Allen Wiseley v. amazon.com, Inc. , 709 F. App'x 862 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SEP 19 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALLEN WISELEY, individually and on               No.   15-56799
    behalf of all others similarly situated,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               3:15-cv-00096-BAS-DHB
    and
    MEMORANDUM*
    ANDREA FAGERSTROM,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware
    Corporation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 30, 2017
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Before: W. FLETCHER and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and BARKER,** District
    Judge.
    Allen Wiseley appeals from the district court’s order granting Amazon’s
    motion to compel arbitration. We have jurisdiction under 
    9 U.S.C. § 16
    (a)(3).
    The Conditions of Use (COU) created a valid contract between Amazon and
    its customers, as Wiseley conceded. Applying California’s approach to
    determining the enforceability of the choice-of-law provision in the COU, see
    Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(b); Nedlloyd Lines, B.V. v.
    Superior Court, 
    3 Cal. 4th 459
    , 466 (1992), we conclude that Washington law
    applies here. Wiseley fails to explain how California’s consumer protection
    statutes are more protective than Washington’s consumer protection statutes;
    rather, Washington’s and California’s consumer protection laws and protections
    against unconscionable contracts appear to be substantially similar. See Davis v.
    O’Melveny & Myers, 
    485 F.3d 1066
    , 1079 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007), overruling on other
    grounds recognized by Ferguson v. Corinthian Coll., Inc., 
    733 F.3d 928
    , 937 (9th
    Cir. 2013); Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
    394 F.3d 1254
    , 1261 (9th Cir.
    2005). Therefore, applying Washington law is not contrary to a fundamental
    policy of California law. While California’s sliding-scale approach to
    **
    The Honorable Sarah Evans Barker, United States District Judge for
    the Southern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
    2
    unconscionability, see Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 
    62 Cal. 4th 1237
    , 1243–44
    (2016), might hypothetically invalidate some contracts that would be upheld under
    Washington’s single-prong approach, see Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters. Inc.,
    
    176 Wash. 2d 598
    , 603 (2013), the reverse is also true. Moreover, any distinction
    does not bear on this case, as we would reach the same result under California law.
    While the COU are adhesive in nature, adhesion is insufficient to support a
    finding of procedural unconscionability under Washington law, Zuver v. Airtouch
    Commc’ns, Inc., 
    153 Wash. 2d 293
    , 304 (2004), and creates only a minimal degree
    under California law. See Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 
    846 F.3d 1251
    , 1261–62
    (9th Cir. 2017); Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1245. No additional indicia of procedural
    unconscionability are present.
    The notices on Amazon’s checkout and account registration pages, which
    alerted Wiseley that clicking the corresponding action button constituted
    agreement to the hyperlinked COU, were in sufficient proximity to give him a
    “reasonable opportunity to understand” that he would be bound by additional
    terms. Zuver, 153 Wash. 2d at 304 (quoting Shroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 
    86 Wash. 2d 256
    , 260 (1975)). Wiseley conceded before the district court that there
    was sufficient notice to create a valid contract, and neither California nor
    Washington allows a party to escape contract obligations if it had actual or
    3
    constructive notice. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 
    763 F.3d 1171
    , 1176,
    1179 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying California law); W. Consultants, Inc. v. Davis, 
    177 Wash. App. 33
    , 41 (2013).
    There is no procedural unconscionability in the presentation of the
    arbitration clause itself, which appears in the same size font as the rest of the COU,
    with key terms bolded. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 
    61 Cal. 4th 899
    ,
    914 (2015) (explaining that any “obligation to highlight the arbitration clause of
    [the] contract . . . would be preempted by the [Federal Arbitration Act]”).
    Nor does the incorporation by reference of the American Arbitration
    Association’s (AAA) rules create procedural unconscionability. See Poublon, 846
    F.3d at 1262; Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1246; cf. Woodward v. Emeritus Corp., 
    192 Wash. App. 584
    , 593, 595, 607 (2016) (holding that a similar provision referencing
    the AAA rules “effectively incorporates the Rules by reference”). Although
    Wiseley argues that it was unclear which rules would apply, he had a “reasonable
    opportunity to understand,” see Zuver, 153 Wash. 2d at 304 (quoting Shroeder, 
    86 Wash. 2d at 260
    ), that the Consumer Arbitration Rules would apply in the context
    of his consumer purchases, and he could call the provided phone number to resolve
    any lingering uncertainty. While the AAA renamed the Supplementary Procedures
    for Consumer-Related Disputes in 2014, this does not render the reference
    4
    ambiguous or misleading in the version of the COU that applied when Wiseley
    made his purchases in 2012 and 2013.
    Wiseley’s three arguments for substantive unconscionability also lack
    merit.1 First, the unilateral modification clause does not render the arbitration
    provision substantively unconscionable because Amazon is limited by the implied
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 See Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 
    840 F.3d 1016
    , 1033 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying California law); cf. Rekhter v. Dep’t of Soc.
    & Health Servs., 
    180 Wash. 2d 102
    , 112–13 (2014) (holding that the duty of good
    faith limits a party’s unilateral discretion to determine a contract term).
    Second, the arbitration clause’s exemption of intellectual property claims for
    injunctive relief does not make the provision overly harsh or one-sided. Under
    Washington law, a provision that “gives [one party] alone the option of requiring
    arbitration” is not substantively unconscionable, so whether one party is more
    likely to bring such claims is immaterial. Satomi Owners Ass’n v. Satomi, LLC,
    
    167 Wash. 2d 781
    , 815–16 (2009). Even if Amazon is more likely to bring
    1
    Because Wiseley has shown only a minimal degree of procedural
    unconscionability under California law, a high degree of substantive
    unconscionability is required under the sliding-scale approach. See Poublon, 846
    F.3d at 1263.
    2
    Since the enforceability of provisions outside the arbitration clause is a
    question for the arbitrator, we address unilateral modification only as it applies to
    the arbitration clause. Tompkins, 840 F.3d at 1032.
    5
    intellectual property claims than its consumers, California law grants Amazon “an
    extra ‘margin of safety’ based on legitimate business needs.” See Tompkins, 840
    F.3d at 1031 (quoting Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1250).
    Finally, the attorneys’ fees provision does not create substantive
    unconscionability because it mirrors Washington’s statutory right to attorneys’ fees
    for frivolous claims. 
    Wash. Rev. Code § 4.84.185
    . To the extent the provision is
    unilateral, Washington law automatically converts it to a bilateral provision that
    would afford Wiseley the same right. See 
    id.
     § 4.84.330; McKee v. AT & T Corp.,
    
    164 Wash. 2d 372
    , 400 (2008). The fees provision also complies with California
    law, which permits Amazon to seek fees as a sanction for frivolous claims. See
    Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1268. Further, Wiseley has not shown that the overall
    arbitration fee scheme “would be unaffordable or would have a substantial
    deterrent effect in [his] case.” Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th at 920 (2015).
    AFFIRMED.
    6