoted those galas to
    the press. Planet Aid also publicizes itself through social
    media. It has a YouTube page featuring videos about its
    charitable activities, some of which have thousands of views.
    Additionally, it regularly posts on Facebook and Twitter to its
    thousands of followers.
    From its inception, Planet Aid has drawn public attention
    and comment. For decades, the global press has reported on
    its relationship with a controversial web of charitable
    organizations accused of misusing funds and its association
    with a Danish cult. In 1993, a few years before Planet Aid
    was incorporated, the Edmonton Journal reported that “an
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                      7
    international organization that specializes in collecting used
    clothes for southern Africa,” was “attracting criticism from
    Denmark to the Arctic Circle” because many “Europeans who
    donate their old [clothes] don’t know the garments end up
    being sold at market prices in Africa—with much of the profit
    filtered into what seem less than altruistic causes.” This
    organization, known as “Humana” was reportedly affiliated
    with the Development Aid People to People (“DAPP”)
    network. According to the article, “[t]hrough a complex web
    of financial interests, the Humana/DAPP network runs a
    financial system out of the Cayman Islands” that includes
    “holding companies,” “Caribbean fruit plantations,” and “a
    yacht dealership.” The article further alleged that Humana
    and DAPP began as a group of radical Danish school teachers
    in the early 1970s, called “Tvind.”
    Then, according to a Danish newspaper, “after the Danish
    government fund slammed the door on subsidies,” Tvind
    “beg[an] an unprecedented, mammoth expansion drive in the
    USA and Canada to raise millions for its international
    activities,” including “found[ing] the organization Planet
    Aid.” In 2001, Tvind’s founder, Mogens Amdi Petersen, was
    prosecuted by Danish authorities for “using his control of
    Tvind and its related [organizations] to divert funds that were
    supposedly intended for charitable and other public
    purposes.”
    Multiple major news organizations in the United States
    and overseas reported on the trial and raised concerns about
    Planet Aid’s connection to Tvind and its use of charitable
    funds. In 2002, the Boston Globe linked Planet Aid to
    Petersen, who faced “charges of tax fraud and embezzlement
    of millions of dollars from a vast international network of
    charities,” and reported that “only about 6 percent of the
    8                    PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    money [Planet Aid] raises is spent on charity.” Several other
    publications reported that the American Institute of
    Philanthropy and the Better Business Bureau were critical of
    Planet Aid’s use of funds. These concerns reverberated from
    The Washington Post (May 2003 article), to the Chicago
    Tribune (Feb. 2004 and May 2011 articles), to the Los
    Angeles Times (Aug. 2015 article).1 Several international
    publications also covered the controversy.
    B
    Lisbeth Thomsen is the director of DAPP Malawi, a
    nonprofit charitable organization based in Malawi. Thomsen
    has worked in Malawi for nearly three decades and has
    worked specifically for DAPP Malawi for over two decades.
    Thomsen helped lead the organization’s poverty reduction
    and humanitarian efforts, establishing pre-schools, teacher
    training colleges, HIV/AIDs counseling centers, door-to-door
    educational campaigns, and other initiatives.
    As the director of DAPP Malawi, Thomsen was its
    spokesperson. When DAPP Malawi opened a school or
    unveiled a new charitable program, she spoke at public
    gatherings before local officials and community members to
    promote the initiative. Thomsen regularly spoke to the press
    1
    In addition to the above articles, numerous other U.S. news
    organizations have also reported on this controversy, including the
    following: The Wisconsin State Journal (Apr. 2002); The Brattleboro
    Reformer in Vermont (Apr. 2005); The Sacramento Bee (Nov. 2006);
    Lancaster Online in Pennsylvania (Jul. 2007); the Rochester Democrat
    and Chronicle in New York (Sep. 2007); Citizens’ Voice in Pennsylvania
    (Dec. 2007); The Times-Tribune in Pennsylvania (Dec. 2007); The
    Lebanon Daily News in Pennsylvania (Jan. 2008); The Burlington Free
    Press in Vermont (Oct. 2008); The Philadelphia Inquirer (Dec. 2012).
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                    9
    to generate attention regarding the successes of DAPP
    Malawi’s programs. She was featured regularly on DAPP
    Malawi’s Facebook and Twitter pages and appeared in
    promotional YouTube videos about DAPP Malawi’s work.
    Thomsen employed a public relations team, which helped her
    seek out positive press coverage and public appearances, and
    develop responses to negative publicity.
    Like Planet Aid, DAPP Malawi was long embroiled in the
    Tvind controversy. The press repeatedly linked DAPP
    Malawi to the Danish cult leader who was prosecuted for
    charity fraud. Additionally, several articles in Malawi
    newspapers raised concerns or made allegations about DAPP
    Malawi’s misuse of charitable funds under the leadership of
    Lisbeth Thomsen. In 2002, the Malawi News linked Tvind,
    Humana, and DAPP Malawi, reporting allegations that “Dapp
    Malawi uses its second hand clothes shops to raise funds
    which are later transferred back to Denmark through . . . a
    dubious scholarship scheme.” In 2003, The Chronicle
    Newspaper reported that “[i]n Malawi, government is now
    probing activities of DAPP Malawi, following . . .
    [accusations that] scholarships and other funds meant for
    Malawian students allegedly have been channeled to
    Denmark.” In 2011, the Nyasa Times reported that
    “employees at [DAPP Malawi] have turned against their
    employers, accusing them of secretly swindling money for
    unknown activities.”
    C
    In June of 2005, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
    (“UDSA”) awarded Planet Aid a grant through its “Food for
    Progress” program. The grant gave Planet Aid approximately
    $23 million to administer poverty reduction programs in
    10                     PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    Malawi including building, staffing, and operating schools to
    train teachers in Malawi; educating the Malawian population
    about risks associated with HIV and AIDs; teaching farmers
    about agricultural techniques to improve crop yields; and
    educating the population about nutrition. Planet Aid asked
    Thomsen to help administer the USDA grant in her role as
    director of DAPP Malawi.
    In 2014, reporters at CIR began to investigate Planet Aid
    and DAPP Malawi’s use of the USDA grant funds. Between
    March and May 2016, they published a podcast, along with
    several news articles and social media posts, alleging that
    Planet Aid, DAPP Malawi, and Lisbeth Thomsen misused the
    funds. The publications alleged that Planet Aid and Lisbeth
    Thomsen stole USDA funds by diverting funds from their
    intended recipients, falsifying invoices, failing to provide
    livestock and agricultural inputs to local farmers, and
    extracting kickbacks from the salaries of DAPP Malawi
    employees.
    In August of 2016, Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen filed
    a defamation suit against the Reporters. In July of 2018, the
    Reporters moved under California’s anti-SLAPP law,
    California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, to strike the
    defamation claim.2       After significant discovery was
    conducted, in March of 2021, the district court granted the
    motion to strike. The district court found that several
    statements by the Reporters were false, but recognized that
    Planet Aid and Thomsen are limited-purpose public figures
    2
    Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen forfeited any argument that
    California’s anti-SLAPP statute may not be applied in federal court by
    failing to specifically and distinctly argue this issue in their opening brief.
    See Greenwood v. FAA, 
    28 F.3d 971
    , 977 (9th Cir. 1994).
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                      11
    in connection with their use of charitable funds and that the
    Reporters did not act with “actual malice.” N.Y. Times,
    
    376 U.S. at 280
    .
    II
    “California law provides for the pre-trial dismissal of
    certain actions, known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
    Participation, or SLAPPs, that masquerade as ordinary
    lawsuits but are intended to deter ordinary people from
    exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for
    doing so.” Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 
    715 F.3d 254
    , 261
    (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see
    also Wilcox v. Super. Ct., 
    33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446
    , 450 (Cal. Ct.
    App. 1994). We have jurisdiction to review the district
    court’s grant of the Reporters’ anti-SLAPP motion under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Because the motion challenges the factual
    sufficiency of Planet Aid and Thomsen’s defamation claim,
    “the motion must be treated as though it were a motion for
    summary judgment.” Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc.
    v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 
    890 F.3d 828
    , 833 (9th Cir. 2018)
    (citation omitted).
    We review de novo whether summary judgment was
    properly entered. L.F. v. Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. #414,
    
    947 F.3d 621
    , 625 (9th Cir. 2020). Whether a plaintiff is a
    public figure is a legal question to be reviewed de novo.
    Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., 
    830 F.3d 881
    , 888
    (9th Cir. 2016). Moreover, we “must make an independent
    examination of the whole record, so as to assure ourselves
    that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on
    the field of free expression.” Suzuki Motor Corp. v.
    Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
    330 F.3d 1110
    , 1113 (9th Cir.
    12                PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    2003) (citing N.Y. Times, 
    376 U.S. at 284
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    III
    The Supreme Court has long enshrined “a profound
    national commitment to the principle that debate on public
    issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open and that
    it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
    unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
    officials,” N.Y. Times, 
    376 U.S. at 270
    , as well as “public
    figures,” Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 
    388 U.S. 130
    , 154
    (1967). Thus, an action for defamation can be maintained
    only to the extent it does not interfere with First Amendment
    rights of free expression.
    In the landmark decisions of New York Times Company
    v. Sullivan, and Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, the
    Supreme Court established that public officials and public
    figures claiming defamation must prove that the allegedly
    defamatory statement was made with “actual malice”—that
    is, “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
    disregard of whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times,
    
    376 U.S. at 280
    ; Curtis Publ’g Co., 
    388 U.S. at 134
    . The
    Court recognized that actual malice standard would bar some
    plaintiffs from recovering damages for erroneous and
    injurious statements. N.Y. Times, 
    376 U.S. at
    270–72.
    Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the law of defamation
    must provide a degree of “breathing space” to avoid chilling
    constitutionally valuable speech. 
    Id.
     at 271–72.
    Subsequently, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme
    Court identified two types of public figures: (1) all-purpose
    public figures, who occupy “positions of such persuasive
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                      13
    power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
    all purposes,” and (2) limited-purpose public figures, who
    achieve their status by “thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront
    of particular public controversies in order to influence the
    resolution of the issues involved.” 
    418 U.S. 323
    , 345 (1974).
    Both categories of public figures, the Court noted, “have
    assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
    society” and “invite[d] attention and comment.” 
    Id.
     All-
    purpose public figures must prove actual malice for virtually
    any subject of defamation. Limited-purpose public figures,
    who have assumed prominence on a limited range of issues,
    need only prove actual malice for speech touching upon those
    issues.
    The Court articulated two justifications for requiring
    public figures to show actual malice. The first was self-help.
    Public figures enjoy “greater access to the channels of
    effective communication” than private individuals and are
    therefore better able to “contradict the lie or correct the
    error.” 
    Id. at 344
    . The second and “[m]ore important”
    justification was the notion of assumption of risk. 
    Id.
     Public
    figures, who have thrust themselves into the public eye,
    “must accept certain necessary consequences” of that
    conduct, including “the risk of closer public scrutiny than
    might otherwise be the case.” 
    Id.
     at 344–45. The Gertz
    Court also emphasized the critical importance of “lay[ing]
    down broad rules of general application” in order to avoid
    “unpredictable results and uncertain expectations,” which
    might discourage freedom of expression. 
    Id.
     at 343–44;
    Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 
    491 U.S. 657
    ,
    686 (1989) (“Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional
    protection can only dissuade protected speech—the more
    elusive the standard, the less protection it affords.”).
    14                 PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    A
    In Makaeff v. Trump University, drawing from Gertz and
    other case law, we articulated a three-prong test to determine
    whether an individual or entity is a limited-purpose public
    figure:
    In undertaking this inquiry, we consider
    whether (i) a public controversy existed when
    the statements were made, (ii) whether the
    alleged defamation is related to the plaintiff’s
    participation in the controversy, and
    (iii) whether the plaintiff voluntarily injected
    itself into the controversy for the purpose of
    influencing the controversy’s ultimate
    resolution.
    Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 266 (citing Gilbert v. Sykes, 
    53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752
    , 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). In its decision
    below, applying Makaeff, the district court determined (i) that
    there was an existing public controversy with respect to
    Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen’s use of charitable funds;
    (ii) that the Reporters’ alleged defamation was related to this
    preexisting controversy; and (iii) that the voluntariness
    requirement was satisfied. We agree.
    1
    Under the first Makaeff prong, we consider whether “a
    public controversy existed when the [allegedly defamatory]
    statements were made.” Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 266 (citation
    omitted). Public interest or attention alone is not sufficient to
    create a public a controversy. Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
    
    424 U.S. 448
    , 454–55 (1976). A public controversy must be
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                     15
    “a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general
    public or some segment of it.” Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 267
    (quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 
    627 F.2d 1287
    ,
    1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Waldbaum, 
    627 F.2d at 1297
    (“If the issue was being debated publicly and if it had
    foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants,
    it was a public controversy.”).
    We have little difficulty in concluding that genuine public
    controversies existed at the time the Reporters published their
    statements about Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen. Long
    before the Reporters published any articles about Planet Aid,
    countless news outlets published articles questioning Planet
    Aid’s integrity and examining the extent to which its
    charitable funds were being used for their intended purposes.
    Planet Aid was repeatedly linked by the press to the founder
    of a Danish charity who was prosecuted for illegally diverting
    charitable funds. Additionally, Planet Aid raised over a
    $100 million in charitable funds. It received tax exemptions
    from the U.S. government to help the poor. This was a
    genuine public controversy; the extent to which Planet Aid’s
    funds were being used for their intended purposes has
    ramifications both for American taxpayers and for the
    advertised recipients of those charitable funds. See Makaeff,
    715 F.3d at 267; Waldbaum, 
    627 F.2d at 1297
    .
    Additionally, before CIR’s reporting on Lisbeth Thomsen,
    numerous articles had been published about DAPP Malawi’s
    use of charitable funds under Thomsen’s leadership. DAPP
    Malawi was linked by the press to the Danish criminal
    prosecution. Various articles questioned its integrity, the
    extent to which it was using its funds to aid the poor, and the
    extent to which it was channeling funds towards controversial
    organizations known for misusing charitable funds. Like
    16                 PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    Planet Aid, DAPP Malawi received donations and grants to
    aid impoverished communities in Malawi. This too was a
    genuine public controversy. See Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 267;
    Waldbaum, 
    627 F.2d at 1297
    .
    2
    Makaeff also asks us to consider “whether the plaintiff
    voluntarily injected itself into the controversy for the purpose
    of influencing the controversy’s ultimate resolution.”
    715 F.3d at 266. This voluntariness requirement has been
    interpreted broadly, both by Makaeff and by other courts.
    Voluntariness is not confined to those who seek to influence
    the resolution of a single issue. Rather, voluntariness can also
    be satisfied by a showing that a person or entity engaged in a
    course of conduct that foreseeably put themselves at risk of
    public scrutiny with respect to a limited range of issues.
    In Makaeff, we deemed Trump University a limited-
    purpose public figure for issues arising from its advertising
    efforts. Trump University had long been engaged in an
    “aggressive advertising campaign,” promoting its educational
    products and services on “social media, local and national
    newspaper, [and the] radio.” Id. at 268–69. After a
    disgruntled former customer disparaged Trump University
    and sued it for deceptive business practices, it filed a
    defamation counterclaim. Id. at 267. In classifying Trump
    University a limited-purpose public figure, we held that
    “large scale, aggressive advertising can inject a person or
    entity into a public controversy that arises from the subject of
    that advertising.” Id. at 267. Because Trump University’s
    “extensive advertising efforts ‘invited public attention,
    comment, and criticism,’” the voluntariness requirement was
    satisfied with respect to issues related to those advertising
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                     17
    efforts. Id. at 269 (quoting Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner,
    
    623 F.2d 264
    , 274 (3d Cir. 1980)).
    Other circuits have also interpreted the voluntariness
    requirement broadly. For example, the Third Circuit deemed
    an architect-engineer a limited-purpose public figure with
    respect to his participation in controversial public building
    projects. McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 
    769 F.2d 942
    , 944 (3d
    Cir. 1985). McDowell regularly contracted with the
    government of the Virgin Islands to build public projects. 
    Id. at 945
    . Subsequently, McDowell was criticized by the media
    for his performance on several projects and possible conflicts
    of interests involved in his being awarded various contracts.
    
    Id. at 948
    . The court designated McDowell a limited-purpose
    public figure for the purpose of his defamation claim. 
    Id. at 949
    . By repeatedly working on high-profile, controversial
    public building projects, the court explained, McDowell “can
    be considered to have voluntarily assumed a position that
    invited attention.” 
    Id. at 950
    . This was “sufficient to
    transform him into a public figure for the limited purpose of
    his work on publicly financed building projects.” 
    Id.
    The Fifth Circuit likewise deemed Louis Rosanova a
    limited-purpose public figure in the context of his connection
    to organized crime. Rosanova, 411 F. Supp. at 440, aff’d,
    580 F.2d at 862. Rosanova had longstanding relationships
    with various members of organized crime as well as with the
    Teamsters union and its president. Id. at 444. Rosanova filed
    a defamation suit after being characterized as a “California
    mobster” in a magazine article. The court classified
    Rosanova as a limited-purpose public figure, rejecting his
    argument that he had not thrust himself into the vortex of any
    single public issue. Id. at 445. By associating with organized
    crime, the court explained, “Rosanova voluntarily engaged in
    18                 PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    a course [of conduct] that was bound to invite attention and
    comment” with respect to those relationships. Id.; 580 F.2d
    at 862; see also Clyburn v. News World Commc’ns, Inc.,
    
    903 F.2d 29
    , 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that plaintiff,
    Clyburn, satisfied the voluntariness requirement in part by
    “hobnob[ing] with high officials”).
    Under this “course of conduct” approach to the
    voluntariness requirement reflected in McDowell, Rosanova,
    and the other cases identified above, it is quite clear both
    Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen actively engaged in conduct
    that invited public comment and attention. Planet Aid
    regularly engages with the press in an effort to cultivate a
    public image, including by issuing press releases, hosting
    galas, and publicizing itself to thousands of followers through
    social media. Additionally, Planet Aid aggressively solicits
    donations from the public. Nat’l Found. for Cancer Rsch.,
    Inc. v. Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, Inc., 
    705 F.2d 98
    , 101
    (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that a charity “thrust itself into the
    public eye” by soliciting donations from the public). It is
    clear from the record that Planet Aid “attempted, through
    various means at its disposal, to put itself and its methods
    before the public.” 
    Id. at 102
    ; see also Ampex Corp. v.
    Cargle, 
    27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863
    , 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t
    is sufficient that the plaintiff attempts to thrust him or herself
    into the public eye.”). Thus, by inviting public attention
    regarding its charitable activities and charitable funds, Planet
    Aid satisfied the voluntariness requirement for those limited
    purposes.
    Similarly, as the director of DAPP Malawi, Thomsen
    served as its spokesperson. She spoke at public gatherings to
    promote DAPP Malawi’s programs and initiatives, she spoke
    to the press to generate attention regarding its programs, and
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                            19
    she employed public relations staff to cultivate her public
    image. Like Planet Aid, DAPP Malawi also solicited
    donations and grants. By taking on the role of DAPP
    Malawi’s spokesperson and regularly engaging in public-
    facing and attention-generating activities, Thomsen invited
    public scrutiny, thereby satisfying the voluntariness
    requirement.
    Classifying Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen as limited-
    purpose public figures through a course of conduct that
    invites public attention is consistent with the rationales
    articulated in Gertz. By actively seeking attention from the
    press, promoting themselves through social media, employing
    public relations staff, and soliciting donations and grants,
    Planet Aid and Thomsen assumed a risk of public scrutiny.
    By regularly providing statements to the press, Planet Aid and
    Thomsen both demonstrate a greater access to channels of
    effective communication than private individuals, and
    therefore an ability to counteract false statements through
    self-help.3
    3
    Planet Aid and Thomsen, relying on Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
    
    443 U.S. 111
     (1979), seek to portray themselves as victims of the
    Reporters’ attempt to create a defense from defamation by turning the
    plaintiffs into public figures. There are two major distinguishing factors
    between Hutchinson and the present case. First, in Hutchinson, the
    plaintiff was a relatively obscure scientist prior to the allegedly
    defamatory statements. By contrast, in this present case, Planet Aid and
    Thomsen were the subject of significant public notoriety and scrutiny well
    before the allegedly defamatory publications. Second, unlike the plaintiff
    in Hutchinson, Planet Aid and Thomsen did not unwittingly become the
    subject of publicity with respect to its charitable activities and use of
    funds. To the contrary, they both actively thrust themselves into the
    public eye.
    20                    PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    3
    Finally, under Makaeff, we consider “whether the alleged
    defamation is related to the plaintiff’s participation in the
    controversy.” Id. at 266; see also Waldbaum, 
    627 F.2d at 1298
     (“Misstatements wholly unrelated to the controversy
    . . . do not receive the New York Times protection.”). Here,
    there was a preexisting public controversy about Planet Aid
    and Lisbeth Thomsen’s misuse of charitable funds generally.
    CIR subsequently reported on their misuse of a particular
    grant from the USDA. Moreover, Planet Aid and Lisbeth
    Thomsen invited public attention regarding their use of
    charitable funds through press releases, promotion of
    charitable programs, soliciting donations from the public, and
    other activities. Thus, the alleged defamation is related to
    Planet Aid and Thomsen’s participation in the controversy.4
    In sum, the district court correctly designated Planet Aid
    and Thomsen as limited-purpose public figures with respect
    to their use of charitable funds.
    4
    In an attempt to defeat the relatedness requirement, Planet Aid and
    Thomsen advocate for narrow definitions of the relevant public
    controversies under the first prong of Makaeff. They argue that the
    preexisting controversies concerned “the use of recycling bins for used
    clothing” and “charges brought against Peterson in Denmark.” They
    further argue that the Reporters’ defamatory publications concerned only
    “USDA funding” and, therefore, that the prior controversies and the
    defamation are unrelated. This argument is unpersuasive and unsupported
    by the law. The preexisting public controversy need not be narrowly
    defined or limited to the exact factual contours of the alleged defamation.
    The “narrow controversy” about Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen’s
    misuse of USDA funding is “a phase of another, broader” controversy
    about their practice of misusing of charitable funding generally. Jankovic
    v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 
    822 F.3d 576
    , 586 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also 
    id.
    (“Indeed, courts often define the public controversy in expansive terms.”).
    PLANET AID V. REVEAL                       21
    B
    Because Planet Aid and Thomsen are limited-purpose
    public figures, their defamation claim can survive an anti-
    SLAPP or summary judgment motion “only if the evidence
    in the record would permit a reasonable finder of fact, by
    clear and convincing evidence, to conclude that [the
    Reporters] published a defamatory statement with actual
    malice.” Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 
    501 U.S. 496
    , 508
    (1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255–256 (1986). Actual malice is a subjective test; it
    means that the Reporters must have published a statement
    with “knowledge that it was false” or “reckless disregard of
    whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times, 
    376 U.S. at 280
    .
    Reckless disregard, in turn, means that the Reporters “in fact
    entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the statement in
    question. St. Amant v. Thompson, 
    390 U.S. 727
    , 731 (1968).
    The district court undertook a thorough and detailed analysis
    of the actual malice assertions. The record supports the
    district court’s conclusion. Therefore, we agree with the
    district court that, for the reasons stated by the district court
    in its order, a reasonable fact finder could not find, by clear
    and convincing evidence, that the Reporters acted with actual
    malice.
    IV
    Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen are public figures for the
    limited purpose of the public controversy surrounding their
    use of charitable funds. The district court correctly concluded
    that a reasonable fact finder could not find, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that the Reporters acted with actual
    malice in publishing the allegedly defamatory statements.
    We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of the Reporters’
    22                PLANET AID V. REVEAL
    motion to strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP
    statute.
    AFFIRMED.