United States v. Jose Arredondo , 379 F. App'x 567 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 14 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-30257
Plaintiff–Appellee, D.C. No. CR-08-02084-FVS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JOSE ALFREDO ARREDONDO,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of W ashington
Fred L. Van Sickle, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 6, 2010
Seattle, W ashington
Before: HAW KINS, LUCERO, ** and N.R. SM ITH, Circuit Judges.
Jose Alfredo Arredondo appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, Circuit Judge for the Tenth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
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we affirm.
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I
Shortly after midnight on July 18, 2008, a confidential informant
advised the Yakima, W ashington, Police Department that Magdalena
Duenas was planning to transport Arredondo, and that there were
outstanding arrest warrants for his arrest. She stated Duenas was going to
leave from a specific block in Yakima that evening, pick up Arredondo at a
specific convenience store in Toppenish, and return to Yakima. She further
informed police that Duenas would be driving a blue Cadillac sedan with a
license plate number “similar to” 097-W W T. This informant had
previously worked with the police, always providing reliable information.
After confirming that Arredondo had outstanding arrest warrants on
felony and misdemeanor charges, police found and followed the Cadillac
from the specified Yakima block to the specified convenience store. An
officer who knew Duenas by sight confirmed she was driving the car. The
officers did not observe anyone entering the car at the convenience store.
But ten to fifteen minutes later, the car traveled about one mile, where
police observed it parked on the street. Even though they saw the
passenger door open and close, the officers could not observe whether
anyone entered the car due to their distance from the car and darkness.
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After the Cadillac drove away, however, an officer promptly observed a
female in the driver’s seat and a male in the passenger’s seat. Police
eventually stopped the Cadillac and found Arredondo inside, along with a
nine-millimeter pistol.
Arredondo was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the firearm as
the fruit of an unlawful detention and to compel disclosure of the
informant’s identity. After the district court denied both motions,
Arredondo entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal
the district court’s preliminary rulings. He was sentenced to thirty-seven
months’ imprisonment.
II
The sole issue we must consider on appeal is whether police had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Arredondo was in the Cadillac. 1 W e
1
Arredondo also states that the district court erred in denying his
motion to compel disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity.
However, defendant failed to meaningfully develop this argument in his
opening brief. Thus, he has waived the issue. See Nat’l Ass’n for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043,
1049 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). Although the government’s answer brief and
Arredondo’s reply brief do partially develop the issue, these limited efforts
are insufficient to permit an informed resolution of the dispute. W e
therefore decline to exercise our discretionary authority to consider the
(continued...)
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review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence de novo
and the factual findings underlying that decision for clear error. United
States v. Kemmish, 120 F.3d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1997).
Police may stop a vehicle that they reasonably suspect carries an
individual with an outstanding felony arrest warrant. See United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985); United States v. Patch, 114 F.3d 131,
134 (9th Cir. 1997). Reasonable suspicion exists if “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968). W e look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
tip provides law enforcement with a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 2006). An
informant’s reliability is a significant factor in this analysis. Id. at 907-08.
W e conclude the tip did possess sufficient indicia of reliability to
justify the stop. W hen a tip contains predictive details that are (1) not
easily presaged and (2) later verified by law enforcement, the tip itself
“demonstrate[s] inside information— a special familiarity with [the] . . .
affairs” of the subject of the tip. Alabama v. W hite, 496 U.S. 325, 332
1
(...continued)
matter. See United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992).
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(1990). Officers are entitled to presume “that because an informant is
shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts
that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged
in criminal activity,” even if “not every detail mentioned by the tipster [is]
verified.” Id. at 331.
Among the wide range of details provided in this case, all but one of
the predictive details were verified. This myriad of confirmed, predictive
details is sufficient to demonstrate that the tipster had reliable inside
information regarding the affairs of Duenas and Arredondo. This is so
notwithstanding her minor error regarding the location of the pick up.
Consequently, the Terry stop was justified. 2
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
2
Because the tip provided reasonable suspicion, it is irrelevant that
officers did not visually identify the car’s passenger before the stop. Terry
merely requires a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on
specific, articulable facts. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
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