Victoria Kaldawi v. State , 709 F. App'x 452 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 26 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VICTORIA ELIA KALDAWI, No. 17-55389
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-07316-JAK-JPR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
THE STATE OF KUWAIT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Victoria Elia Kaldawi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her claims against the sovereign defendants for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and denying her motion to enter default judgment and dismissing her
claims against the individual defendants We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d
302, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1997), and determinations as to personal jurisdiction, Love v.
Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 608 (9th Cir. 2010). We may affirm
on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59
(9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Kaldawi’s claims against the sovereign
defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Kaldawi failed to
establish an exception to the sovereign defendants’ immunity under the FSIA. See
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)
(statutory exceptions to FSIA provide sole basis for jurisdiction over a foreign
state); see also In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When entry of
judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a
district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the
subject matter and the parties.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Kaldawi’s motion to enter default against these defendants for the same
reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (“No judgment by default shall be entered by a
court of the United States . . . against a foreign state . . . unless the claimant
establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.”);
Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (standard of review).
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Dismissal of Kaldawi’s claims against Al-Fahed, Al-Suheil and Al-Fares for
lack of personal jurisdiction was proper because Kaldawi did not establish that
these defendants had “certain minimum contacts” with California “such that the
maintenance of the suit d[id] not offend the traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Love, 611 F.3d at 609 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaldawi’s
motion to enter default judgment against these defendants for the same reason. See
Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712 (it is proper to avoid entry of default judgment if there is no
personal jurisdiction over a defendant); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th
Cir. 1986) (standard of review).
Kaldawi’s motion to expedite case and ruling (Docket Entry No. 17) is
denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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