United States v. Graner , 69 M.J. 104 ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Charles A. Graner Jr., Specialist
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 09-0432
Crim. App. No. 20050054
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued May 3, 2010
Decided June 25, 2010
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ERDMANN
and RYAN, JJ., joined. EFFRON, C.J., filed a separate opinion
concurring in part and in the result. BAKER, J., filed a
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Counsel
For Appellant: Charles W. Gittins, Esq. (argued); Captain
Michael E. Korte (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Chad M. Fisher (argued); Colonel Norman
F. J. Allen III, Lieutenant Colonel Martha L. Foss, and Major
Sara M. Root (on brief); Captain Philip M. Staten.
Military Judge: James L. Pohl
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review in this Abu Ghraib case to determine
whether the military judge abused his discretion in (1) refusing
to compel the Government to produce certain memoranda requested
by the defense; (2) excluding the testimony of, and an e-mail
from, Major Ponce; and (3) limiting the testimony of a defense
expert witness. We hold that the military judge did not abuse
his discretion in any of these decisions and affirm the judgment
of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA).1
I.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of two
specifications of conspiring to commit maltreatment, one
specification of dereliction of duty for failing to protect
detainees under his charge from abuse, four specifications of
maltreating detainees, assault with a means likely to produce
death or grievous bodily harm, assault consummated by battery,
and committing an indecent act, in violation of Articles 81, 92,
1
Appellant and the Government have also submitted three
outstanding motions related to this case. “The Court will
normally not consider any facts outside of the record
established at the trial and the Court of Criminal Appeals.”
C.A.A.F. R. 30A(a). While we may remand for further factfinding
if an issue concerning an unresolved fact affects the Court’s
resolution of the case, C.A.A.F. R. 30A(c), none of the
documents that either party seeks to submit into the record are
necessary to resolve the issues of this case. As such, all
three motions are denied.
2
United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
93, 128, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. §§ 881, 892, 893, 928, 934 (2000). The panel sentenced
Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for ten
years, reduction to E-1, and forfeiture of all pay and
allowances. The convening authority approved the findings and
sentence. The CCA summarily affirmed. United States v. Graner,
No. 20050054 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2009).
II.
On November 7, 2003, Appellant exploited his position as a
military policeman at Abu Ghraib, an American-operated detainee
facility in Iraq, in order to abuse and demean Iraqi detainees.
Appellant’s actions that day included: ripping the pants off a
detainee and having Specialist Sabrina Harman write “I’m a
rapeist [sic]” on the detainee’s leg, then punching the detainee
in the temple so hard that the detainee was knocked unconscious;
posing in a picture with a detainee where Appellant held the
detainee’s head in his hands while Appellant’s other hand was
cocked in a fist near the detainee’s head, even though
photography was prohibited at that section of the facility;
helping to force the unwilling detainees into a naked human
pyramid and then posing for a picture with the pyramid of naked
Iraqi detainees; taking a picture of a detainee being forced to
masturbate while Private First Class (PFC) Lynndie England
smiled, pointed at the detainee’s genitals, and gave a “thumbs-
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up” sign; placing a detainee in a position so that the
detainee’s face was directly in front of the genitals of another
detainee to simulate fellatio, and then photographing them; and
wrapping a tether around a detainee’s neck, handing the tether
to PFC England, and then taking a picture of PFC England and the
tethered detainee.
The defense theory of the case was that Appellant was
complying with a general command climate of humiliating
detainees in the belief that humiliation would make them more
likely to reveal information of intelligence value, and that
individual military policemen had wide discretion in
implementing this agenda. Several defense witnesses testified
that the detainees were routinely naked, that their sleep was
regulated and disturbed, that their food was limited, and that
their hands were sometimes handcuffed to cell doors. Defense
witnesses also testified that they had received vague orders to
soften up detainees, that intelligence personnel did not care
what was done to detainees, and that intelligence personnel
supported more aggressive use of force on detainees.
III.
A.
On June 12, 2004, the defense requested that the Government
provide
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a copy of the Department of Defense report detailing
the legal obligations of the United States government
to refrain from using torture as an interrogation
technique and the legal liabilities of government
agents who do use such methods. This report was
produced on or about 6 March 2003 by a DoD working
group. . . . This report would be relevant to the
defense’s case because the report constitutes some
evidence of the duties owed to a detainee (viz. in the
context of a dereliction of duty charge) by a
government agent and of whether these duties change if
the agent is ordered to engage in conduct that
constitutes maltreatment.
Emphasis deleted.
The Government denied the request, asserting that the DoD
report was not relevant because Appellant’s actions were not in
furtherance of an official interrogation.
At a session of the trial held pursuant to Article 39(a),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (2006), the defense renewed its request
for the DoD report. The military judge declined to compel
release of the report because the defense had not demonstrated
relevance, but the military judge invited a future motion if
relevance could be established at trial.
Later in the same Article 39(a) session, the defense
revisited the memo issue. At this point, the defense counsel
conflated the DoD report with other memoranda that were not
previously mentioned:
Just a minute ago, we were talking about a memo from
the Department of Justice, from various Staff Judge
Advocates and General Counsel to the President of the
United States, to the CIA and other government
agencies, to the Secretary of Defense. We understand
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United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
there were memos given, perhaps, to Lieutenant General
Sanchez and to other officials within the direct chain
of command of Specialist Graner pertaining to the
legal status or not of detainees during the war on
terrorism.
There was then a lengthy colloquy between the military
judge and defense counsel in which the defense proposed several
broad theories on why the memos were needed: (1) that the memos
established that the detainees were not protected by any of the
laws of war, and therefore Appellant could not possibly maltreat
them; (2) that Appellant lacked the state of mind necessary to
maltreat because he thought he was just following orders; and
(3) that there was unlawful command influence in general. The
military judge again rejected the request because Appellant had
not formulated a sufficient theory of relevance but again
invited the defense to resubmit the discovery request once
relevance had been established. The defense did not submit
another request for the DoD report or any other memos during the
remainder of the trial.
The Government claims that the DoD report was publicly
released on the DoD website one day after the Article 39(a)
hearing.2
2
The Government has moved to submit an affidavit stating that
the assistant trial counsel disclosed the DoD report, as well as
other documents, to the defense. As noted earlier, this Court
has denied the motion to submit this affidavit.
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B.
Appellant argues that the military judge abused his
discretion by not compelling the Government to submit the
various memoranda because they would have supported the defense
theory that senior government officials had authorized the sort
of detainee treatment that Appellant engaged in.
We review a military judge’s ruling on a request for the
production of evidence under the strict standard of an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 239, 246
(C.A.A.F. 2004). “A military judge abuses his discretion when
his findings of fact are clearly erroneous, the court’s decision
is influenced by an erroneous view of the law, or the military
judge’s decision on the issue at hand is outside the range of
choices reasonably arising from the applicable facts and the
law.” United States v. Miller, 66 M.J. 306, 307 (C.A.A.F.
2008); see United States v. Travers, 25 M.J. 61, 62 (C.M.A.
1987).
“The trial counsel, the defense counsel, and the court-
martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain . . . evidence in
accordance with such regulations as the President may
prescribe.” Article 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The
government’s suppression of evidence is a statutory violation if
it violates the President’s discovery rules, promulgated under
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United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
Article 46, UCMJ, which appear in Rules for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 701-703.
Three of these rules are potentially applicable to
Appellant’s discovery request:
(1) Each party is entitled to the production of evidence
which is relevant and necessary. R.C.M. 703(f).
(2) Upon the request of the defense, the government must
produce any documents that are in the possession of military
authorities and are “material to the preparation of the defense
or are intended for use by the trial counsel as evidence in the
prosecution case-in-chief at trial.” R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(A).
(3) The trial counsel must disclose to the defense
the existence of evidence known to the trial counsel which
reasonably tends to:
(A) Negate the guilt of the accused of an
offense charged;
(B) Reduce the degree of guilt of the accused of
an offense charged; or
(C) Reduce the punishment.
R.C.M. 701(a)(6).
Of course, these rules are themselves grounded on the
fundamental concept of relevance. As Professor Wigmore put it
over a century ago: “None but facts having rational probative
value are admissible.” 1 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials
at Common Law 655 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983). For us, the
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United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
standard is set out in Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 401:
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.”
Applying this standard, we conclude that the military judge
did not abuse his discretion in determining that the defense did
not present an adequate theory of relevance to justify the
compelled production of the DoD report, the only piece of
evidence identified with specificity in the defense request.
None of the theories enunciated at the Article 39(a)
session by Appellant established the relevance of the request.
There was no evidence that Appellant’s state of mind at Abu
Ghraib was in any way affected by a DoD report that he had never
seen. Appellant’s affirmative duty to protect the detainees
under his charge from abuse was not affected by any views on the
international legal status of Iraqi detainees set out in the
report. Abuse of detainees in the custody or control of the
United States may form the basis of a maltreatment conviction.
See United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316, 323 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
Finally, Appellant failed to present any “facts which, if true,
constitute unlawful command influence.” United States v.
Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
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United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
The military judge also did not abuse his discretion in
declining to order the production of the various other documents
that Appellant maintains on appeal that he requested. R.C.M.
703(f)(3) requires that any request for the production of
evidence shall list each piece of evidence and a description of
each item “sufficient to show its relevance and necessity, a
statement where it can be obtained, and, if known, the name,
address, and telephone number of the custodian of the evidence.”
The defense failed to meet this burden with respect to any
document encompassed by this issue other than the DoD report.
IV.
A.
Major William Ponce was a mid-level military intelligence
officer who had been assigned to both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Major Ponce wrote an e-mail on August 14, 2003, to several
people in which he stated that he favored the more forceful
treatment of detainees during interrogation. Abu Ghraib did not
yet exist as an interrogation center when the e-mail was sent,
but several of its recipients may have occupied positions at Abu
Ghraib. There is no evidence that Appellant or any of his
coconspirators ever knew about this e-mail. Appellant moved for
its admission prior to trial on the basis that it may have
affected the orders that issued from military intelligence
teams. The Government objected on the basis that it was
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United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
irrelevant, was hearsay, and lacked foundation. The military
judge sustained the Government’s objection because the e-mail
was not relevant. Later, there was a renewed discussion about
Major Ponce’s e-mail. The military judge again denied the
admission of the e-mail because it was too far removed in time
and space from Appellant’s activities at Abu Ghraib.
Appellant also wanted to call Major Ponce to testify before
the court members to establish when military intelligence
officers generally became more forceful in their treatment of
detainees. The military judge initially agreed to allow Major
Ponce to testify about the “conditions for actionable
intelligence and its impression on the [military intelligence]
community in the September time-frame and the October time-
frame.” But the military judge changed his mind after the
defense moved to introduce the testimony of Roderick Brokaw, a
retired military interrogator with the Army who had worked as an
interrogator at Abu Ghraib, because the military judge reasoned
that Mr. Brokaw had a strong connection with Abu Ghraib, while
Major Ponce’s connection was tenuous at best. Mr. Brokaw was
permitted to testify “as to pressure from higher echelons to
produce actionable intelligence.”
Later, the defense again argued that Major Ponce should be
able to testify in order to show “the frustration that higher
command was feeling” about being unable to acquire intelligence
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United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
within the existing interrogation parameters, but the military
judge did not allow his testimony because it was unclear who
received Major Ponce’s e-mail or what impact it had on the
interrogators at Abu Ghraib.
B.
Appellant argues that the military judge abused his
discretion when he declined to admit Major Ponce’s e-mail or
allow Major Ponce to testify, purportedly because Major Ponce
would have helped establish the defense theory that his
superiors authorized the rough treatment of detainees.
We review a military judge’s decision on whether to admit
evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Weston,
67 M.J. 390, 392 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
The military judge did not abuse his discretion when he
declined to admit Major Ponce’s e-mail and testimony. There was
no evidence that Appellant, or anyone giving orders to
Appellant, knew about Major Ponce’s e-mail, or had any contact
with Major Ponce. Appellant was still able to present direct
evidence that he and his coconspirators believed that they were
supposed to soften up the detainees. Given the total lack of
evidence connecting Major Ponce’s opinions with Appellant’s
conduct, neither Major Ponce’s e-mail nor his expected testimony
had a tendency to show that any fact of consequence to the
court-martial was more or less probable.
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V.
A.
Thomas Archambault, a non-military training instructor and
use-of-force specialist, testified for the defense as an expert
on the use of force. At a pretrial Article 39(a) hearing, Mr.
Archambault testified that use of the leash on detainees and the
naked pyramids were reasonable uses of force. With respect to
the tether, he stated that the use of the tether around the neck
of the detainee was a reasonable means of cell extraction under
the facts of this case. While Mr. Archambault said that the
tether should not have been used around the neck as it was, he
reasoned that the tether may have accidentally slipped from the
upper torso to the neck. Mr. Archambault testified that the
fact that pictures were taken of the leash incident did not
render the tether incident unreasonable because the photographer
could quickly have come to the other guard’s aid in the event
that the detainee became violent.
With respect to the naked pyramids, Mr. Archambault
testified that this sort of “stacking” could be an appropriate
use of force, even if it was neither authorized nor approved by
any professional organization or training manual, as a means of
controlling and containing unrestrained detainees. Here, Mr.
Archambault reasoned, the detainees were not in restraints, they
were shouting to each other in Arabic, and the detainees were
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all in a small space with limited guards. Mr. Archambault also
testified that the form of stacking here prevented “positional
asphyxia,” a dangerous medical condition where a person has
trouble breathing as a result of pressure on the diaphragm. Mr.
Archambault conceded that he was aware of only one incident of
stacking humans and that occurred at Attica Prison, a civilian
facility in the United States, by guards taking back the
facility from rioting, unrestrained inmates.
The military judge ultimately limited Mr. Archambault’s
testimony to the point that the detainees would not have
suffered from positional asphyxiation because of the manner in
which they were stacked. The military judge refused to allow
Mr. Archambault to testify concerning the appropriateness of the
leash (or tether) around the neck and stacking techniques. The
military judge concluded that such testimony was irrelevant and
not helpful to the court members. Mr. Archambault knew of no
authority for either technique, and the stacking at Attica had
occurred under very different circumstances.
B.
Appellant argues that Mr. Archambault’s testimony was
improperly restricted because Appellant was denied his most
effective rebuttal to the tether and pyramid incidents.
An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
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United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.” M.R.E. 702. “The military judge has
broad discretion as the ‘gatekeeper’ to determine whether the
party offering expert testimony has established an adequate
foundation with respect to reliability and relevance.” United
States v. Green, 55 M.J. 76, 80 (C.A.A.F. 2001), quoted in
United States v. Allison, 63 M.J. 365, 369 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
We find that the military judge did not abuse his
discretion when he limited Mr. Archambault’s testimony to
positional asphyxia. The military judge properly determined
that Mr. Archambault had an insufficient basis to conclude that
the naked human pyramid and the tether around the neck were
reasonable uses of force.
VI.
The judgment of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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EFFRON, Chief Judge (concurring in part and in the result):
I concur in the result with respect to Issue I. I concur
with the opinion with respect to Issue II.
Issue I, as granted, states:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED TO THE
SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF THE ACCUSED BY FAILING
TO ORDER DISCLOSURE OF MEMOS THAT SET OUT
APPROVED “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TACTICS” FOR
HANDLING DETAINEES IN UNITED STATES CUSTODY.
The threshold question with respect to prejudice is whether
the Government provided the defense with timely disclosure of
the requested material. As reflected in the following
chronology, the Government provided timely pretrial disclosure
of the 2003 Department of Defense Working Group Report on
Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism
[hereinafter 2003 DoD Report], the primary document at issue in
the present appeal.
On June 12, 2004, Appellant submitted a pretrial discovery
request for the Government to provide a copy of the 2003 DoD
Report “detailing the legal obligations of the United States
government to refrain from using torture as an interrogation
technique and the legal liabilities of government agents who do
use such methods.” At that point, the Government denied the
request. On June 21, 2004, defense counsel asked the military
judge to order production of the 2003 DoD Report. The military
judge denied the motion on the ground that the defense “[a]t
United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
this time” had not made a sufficient connection to the issues in
the trial. The military judge emphasized repeatedly that his
ruling was based on what the defense had “proffered so far,” and
he advised the defense: “You are free to renew your request
upon a showing of greater relevance than what you’ve shown so
far.”
According to an unrebutted affidavit submitted by the
Government during the present appeal, the assistant trial
counsel provided the defense counsel with the requested 2003 DoD
Report on July 22, 2004 -- a point in time more than five months
before the beginning of trial on the merits. The Government’s
filing directly refutes Appellant’s claim that the document was
not provided to the defense “prior to, during, or after trial.”
See Brief of Appellant at 5, United States v. Graner, __ M.J. __
(C.A.A.F. 2010) (No. 09-0432).
Under these circumstances, there was no prejudice,
irrespective of the sufficiency of the defense motion or the
validity of the military judge’s ruling on the motion.
Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the approach to Issue
I in the majority opinion, which rejects the Government’s filing
and proceeds on the assumption that the Government withheld the
document. Graner, __ M.J. at __ (2 n.1, 6 n.2).
Similar considerations apply with respect to the other
documents pertinent to Issue I. Although I disagree with the
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United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
decision to reject the defense motion to file these documents on
appeal, id., the result is the same because the documents at
issue do not establish material prejudice to the substantial
rights of Appellant. The 2003 DoD Report, which was provided to
the defense at trial, referred to, and relied upon, the 2003
Department of Justice Memorandum. As such, the Department of
Justice document was identified with sufficient particularity to
alert the defense of its existence at the time of trial, but the
defense did not submit a request for production of that document
at trial. Moreover, the 2003 Department of Justice Memorandum,
and the other reports identified on appeal by the defense, did
not contain information that differed in material respects from
the information in the 2003 DoD Report that was provided to the
defense during trial. The defense did not introduce information
from the 2003 DoD Report at trial. Appellant has not
established that the information in the other documents would
have been more useful to the defense at trial than the
information provided to the defense in the 2003 DoD Report.
Under these circumstances, any error by the military judge with
respect to discovery of these documents did not prejudice the
rights of Appellant. See Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
859(a) (2006).
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BAKER, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion with
regard to Appellant’s motion to compel discovery of the
Department of Defense (DoD) report. This report was
specifically requested, was made part of the record, and was not
relevant to Appellant’s defense, for the reasons stated in the
majority opinion. I also agree with the Court’s resolution of
the issues pertaining to Major Ponce and Mr. Archambault.
However, I do not agree with the majority’s treatment of the
issue of discovery of the various other memoranda, and
therefore, dissent from that portion of the opinion and note 1
for the reasons that follow.
Appellant raised and this Court granted the issue
challenging the military judge’s refusal or failure to order
discovery of a variety of official government memoranda said to
pertain to the handling of detainees.1 He has moved to attach
these memoranda to the appellate record.2 Unfortunately, the
1
Issue I:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL
PREJUDICE OF THE ACCUSED BY FAILING TO ORDER
DISCLOSURE OF MEMOS THAT SET OUT APPROVED “ENHANCED
INTERROGATION TACTICS” FOR HANDLING DETAINEES IN
UNITED STATES CUSTODY.
2
Among other things, the motion to attach included the
following:
United States v. Graner, No. 09-0432/AR
majority, in a footnote, denies this motion in a perfunctory
manner by stating that the documents are not “necessary” and
without explaining how it can reach this conclusion without
reviewing the documents. I would have granted the motion to
attach. Alternatively, if a majority of this Court concluded
that it was beyond our authority to attach such documents to the
record, a remand to the CCA or an order for a DuBay3 hearing
would have been in order -- or any alternative mechanism,
including judicial notice, which could allow for consideration
of the documents.4 In this way, we might have addressed head-on
Appellant’s allegations that he was operating in a command
climate, if he was not following specific instructions, that
condoned and tolerated detainee abuse. Given the Court’s
(a) Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of
Justice, on Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful
Combatants Held Outside the United States to William
J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Defense
(Mar. 14, 2003).
(b) Major General Geoffrey Miller, Annex 20: Assessment
of DoD Counterterrorism Interrogation and Detention
Operations in Iraq (U), Taguba Report with Annexes
(AR 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police
Brigade), available at
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/detainees/taguba).
(c) Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y, Dep’t of
Defense, on Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War
on Terrorism to the Commander, U.S. Southern Command
(Apr. 16, 2003).
3
United States v. DuBay, 17 C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (C.M.A.
1967).
4
C.A.A.F. R. 30A(b).
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refusal to directly address this claim, Appellant is left to
allege that he was singled out for prosecution and did not
receive a fair trial, writ large. Further, addressing the claim
directly would afford Appellant, and the public, the knowledge
that his claim, meritorious or not, was addressed in detail by a
federal civilian court.
Instead, Appellant’s specific and broader claims have been
dismissed with a perfunctory wave of the judicial pen. True, at
the time of trial, Appellant did not describe the memos in
question with specificity, or directly link those memos to his
conduct. However, the majority does not explain why, how, or
if, Appellant’s counsel could have identified these memos with
sufficient specificity in order to now support a relevance claim
on appeal. Neither does the majority indicate whether the memos
were classified at the time of trial. More importantly, absent
review of the memos, Appellant and the larger audience are left
to wonder whether the memos are in some manner relevant to
Appellant’s broader (and more amorphous) argument regarding
command climate.
Of course, these documents can now be described with
particularity and are publicly available. We know what they
say, and can address Appellant’s relevance arguments in detail.
Instead, Appellant and the larger audience, including the
public, the military community, and the victims of Appellant’s
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abuse are left to review the memos on their own and reach their
own determinations as to whether or not they were relevant, and
in what manner, without benefit of a full judicial vetting and
application of legal principles. The interests of justice and
the military justice system would be better served were the
documents attached to the record and subject to judicial review.
4