Joel Salz v. Standard Insurance Company , 380 F. App'x 723 ( 2010 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUN 01 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JOEL SALZ, No. 09-55224
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:06-CV-01821-GW-E
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY;
MTC MANUFACTURING LONG TERM
DISABILITY INSURANCE PLAN,
Defendant - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 4, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: B. FLETCHER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and WALTER, Senior District
Judge.**
In this ERISA action, Joel Salz appeals the district court’s judgment in favor
of the appellees, holding that defendant Standard Insurance Company
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Donald E. Walter, Senior United States District Judge
for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
(“Standard”), the plan administrator, did not abuse its discretion in denying
benefits under the Long-Term Disability Plan purchased by M.T.C. International,
L.L.C.
Although the district court’s decision was reached after this circuit issued
Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Insurance Co., 458 F.3d 955, 966-69 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) and after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008), it did not have the benefit of
Montour v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., 588 F.3d 623, 631-32 (9th
Cir. 2009). Montour made it clear that Abatie had “abrogated a line of cases” such
as Jordan v. Northrup Grumman Corp. Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869 (9th
Cir. 2004), which the district court relied on in its decision. 588 F.3d at 631.
We therefore reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to
apply the structural conflicts framework as elucidated in Montour. We note a
number of nonexhaustive facts and circumstances the court should consider on
remand.
First, Montour held that a proper administrative process will meaningfully
discuss a claimant’s award of social security benefits, id. at 635, but here Standard
mentioned the fact of Salz’s award without analyzing the distinctions between the
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basis for the two awards, see id. (citing Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 671 n.3
(6th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 2343).
Second, even if use of the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (1991) (“DOT”) is appropriate, Standard’s exclusive reliance
on the DOT failed to take into account Salz’s “Own Occupation.” While the policy
states that Standard “is not limited to looking at the way you perform your job for
your Employer” (emphasis added), a proper administrative review requires
Standard to analyze, in a reasoned and deliberative fashion, what the claimant
actually does before it determines what the “Material Duties” of a claimant’s
occupation are. See, e.g., Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381(3d Cir. 2003); Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 264 (4th
Cir. 2002); Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243 (2d Cir.
1999). Standard did not do so.
Finally, even if Standard’s exclusive reliance on the DOT had been proper,
the way in which Standard relied on it was unreasonable. Standard’s evaluation of
Salz’s job used the DOT’s “sedentary” classification, which specifies that
“[s]edentary work involves sitting most of the time.” Standard, however, also
accepted that Salz could not sit for a prolonged period of time in a fixed position,
such as sitting at a computer. Standard stated that Salz’s managerial occupation
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“would typically allow for maximum self regulated flexibility in position change,”
but we can locate nothing in the DOT (and no evidence in the administrative
record) to support this conclusory statement.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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