Michael Moe v. Nncc , 670 F. App'x 554 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 4 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL JOHN MOE, No. 15-16513
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00689-RCJ-VPC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NORTHERN NEVADA
CORRECTIONAL CENTER; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Michael John Moe appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal for failure to state a
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We may affirm on any ground supported by the
record. Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
Dismissal of Moe’s action as Heck-barred was proper because Moe has not
demonstrated that the results of the disciplinary hearing, including the loss of
good-time credits, have been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,
648 (1997) (claim for monetary and declaratory relief based on allegations that
necessarily imply the invalidity of the loss of good-time credits is not cognizable
under § 1983); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (if “a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”). Because the district
court did not specify whether the dismissal of Moe’s action was with or without
prejudice, we treat the dismissal as being without prejudice. See Trimble v. City of
Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissals under Heck are without
prejudice).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Moe’s complaint
without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that “a district court may dismiss without leave
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where . . . amendment would be futile”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moe’s motion for
relief from judgment. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,
5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and listing
grounds warranting relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moe’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Moe failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and exceptional circumstances requirement for
appointment of counsel).
Moe’s contention that the district court judge was biased against him is
unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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