James Shilling v. Jackie Crawford , 377 F. App'x 702 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 28 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES SHILLING No. 08-16494
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. Nos. 2:05-CV-00889-PMP-
GWF
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JACKIE CRAWFORD, et al.
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Philip M. Pro, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 15, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, HUG and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Former Nevada prisoner James Shilling appeals from the district court’s
summary judgment of his action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”). We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
grant of summary judgment de novo. Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747,
749 (9th Cir. 2009). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law.
Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 562 (9th Cir. 2009). We may affirm on any
grounds supported by the record, id., and do so here.
As a threshold matter, it is well settled that in the First Amendment context,
[t]he determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice is more often
than not a difficult and delicate task,. . . the resolution of [which] is not to
turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in
question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
RLUIPA incorporates this principle, defining "religious exercise," to include "any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (emphasis added). "RLUIPA 'bars
inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is "central" to a prisoner's
religion.'" Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005)). The suggestion that
the prison was permitted to deny Shilling a kosher diet because it determined that
he was not a "legitimate" Orthodox Jew as a matter of the formal requirements of
2
Judaic law or would not be recognized as a true member of the religion by an
Orthodox Jewish congregation because his mother was not Jewish and he had not
formally converted is plainly inconsistent with RLUIPA. Because it is not our
place to question the sincerity of Shilling's religious beliefs, we credit the beliefs
he alleges as genuine.
Shilling brought claims for both injunctive and monetary relief for
defendants’ failure to provide him with a kosher diet at the High Desert State
Prison (“HDSP”) in Nevada. Because Shilling has since been transferred to a
Washington correctional facility with no prospect of returning to HDSP, any
claims for injunctive relief are moot. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519
(9th Cir. 1991).
Shilling’s claims for damages were brought against defendants in both their
official and individual capacities. State officials sued for damages in their official
capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Doe v. Lawrence
Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). Rather, suits against
them are no different than suits against the state itself, and the Eleventh
Amendment bars such suits. Id. Thus, the summary judgment on Shilling’s
§ 1983 claims against defendants in their official capacities was proper.
3
Summary judgment was also proper on Shilling’s RLUIPA claims against
defendants in their official capacities. RLUIPA does not unambiguously condition
receipt of funds under RLUIPA on a waiver of sovereign immunity for money
damages against the state, see Holley v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., No. 07-15552, slip op.
5215 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2010). Thus, Shilling cannot recover money damages on his
RLUIPA claim by suing defendants here in their official capacities.
This court has not yet decided whether money damages for RLUIPA claims
are available against state actors sued in their individual capacities. A number of
other circuits have answered that question in the negative. See, e.g., Nelson v.
Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 885-89 (7th Cir. 2009); Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182,
187-88 (4th Cir. 2009); Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 327-29 (5th Cir. 2009);
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2007). We need not settle that
question, however, because even assuming arguendo that such damages would
otherwise be available, the defendants in this case are entitled to qualified
immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The right must have been clearly established at the time of
4
defendant’s alleged misconduct, id. at 816, so that a reasonable official would have
understood that what he was doing under the circumstances of the case violated
that right, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). Qualified immunity protects
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
The conduct at issue here took place in 2003-2004. RLUIPA was enacted in
2000. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803. In pertinent part, it provides that
[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . .
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person--
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Major cases interpreting RLUIPA were not
decided until after the defendants proposed Shilling’s transfer to another
correctional facility that could more easily accommodate his request for a religious
diet than HDSP. See, e.g., Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005);
Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008); Shakur v. Schriro, 514
F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008). It was thus not clear in 2003-2004 that Shilling was
entitled to relief under RLUIPA. Accordingly, the district court correctly applied
qualified immunity to defendants on that account.
5
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar § 1983 claims against officials in
their personal capacities. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992).
However, in this case, qualified immunity was correctly applied to Shilling’s
§ 1983 claims because defendants could not reasonably have known that
transferring Shilling from one correctional facility to another to accommodate his
request for a kosher diet violated a clearly established First Amendment right. See,
e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005) (holding that in most cases
“the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to
more adverse conditions of confinement” because “[c]onfinement in any of the
State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the
conviction has authorized the State to impose”).
Because we hold that all defendants were entitled to summary judgment on
all of Shilling’s claims, we need not reach Shilling’s arguments regarding specific
defendants.
AFFIRMED.
6